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 Introduction 
 Robert  Knight 
 1 The Return of the Tribes 
 The abruptness with which the Cold War ended was reinforced by a 
sense that an unexpected switch had taken place: the familiar ideo-
logical players had been taken off the pitch and substituted by ethnic 
or national ones. The political philosopher Michael Walzer encapsu-
lated this in his dramatic announcement, three years after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, that  ‘ the tribes have returned ’ . 1 The tribes brought 
with them a host of thorny, even insoluble problems: those discussed 
by Walzer included the reconciliation of collective rights with indi-
vidual freedom and the establishment of criteria for the right of seces-
sion.  ‘ Ethnic politics ’ can be understood as the political mobilization 
around this kind of issue. It may be instigated or encouraged by a 
range of actors: states, lobbies or  ‘ ethnic entrepreneurs ’ . 2 What they 
have in common is the expression of grievances and entitlements  – 
real, imagined or exaggerated  – which assume the central importance 
of a collective identity based on common descent and shared culture. 
The remedy for the perceived injustice may be sought in a change in 
the internal constitution of a country or, in the extreme case the revi-
sion of state boundaries. It may be aggressive and expansionist but it 
often sees itself as a purely defensive resistance to the threat of assimi-
lation, whether from ethnic competitors or the state. 3 
 This collection seeks to illuminate the relationship between this 
kind of politics at a time when it appeared to have been consigned to 
the dustbin of history by the confrontation between capitalism (or 
liberal democracy) and Soviet communism (or Marxist-Leninism). 
Its aim is to contribute to the debate stimulated by its unpredicted 
end. As Gordon Johnson has written, this  ‘ rendered provisional all 
previous accounts of its dynamics, signifi cance and scope; interim 
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judgments were subject to confi rmation and revision as well as new 
questions, new evidence and new approaches. ’ 4 
 A fi rst step towards this debate is to note that post-Cold War discus-
sions have implied rather diverse, even contradictory, understand-
ings of the relationship between ethnic politics and the Cold War. 
Sometimes, ethnic nationalism appears as an irresistible elemental 
force which rose from the deep to destroy the multi-national polities 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (and perhaps the bi-national 
Czechoslovakia); elsewhere it was the ineptness of communist regimes 
in managing ethnic confl ict which was highlighted as the root of the 
problem: in the case of Yugoslavia (Slobodan Milo š ovi ć in Serbia, and 
Fran Tudjman in Croatia) and Ceau ş ecu ’ s Rumania, it had been used 
by failing communist despots as a last ploy to shore up their position 
and survive the transition to post-communist rule. 5 Some saw the 
issue as a Balkan or Yugoslav pathology refl ecting the region ’ s  ‘ ancient 
hatreds ’ (as in Robert Kaplan much criticized book). 6 John 
Mearsheimer, the leading proponent of the International Relations 
 ‘ defensive realist ’ school, gave a passing nod to this interpretation 
when he predicted that the  ‘ return to the future ’ which now beck-
oned would mean that  ‘ the longstanding blood feuds among the 
nationalities in Eastern Europe are likely to re-emerge in a multi-
polar Europe ’ . His wider argument was that the end of communism 
meant the replacement by the stable bipolarity of the Cold War with 
a dangerously unpredictable multi-polar Europe. 7 Some historians 
saw the acute danger of a return to the vulnerable fragmented diplo-
matic system of pre-war Europe. 8 Michael Ignatieff argued no less 
pessimistically that in both East and West the constraints on ethnic 
hatred had been removed in both West (USA and Northern Ireland) 
and Eastern Europe. The departure of  ‘ the imperial police ’ and a 
collapse of nation state structures had left  ‘ hundreds of ethnic groups 
at the mercy of each other. ’ 9 Last but not least Norman Naimark 
interpreted twentieth century history as a spreading bush fi res of eth-
nic hatred, which a feeble international community had failed to 
extinguish. 10 
 On the other hand some sociologists saw the arrival of ethnic poli-
tics and confl ict in central Europe and the former Soviet Union as a 
reversion to normality, compared to which the Cold War  – if it 
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 featured at all  – seemed little more than an anomalous blip on the 
radar screen. Milton Esman, for example, saw the end of the Cold 
War as confi rming that ethnic politics was  ‘ today ’ s most pervasive and 
dangerous expression of organised confl ict. ’ 11 For Anthony Smith 
ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe was part of a wider revolt 
against state intervention and cultural homogenization,  ‘ a new phase 
of the whole process of demotic vernacular mobilisation that has 
been sweeping various parts of the world since the eighteenth cen-
tury and possibly earlier. ’ Unlike most observers he found nothing 
particularly surprising about the recent turn of events. 12 
 Two decades later some of the gloom of the 1990s has lifted. The 
direst of the early predictions have not materialized; Europe has not 
descended into a bloody free-for-all of ethnic hatred 13 and even the 
bloody collapse of Yugoslavia can now, at the risk of complacency, 
be seen less as a portent than as the terrible exception that proves the 
rule of stabilization. In this, the intervention of international actors 
(OSCE, EU) have clearly played a major  – albeit contested  – role. 14 
But the destructive potential of ethnic politics is clearly far from 
exhausted; extreme right-wing or populist parties throughout Europe 
continue to mobilize resentment against minorities, refugees and asy-
lum seekers. In doing so, they frequently appeal to and foster emo-
tions of ethnic vulnerability. 
 Equally important here, the centrality of ethnic nationalism in the 
collapse of communism has been revised. While it is clear that separatist 
movements in the Baltic States, Ukraine, Georgia and elsewhere played 
an important role at several points in the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and in weakening the legitimacy of communist regimes throughout 
Eastern Europe it is widely accepted that they formed only one link  – and 
not necessarily the strongest  – in a complex causal chain of ecownomic 
breakdown, loss of legitimacy and ebbing elite self-confi dence. Further-
more, the understanding of contingent factors such as the diffusion of 
unrest from Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union (and back) and human 
agency, and above all the role of Michael Gorbachev have undermined 
the portrayal of ethnic nationalism as an irresistible force. 15 
 At the same time, moving to the historical questions that are behind 
this book, the way ethnicity and ethnic politics functioned and was 
experienced during the Cold War itself remains open to debate. The 
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current consensus is that it was a peripheral phenomenon, subordi-
nated to the dictates of  ‘ high politics ’ but many questions still remain 
about how ethnic loyalties, resentments and hatreds were actually 
controlled or  ‘ managed ’ . 
 A considerable body of literature suggests that ethno-nationalist 
appeals never ceased to be important for Eastern Europe regimes. As 
long ago as 1973, Robert King pointed out that behind the rhetoric of 
unity and internationalism long-standing points of friction at the bor-
ders continued between communist states. Since Stalin ’ s death it had 
increased as regimes sought to shore up their popularity by appeals to 
 ‘ Staatsvolk nationalism ’ . 17 Katherine Verdery has shown how economic 
failure in Romania brought a  ‘ scarcity regime ’ which forced the ruling 
Communist Party to shift its legitimation to the traditional nationalist 
terrain of the interwar period. 18 This was often accompanied by a 
weakening of the control from the centre as regional identities, which 
had previously been  ‘ ignored or battered ’ were mobilized, often by 
local communists. 19 In the multi-national Soviet Union the practices 
of Leninist nationality policy meant that while central party orthodoxy 
was rigidly enforced the  ‘ indigenisation ’ ( korenisatziya ) also allowed 
ethno national identities to be  fostered. 20 
 Refl ecting this, Andre Gerrits has criticized one of the images most 
frequently deployed to describe the arrival of ethno-national confl ict 
and the fall of communism  – the melting glacier. In this metaphor 
 ‘ traditional nationalist emotions, resentments and confl icts were sup-
posedly covered by a layer of ice (the  Pax Sovietica ) and only revived 
when the ice began to melt, when (international) political confor-
mity and harmony enforced by the Soviet Union collapsed. ’ In fact, 
Gerrits argues 
nationalism and the minority issue were never put in a freezer. 
Indeed, they were frequently used and manipulated by communist 
regimes. They were a constituent part of the communist experi-
ment from the very beginning, and they served as one of the most 
powerful, albeit ultimately ineffective, instruments for acquiring 
legitimacy. 21 
 This collection pursues this sceptical line but seeks to broaden it by 
looking not just at communist regimes but at both sides of the Iron 
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Curtain and the interaction between East and West. It seeks to under-
stand how ethnic politics, which was usually rooted in the local or the 
regional milieu, was related to, or interacted with the international 
struggle. 
 2 Misperceptions and Myopia? 
 Some have broadened Gerrits ’ point into a criticism of western per-
ceptions, arguing that the failure of (western) outsiders to register 
the importance of ethnic politics during the Cold War stemmed from 
a systematic misapprehension. George Sch ö pfl in, for example, saw 
 ‘ the sudden re-emergence of nationalism ’ as an  ‘ an optical illusion ’ 
since  ‘ in reality, under the surface of events and indeed not merely 
under the surface, ethnicity and nationhood not only remained in 
being, but they contributed signifi cantly to the pattern of politics, 
though it was seldom understood in this way. ’ 22 Similarly, in the pes-
simistically titled  Pandaemonium Daniel Moynihan referred to a  ‘ fog 
descending over Europe ’ which concealed the salience of ethnicity. 
In his introduction to the same book, Adam Roberts described West-
ern observers as having been  ‘ mesmerised ’ into missing the impor-
tance of ethnic confl ict. 23 Walker Connor, the prominent sociologist 
of ethnicity, even diagnosed a fundamental  ‘ divorce between intel-
lectual theory and the real world. ’ 24 
 These kinds of criticism are not new. Connor himself made a very 
similar point twenty years before in the course of the  ‘ rediscovery ’ of 
ethnic politics in Western Europe, of which he was a pioneer. Around 
the same time, Joseph Rothschild listed no fewer than fi fteen expla-
nations for the  ‘ prolongued myopia ’ which the social sciences had 
displayed towards  ‘ politicized ethnicity ’ (but which he thought was 
now coming to an end). At least three of them are worth noting 
here: the assumption that the  ‘ so-called nation state ’ was normative; 
the propensity of  ‘ the development-and-modernization theorists to 
exaggerate the capacity of elites to plan and mould public values, 
identities, and allegiances in an integrationist direction ’ ; and the 
discrediting of ethnic ideas as a result of the Nazi experience. 25 
 Cold War historiography for its part concentrated for a long time 
on diplomacy and  ‘ high politics ’ . 26 That meant above all the  rationality 
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and the morality of the strategies of leaders and policy-makers  – par-
ticularly of the two superpowers  – at moments of crisis. This prefer-
ence should certainly not be dismissed as myopic and can be seen as 
an appropriate response to the unprecedented dangers of the nuclear 
age; similarly the concerns of historians in a second phase of histori-
ography in the 1960s and 1970s refl ected the substantial issues raised 
by the US involvement in Vietnam. But in any case, well before the 
Cold War ended the historiographical focus was shifting, becoming 
less dominated by contemporary controversies and deploying a wider 
range of archival resources. This  ‘ historicisation ’ meant that greater 
weight was given to the role of European governments, and societies, 
which were increasingly studied not just as constraints on policy- 
makers but in their own right. Since the end of the Cold War, as the 
threat of confl ict between the superpowers has receded the Cold War 
has also increasingly been seen as cultural history. In some work cul-
ture was discovered as an additional, previously, neglected battle-site, 
alongside politics and the military ( ‘ the cultural Cold War ’ ) but more 
recently  ‘ Cold War culture ’ has moved into the centre of attention. In 
Gordon Johnston ’ s words this  ‘ poses a broader set of questions about 
patterns of behaviour, attitudes and structures of thought and mean-
ing associated with the Cold War. ’ 27 
 The contributors to this collection have been infl uenced by these 
shifts in the sense that they see the Cold War as involving more than 
geopolitical and military confrontation. They also understand that 
power did not always fl ow in one direction only, downwards from the 
super-power to the client state (or ally) or from the national centre to 
the region. 28 They see ethnic identities as fl uid and deep-rooted, less as 
the defi ned characteristics of clearly bounded groups than as  ‘ perspec-
tives on the world ’ in Rogers Brubaker ’ s phrase. 29 In short, these identi-
ties are too complex and dynamic to be reduced to malleable resources 
or tools in the hands of national and international policy makers. 
 This point was (almost) conceded by the doyen of US Cold War 
diplomatic historians, John Lewis Gaddis when wrote (in the hubristi-
cally entitled  Now we know ) that the end of the Cold War had 
 revealed how durable national, cultural, ethnic, religious, and lin-
guistic particularities really are; but that is only to acknowledge  that 
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they must have been present throughout the Cold War itself as they had 
been for decades, even centuries, preceding it. They ensured that 
the  ‘ third world ’ would fi nd its own way whatever cold warriors in 
Washington or Moscow did. ’ 30 
 Yet, unlike other revelations in Gaddis ’ s book these  ‘ particularities ’ 
had not needed the opening of Soviet or East European archives to be 
discovered. But they did perhaps require a greater readiness to under-
stand them than was shown by Gaddis who tended, both during and 
after the Cold War to view nationalism as a disruptive force opposed 
to the orderly functioning of diplomacy and closely related to  ‘ revolu-
tion, religious fundamentalism, racism and . . . authoritarianism. ’ 31 
 The contributions which follow elucidate ethnic particularities by 
examining their contribution to Sch ö pfl in ’ s  ‘ pattern of politics ’ at six 
specifi c sites of ethnic interaction. Three of them are at the East-West 
border (Italy/Yugoslavia, Austria/Hungary and Bulgaria/Turkey): 
two of them involve minority disputes between states on the same 
side of the Iron Curtain and in the case of the Sorb minority there 
was no neighbouring  ‘ kin-state ’ to counteract the policies of the 
dominant German (GDR) society. 
 The very diversity of ethnicity makes generalizations unwise and 
it would clearly be foolish to construct an overarching  ‘ grand the-
ory ’ of ethnic politics in the Cold War on the basis of these cases. 
Nor is it suggested here that a neglected  ‘ ethnic Cold War ’ is await-
ing discovery. Nevertheless three common themes may be worth 
noting here: 
 First, if the Cold War is seen, as it has in recent years, as a compe-
tition between two  ‘ modernising cousins ’ 33 ethnic identities (like 
religious beliefs) could easily appear as an obstacle on the onward 
march of progress on either side of the Iron Curtain. Where the tra-
ditional leadership was religious (Catholic leaders of the Sorbs, the 
imams of the Bulgarian Turks) the fear was that they could provide 
alternative values. In the case of the Sorbs modernization arrived 
in the form of the gigomanic open-cast mining which destroyed 
the traditional Sorbian milieu. For the Bulgarian Turks, having fi rst 
been given a relatively war-reaching autonomy, it meant coercive 
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secularization, and an invasion of the private sphere including the 
de-islamization of personal names. 
 Second, the Cold War shifted the calculus of ethnic politics. That 
does not mean that minorities always became the helpless pawns of 
the superpowers (a favourite topos of minority leaders). In the case 
of South Tyrol at least at the start of the Cold war G ü nther Pallaver 
argues that the minority gained by the West ’ s fear of communism. 
Like the mobilization in  ‘ defence ’ of  Deutschtum in the Austrian 
province of Carinthia it provided a chance to reinvent what might 
have otherwise have been a discredited cause by adopting the 
language of anti-communism. Similarly Sabina Mihelj argues that in 
Triest, the Cold War could encouraged a discursive readjustment, 
which allowed the perpetuation of deeply rooted anti-Slav stereotypes. 
In the 1950s on the other hand Catholic anti-communism provided 
common ground across the ethnic divide in Tyrol the conservative 
South Tyrol People ’ s Party (SVP) supported the Christian Democrats 
in Rome even when this meant soft-pedalling on the autonomy 
provisions supposedly agreed in 1946. Minorities might also benefi t 
from the propaganda dimensions to ethnic disputes. Communist 
regimes claimed that their Leninist nationalities policies were a 
demonstration of their progressive credentials. Racism and segrega-
tion in the US South was constantly cited as their mirror image and 
the Civil Rights struggle was extensively covered in the press. However 
(as Martin Mevius shows for the Hungarian-Rumanian relations) 
this propaganda could rebound by directing attention to unresolved 
issues closer to home. 
 Third, if ethnicity involves, in line with one Frederik Barth ’ s well-
known defi nition, as  ‘ boundary maintenance ’ it is worth asking how 
it was involved in the construction of the Cold War boundary, which 
also linked a sense of community with a perception of an external 
threatening  ‘ other ’ . 34 Clearly there was no simple mapping of ethnic 
boundaries onto geo-strategic or military borders. In some cases as in 
Western stereotypes of Slavs the Cold War did seem to clothe racial-
ized images in a more universal language. 35 Elsewhere, for example 
Hungarian attitudes towards Rumania ethnic stereotypes were in ten-
sion with the demands of ideologically sanctioned solidarity. 
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 Chapter 1 
 Western Perspectives on Ethnic Politics 
 Robert  Knight 
 1  Ethnic Politics in the Cold War 
 Despite some federalist hopes and dreams, the post-war international 
order was rebuilt on the basis of nation states and their mistrust of 
minority rights. 1 Ethnic ties and ethnic claims were viewed with par-
ticular suspicion because they seemed to threaten national sovereignty 
and cohesion. Ethnic homogeneity, as Inis Claude wrote in 1955,  ‘ fre-
quently appeared as a value in itself ’ . 2 The founding fathers of the 
United Nations certainly had no interest in strengthening the ability 
of ethnic minorities to resist assimilation. 3 Indifference or hostility 
towards collective minority rights  – the obverse of the  ‘ strange  triumph 
of Human Rights ’ 4  – can also be seen in the peace settlement. In con-
trast to the treaties signed after World War I Western governments 
followed what one British offi cial called  ‘ the general policy to avoid 
laying down any minority rights in  this peace settlement ’ . 5 There was 
no restoration of the (limited) possibilities of appeal which had been 
enjoyed under the League of Nations. 6 For example the provisions for 
autonomy to the South Tyrol German-speaking population agreed 
in 1946 and incorporated into the 1947 Italian Peace Treaty were 
extensive on paper but there was little international interest in ensur-
ing that Italy implemented them. Similarly, the protection for  Austria ’ s 
Slovenes and Croats laid down in the 1955 Austrian State Treaty was 
not followed up with any energy by the four signatory powers. 
 This attitude is not hard to understand. Even in the World War I 
treaties, Britain and France, as  status quo powers, had seen minority 
rights as a dangerous Pandora ’ s box. 7 The experience of Hitler 
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 hardened this view so that at the end of the war, in Claude ’ s words, 
 ‘ statesmen, generally backed by a public opinion which was deeply 
impressed by the perfi dy of irredentist and disloyal minorities, were 
disposed to curtail rather than to expand, the rights of minorities ’ . 8 
The failure of appeasement and the Munich agreement were taken 
as conclusive proof that the only way to  ‘ deal with dictators ’ was to 
stand up to them. 9 This perspective, though understandable, was 
selective in that it focused exclusively on Chamberlain ’ s diplomatic 
miscalculations and its exploitation by the predatory Nazi  ‘ kin-state ’ . 
That obscured the underlying,  ‘ transferable ’ element of the  ‘ Munich 
problem ’  – the reconciliation of minority rights and state cohesion 
in an ethnically diverse society. Thanks to Hitler and the Sudeten 
 German Party, most post-war claims to minority rights risked being 
 dismissed as pretexts for subverting the state: the perspective was 
summed up by the belief that  ‘ every protected minority will ultimately 
fi nd its Henlein ’ . 10 
 Of course, the turn against minority rights and ethnic claims 
went deeper than this shamefaced memory of Munich. The very 
idea of basing collective claims on a supposed community of 
descent was now indelibly marked by Nazi racism and genocide. 
Even if racism was hardly absent in post-war Europe, the overt use 
of the language of racial superiority and anti-Semitism was thor-
oughly discredited. 11 That made any hint that ethnic categories 
were being rehabilitated deeply suspect. Even non-dominant 
minorities who made no claims to racial superiority were open to 
the accusation that they were reopening  ‘ the race question ’ . Pro-
ponents of ethnic group rights lost most of the infl uence and 
 standing they had enjoyed before the war. Individuals rather than 
groups were seen as the prime bearers of rights. 12 For example, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) laid down Educa-
tional rights in Article 26 in relation to educational opportunities 
and parental choice. It had nothing to say about the possibility that 
education might help minorities redress structural disadvantages 
in the cultivation of its language or culture. 13 On this point, the 
Soviet Union, for all its theoretical adherence to Leninist princi-
ples of national autonomy and its advocacy of collective  ‘ social 
rights ’ , did not seem to disagree. 
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 The norm of the nation-state was also embedded in Western percep-
tions of communist take-overs in Eastern Europe. Soviet domination 
came to be seen as a dual-linked oppression; both the rights of national 
self-determination and democratic rights were being trampled under-
foot. As this view solidifi ed, the exclusionary implications of ethnic 
nationalism seemed a secondary issue. In echoes of nineteenth- 
century liberal views of the Ottoman and Tsarist empires, Eastern 
European nations were seen as captive nations awaiting their moment 
of liberation. 
 The marginalization of ethnic explanations can be seen in the 
aftermath of the Yalta conference (February 1945). The attacks on 
the agreements were portrayed as a gross act of national betrayal and, 
like Munich before it, the betrayed nation was generally assumed to 
be a nation-state. Admittedly, Poland ’ s pre-war ethnic plurality, which 
provided the rationale for the revision of its Eastern borders, was 
used by Churchill in his House of Commons defence of Yalta on his 
return. But this kind of argument was soon displaced by the extinc-
tion of Polish democracy and the alleged connivance of Western 
leaders in it. 14 The continuing violence among Poles, Ukrainian and 
Lithuanians on Poland ’ s eastern borders received little attention, 
while the expulsion of the German population was reinterpreted as 
an ideologically motivated act. When Churchill returned to the sub-
ject in his  ‘ Iron Curtain ’ speech of March 1946, he fi tted it into his 
warning message of the Soviet menace. Unlike his comments a year 
before, he made no mention of German racial persecution of Jews 
and Slavs as the context for the expulsion of the Germans. Neither 
did he discuss his own ambiguous role in the West ’ s acceptance of 
the necessity of the expulsions. 15 Instead, he accused  ‘ the Russian- 
dominated Polish Government ’ of making  ‘ enormous and wrongful 
inroads upon Germany ’ , and instigating mass expulsions  ‘ on a scale 
grievous and undreamed of ’ . 16 The city of Stettin (Szczecin) was not 
a site of ethnic interaction but the end point of the perimeter which 
marked the extent of Soviet encroachment. Behind the line lay 
 Eastern Europe ’ s nations, referred to by Churchill as  ‘ ancient states ’ 
with  ‘ their famous capitals and the populations around them ’ .  Trieste, 
at the other end of the curtain, was also reframed. Here too Churchill 
had himself been instrumental in the process the previous summer 
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when he had successfully urged the US government to draw a line 
against any further advance of Yugoslav troops. As a result, the city 
became an early Cold War hot spot rather than just another  ‘ ethnic 
squabble ’ . 17 In Pamela Ballinger ’ s words, the  ‘ Anglo-American inter-
pretation of the Italo-Yugoslav border dispute as a thinly veiled act of 
communist expansion prevailed over  . . . competing interpretations 
emphasizing a complex history of nationalist contestation ’ . 18 
 This  ‘ de-ethnicisation ’ can also be seen in another classic text of 
the early Cold War, the  ‘ Truman doctrine ’ (March 1947). Truman ’ s 
speech was of course a decisive step in the globalization of US policy 
towards Soviet policy, and contained suitably Manichean rhetoric. 19 
Less often noted is the way Truman ’ s simplifi cation downplayed 
 ethnic dimensions of the crisis. By implication, the Greek nation he 
portrayed was ethnically homogeneous. 20 Greek territorial claims 
(against Albania and  ‘ Yugoslav Macedonia ’ ) or Greek proposals  ‘ to 
rid themselves of disloyal Slavophone elements ’ (estimated at half 
the population of 60,000) in exchange for around 20,000 Greeks 
(now in Bulgaria) were not mentioned and the ethnic grievances 
raised by the Yugoslav government were seen as mere pretexts. 21 The 
State Department corrected its envoy (Mark Ethridge) in order to 
make  ‘ a clear-cut distinction between general conditions . . . which 
make possible or serve as pretexts for frontier violation and actual 
direct causes and responsibility for such violation ’ . Using internal 
conditions in one country to justify territorial violations would be 
 ‘ clearly contrary ’ to the UN Charta. 22 Offi cials were also concerned 
that the  ‘ occurrence of a large number of typical Balkan border 
 incidents should not be allowed to divert attention from the system-
atic aggressive policies ’ of Greece ’ s three communist neighbours. 23 
Of course, in Greece, as with Trieste, ethnic (and other) grievances 
were indeed being used by Yugoslavia. But the point here is that in 
the simple Cold War narrative, the exploitation was the main story, 
the grievances themselves were secondary issues. 
 This process also reinforced a straightforward  ‘ majoritarian ’ under-
standing of democracy, in which a militant communist minority (sup-
ported by an international communist movement) was pitted against 
a unitary Greek nation. In this view, the party or parties with the most 
votes in election won the legitimate right to speak for the nation. If 
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they proved fallible or became unpopular they could always be voted 
out of offi ce. As Truman put it (conceding that  ‘ the Greek  Government 
is not perfect ’ ), one of the chief virtues of democracy was that  ‘ its 
defects are always visible and, under democratic processes, can be 
pointed out and corrected ’ . But this was precisely what was not pos-
sible in ethnically divided societies, where majority-minority relation-
ship were structurally embedded so that ethnic competition became 
a  ‘ zero-sum confl ict ’ . 24 
 Truman ’ s scenario of a world divided between despotism and 
democracy was sustained over the following decade by the prevailing 
totalitarianism model of communism. In the schematic presentation 
of the  ‘ syndrome ’ by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the 
repression exercised by communist regimes was so overwhelming 
that it allowed almost no space for resistance. 25 That applied in the 
fi rst case to the supposedly helpless and atomized individual but it 
also meant that the mobilization of collective identities, like national-
ism or ethnicity, was also given little chance (although Friedrich and 
Brezinski did give consideration to the possibility of communist 
regimes using it to strengthen their hold on power). 26 This lack of 
interest in nationalism even extended to Nazi Germany, the supposed 
comparator of the communist totalitarian state. 27 The Nazi utopia of 
 ‘ the folk community ’ was seen as the functional equivalent of the 
communist  ‘ world brotherhood of the proletariat ’ both of them 
being means of mass mobilization, but the actual target was on the 
left  –  ‘ the classless society of the socialist tradition ’ . 28 
 On this analysis it was hard to see how communist rule might ever 
change, let alone collapse. 29 So it is perhaps not surprising that little 
consideration was given to what a post-communist world might look 
like. Friedrich and Brzezinski gave merely a hint that they anticipated, 
on classical liberal lines, that liberated states would wish  ‘ to further 
understanding between nations ’ . This would mean the  ‘ possibility for 
peaceful coexistence of the nations peopling this world ’ . 30 
 Of course, neither the ethnic diversity of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Empire nor the resulting tensions were a secret, even if reli-
able information was not easy to get hold of. And the politics of the 
anti-communist refugees who had fl ed to the West suggested that 
showed that these tensions went too deep to be suppressed in the 
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interests of anti-communist unity. 31 In the case of the future of the 
territory to the east of the Oder – Neisse line, the ethnic confl ict also 
involved the large Polish community in the United States, on the one 
hand, and the West German governments, on the other, which 
included the representatives of the expellee parties. US offi cials could 
hardly gloss over this difference altogether although the unresolved 
legal status of the border meant they could allow German expellee 
politicians to believe that a restoration the 1937 borders was still pos-
sible. West German governments for their part practised what Pertti 
Ahonen has called a  ‘ juggling act ’ between  ‘ the promotion of for-
ward-looking, democratic values and structures ’ on the one hand and 
 ‘ the pacifi cation of compromised, discontented elements ’ on the 
other. 32 Other equally toxic ethnic differences continued to simmer 
in the diaspora: between Slovak separatists and Czechoslovak exile 
politicians over the future of Czechoslovakia; between Ukrainians 
and refugees from the Baltic states, who anticipated the  ‘ dismember-
ment ’ of Russia, and former Vlassovite Russian nationalists on the 
other; last not least confl icts  – sometimes violent  – between Serb and 
Croat exile groups over the future existence of Yugoslavia or continu-
ation of war time confl icts. US policymakers sought to defer any deci-
sions on these differences until future liberation, in the meantime 
including Czechoslovakia, Russia and Yugoslavia in the list of captive 
nations. 33 
 The suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolution made it clear 
that any direct or military  ‘ liberation ’ was highly unlikely. At the same 
time, there was growing evidence that East European regimes were 
ready to diverge from Soviet instruction. Some Western observers 
began to wonder how much longer Soviet domination could last. 
In 1965, Ghita Ionescu argued that Stalin ’ s empire had already broken 
up since his successors were  ‘ incapable of imposing the kind of ideo-
logical uniformity and economic dominance he had ’ . 34 He also dis-
cussed nationalist grievances as  ‘ the most virulent motive of dissent ’ 
against communist rule; there were two aspects to this: the resistance of 
a people which sees national sovereignty being curbed by  ‘ suzerain 
power ’ and also the claims by  ‘ ethnic or regional groups . . . that 
the central administration oppresses or neglects them ’ . 35 Brzezinski, 
 moving away from the schematism of the totalitarian interpretation, 
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now concluded that  Eastern European states were moving from being 
satellites into the position of junior allies, while communist totalitar-
ian rule was mutating into  ‘ domesticism ’ . He referred to Tito and 
 Ceau ş escu , whose leadership was supported by a new generation of 
technocrats and managers, who were less ideologically purist than their 
predecessors. Brzezinski saw a danger in Western encouragement of 
anti-Soviet nationalist dictatorships unleashing xenophobia and ethnic 
confl ict. For this reason he thought it would be shortsighted for the 
West to try to  ‘ ride the tiger ’ of nationalism in the hope that it would 
threaten the Soviet-dominated world only. 36 Other Western observers 
began to see the Soviet Union less as an implacable totalitarian enemy 
than as a manageable, if unpredictable competitor. One advantage of 
a  Pax Sovietica was its ability to keep the tiger within bounds. Mark 
Kramer has referred to  ‘ the stabilizing effect of the Soviet military pres-
ence in Eastern and Central Europe [which] was widely taken for 
granted and even appreciated, at least tacitly ’ . 37 
 2  The  ‘ Ethnic Revival ’ in Western Europe 
 Downplaying ethnic claims and ethnic explanations was an (under-
standable) response to Nazi rule and refl ected the polarizing logic of 
the Cold War. It was also in line with the prevailing theoretical assump-
tions of social sciences, which tended to see ethnicity as a vestigial 
phenomenon, or limited to traditional societies. To the  ‘ mandarins 
of the future ’ its political importance in the Third World was as a 
potential obstacle in the  ‘ nation-building ’ , which was meant both to 
strengthen resistance to communism and to create the basis for eco-
nomic growth, perhaps even the  ‘ take-off ’ envisaged in Walt Rostow ’ s 
well-known model of development. 38 In some versions of moderniza-
tion,  ‘ integration ’ played a key role, acting as a glue which could 
achieve social cohesion in very different contexts. 39 For advocates and 
students of European unity, integration involved the closer coordina-
tion of trade policy, the avoidance of any return to pre-war economic 
nationalism and, at the federalist end of the scale, the creation of 
supranational institutions or even a United States of Europe. Carl 
Friedrich, for example, wondered if those who were  ‘ unifying (and 
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integrating) Europe ’ could not be seen as  ‘ nation-builders ’ no less 
than  ‘ Nehru or those who try to weld tribes into nations ’ . 40 In the case 
of the infl uential political scientist Karl Deutsch, integration meant 
the process of ever intenser and denser communication, ultimately 
leading to a higher level of  ‘ community ’ . 41 \ Deutsch ’ s scientifi c agenda 
had a political dimension, in which there was a progressivist teleology 
as well as a concern about the robustness of Western values in the 
face of the communist challenge. Though Deutsch certainly acknowl-
edged the existence of inertial forces slowing down integration, he 
was generally confi dent that they would be overcome. The key ques-
tion in relation to national-building was how nations  ‘ triumph over 
smaller units, such as tribes, castes, or local states, and more or less 
integrate them into the political body of the nation? ’ 42 At least before 
the revival of Gaullism in the 1960s, Deutsch considered the possibil-
ity that  ‘ a North Atlantic Community might develop between democ-
racies on both sides of the Atlantic ’ . 43 In this process there was in 
principle  ‘ no upper limit on the number of ethnic and linguistic 
groups that could be integrated ’ . 44 Andrei [Markovits], a student of 
Deutsch, has aptly described him as an  ‘ eternal optimist ’ . 45 That opti-
mism has been viewed more critically by Michael Latham as the delu-
sion that  ‘ the  “ traditional ” world was plastic and malleable ’ , which 
led many social scientists  ‘ to overestimate their ability to redirect and 
channel nationalist forces ’ . 46 
 In the course of the 1960s, modernizing confi dence began to ebb 
and expectations were lowered. Outside Europe the unity of anti- 
colonial nationalist movements began to fracture after independence 
and, as in the case of Nigeria, state boundaries came under attack 
from secessionist movements. 47 The view that ethnicity was only 
salient in traditional societies was also undermined by its mobiliza-
tion in industrial society, in combination with forms of ethnic unrest. 
In the United States, the reality and the desirability of the  ‘ melting 
pot ’ was questioned by African-Americans in the civil rights move-
ment as well as immigrant groups resisting integration, at least on the 
terms that seemed to be on offer. The subject of ethnicity  – and the 
word itself  – spread throughout political and academic discourse. 48 
As it did, some of its students sought to decontaminate it, that is 
remove the taint of racism and right-wing extremism. For example, 
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the sociologist Joshua Fishman argued that  ‘ while there is a racist 
potential in modern ethnicity that is not suffi cient to dam the 
phenomenon ’ . 49 In Western Europe the unequal treatment of post-
war immigration led to social and ethnic ( ‘ racial ’ ) unrest among 
second-generation immigrants and undermined the prevailing com-
placent assumptions that racial confl ict was a specifi c problem of the 
United States. 50 
 Perhaps most important here, there was an unexpected mobiliza-
tion of ethnicity in Western Europe. The diversity of these  ‘ ethno- 
regionalist ’ or  ‘ ethno-regionalist ’ movements makes it hard to 
generalize about them. 51 They included urban terrorists using Marx-
ist slogans as well as neo-fascist groups; Basque militants opposed to 
Franco ’ s regime, Catholics demanding civil rights in Northern  Ireland, 
Corsican protesters against French centralization and French-lan-
guage separatists in the German-speaking Canton of Bern, to name 
only a few.
It is also diffi cult to locate these new movements in relation to the 
Cold War. On one interpretation they became possible because the 
East – West battle was becoming muted. Fear of communism as an ideol-
ogy or of nuclear attack was declining within the post-war generation. 
Traditional party loyalties were being undermined by an unprece-
dented economic growth and the extension of welfare provision. 52 
 The emergence of  ‘ ethno-regionalist ’ mobilization also directly 
contradicted Karl Deutsch ’ s observation that Western European 
nationalism had  ‘ settled down ’ . 53 Critics of modernization theory like 
Walker Connor concluded that  ‘ ethnic consciousness, far from disap-
pearing was  “ defi nitely on the ascendancy as a political force ” ’ . 54 He 
saw this as a refutation of the  ‘ American scholarship ’ which had 
 analyzed and dismissed ethnicity as a force in advanced industrial 
societies. On the contrary, he argued it was an inevitable part of the 
processes of homogenization, urbanization and centralism. Increased 
communication had not destroyed ethnic difference but heightened 
consciousness of it and facilitated the mobilization against the 
unequal treatment of different ethnic groups. 
 The new ethnic mobilization also meant a challenge to Truman ’ s 
simple contrast between totalitarianism and democracy by claiming 
that the democracy which the West had been defending was far from 
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perfect. To some critics this amounted to a rejection of liberal values 
and a covert attempt to reintroduce outlawed racialist categories 
into European politics. Samuel Salzborn has recently argued along 
these lines, claiming that ever since the end of the Third Reich a 
determined intellectual lobbying campaign had been waged by a 
network of activists, including several who had been complicit in 
National Socialism. Their aim was nothing less than the rehabilita-
tion of an ethnicized political theory, which would eventually allow 
Europe to be reorganized along  ‘ organic ’ ethnic lines. Ethnic groups 
rather than individuals would be the bearers of rights. By the 1960s, 
 Salzborn argues, this lobbying activity had successfully permeated 
mainstream structures in Western Europe (in particular, the Euro-
pean federalist movement) and begun to undermine the civic, 
republican values which had underpinned Europe ’ s post-war territo-
rial settlement. 55 
 Though Salzborn is convincing in his  expos é of the lineage of a part 
of the ethnic revival, he probably overstates its coherence and level of 
organization. But his identifi cation of the post-war territorial and 
political territorial settlement as a target of the  ‘ ethnic revival ’ points 
to the way  ‘ Yalta ’ was now recoded, partly as an extension of de 
Gaulle ’ s (abortive) attempt to break through the supposed super-
power  Diktat and establish a  ‘ Europe of des patries ’ . One leading fi gure 
in the ethnic revival, Guy H é raud, looked forward to a  Europe des eth-
nies . In this perspective Yalta symbolized not just Soviet imprisonment 
of nations (and western connivance in it) but the imprisonment of 
Europe ’ s diverse ethnic groups. 56 H é raud, like Fishman, thought it 
was time for ethnic movements to lose the stigma of Munich. 
 In elaborating this point others argued that the basic message of 
the new movements was emancipatory; their anti-statism was not an 
attempt to destabilize the post-war order but to supply the basic need 
for warmth and  Gemeinschaft , which had been ignored by centraliza-
tion and homogeneity. For this reason, Fishman aligned them with 
the libertarian politics, which was emerging from the ferment of the 
1960s, including the hippies. 57 Similarly, Anthony Smith sought to 
counter those who were  ‘ aghast at what appeared to be a revival of 
 “ tribalism ” . . . only ten or fi fteen years after its apparent destruction 
in the bunker of Berlin ’ . 58 He argued that the ethnic revival was part 
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of a wider radical rejection of  ‘ the prevailing statist framework ’ and a 
quest for more  ‘ natural ’ and  ‘ spiritual ’ forms of existence. He traced 
its pedigree back to the enlightenment and a  ‘ critical discourse, 
appealing to general principles like popular sovereignty, inalienable 
rights and cultural diversity ’ . Since the war many movements had 
undergone a  ‘ radical ideological metamorphosis ’ , which meant they 
were more likely to be on the left than on the right. In short, for 
Smith, this was a welcome grass-roots revolt against the straightjacket 
imposed at Yalta. 59 
 Whether viewed critically or positively the ethnic mobilization of 
the 1970s had important implications for Eastern Europe, and the 
Soviet Union, especially if it was indeed a global phenomenon, as 
relevant for industrialized as for agrarian societies. But overall, most 
of its analysts stuck to Western Europe (apart from the occasional 
passing reference to the  ‘ Croatian Spring ’ ). On the other hand, 
scholars of Eastern Europe or Soviet policy, although well aware of 
signs of disaffection or unrest, including some which would erupt 
20 years later, were cautious about drawing wider conclusions, or see-
ing it as part of a systemic crisis. In fact, in the decade after the crush-
ing of the Prague Spring, Soviet control of Eastern Europe stabilized 
and the cohesion of the Soviet Union was rarely questioned. Joseph 
Rothschild, for all his deep knowledge of Eastern Europe, saw a  ‘ his-
torically ironic reversal ’ of the inter-war situation. The challenge to 
state legitimacy in the West was now  ‘ potentially more serious than it 
was and at least as serious . . . as in the East European countries ’ 
where ( ‘ with the possible exception of East Germany, the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia ’ )  . . . the state did  ‘ not appear to be targets of 
domestic ethnopolitical repudiations and delegitimations ’ . 60 Several 
experts on Soviet society accepted the offi cial estimate that, as Brezh-
nev proclaimed in 1972, the  ‘ nationality question ’ had been  ‘ fully, 
defi nitively, and irreversibly resolved ’ . 61 This perception was probably 
further reinforced by the dominant  ‘ neo-realist ’ theories in Interna-
tional Relations, which privileged the international  ‘ system ’ over the 
unit and saw the tendency towards an equilibrium between the two 
superpowers. In a notable hostage to fortune, its leading fi gure, 
 Kenneth Waltz, made the production of  ‘ reliable and explanations or 
predictions ’ a central criteria for the validity of a theory. 62 
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 The Helsinki Final Act (1975) came close to the  de facto recogni-
tion of the Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe, including the 
absorption of the Baltic States, even if it did not amount to the com-
plete Western legitimation Soviet leaders were looking for. It kept 
open the possibility of peaceful reunifi cation of Germany. In West 
Germany the Oder – Neisse border was now widely accepted as per-
manent and the increasing contacts between West Germany and 
Poland helped defuse the issue. According to Levy and Dierkes, 
West German national identity gradually evolved from an  ‘ ethno-
national idiom ’ to an  ‘ economic identity ’ . 63 Some even saw West 
Germany as the fi rst  ‘ post-national ’ society. The unexpected resur-
rection of human rights in the aftermath of Helsinki was driven by 
dissident groups in Eastern Europe rather than Western govern-
ment. The Ford administration, in the aftermath of the Vietnam 
debacle, was not looking for reasons to intervene in Eastern 
Europe. 64 In any case, Article VIII of Helsinki Final Act did not tread 
any new ground in terms of minority protection; it was a fairly con-
ventional reiteration of the right of self-determination as well as the 
national sovereignty. The alignment of human rights and minority 
rights came after the fall of communism, thanks to the intervention-
ist policies of the OCSE and its High Commissioner on National 
Minorities. 65 
 A decade before the fall of the Berlin wall, minority protection, affi r-
mative action, the right of secession, the validity and limits of liberal-
ism and a host of other public policy and philosophical issues were 
being debated in the West. 66 The academic study of nations and 
nationalism, which had been in the doldrums, moved up the academic 
agenda. Yet in the two most infl uential discussions, there was little 
indication of the developing crisis in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Benedict Anderson ’ s infl uential  Imagined Communities (1983) took 
most of its contemporary examples from South America and South-
East Asia although there was a tangential reference to the diffi culties 
facing Yugoslavia since Tito ’ s death (1980). Starting from a recogni-
tion of the greater durability and power of nationalism compared with 
Marxism, Anderson warned of the possibility of confl ict in Eastern 
Europe between nationalistically minded Marxist regimes, giving 
Yugoslavia and Albania as examples. In contrast to Smith, Anderson 
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also endorsed the stabilization achieved in Eastern Europe by the Red 
Army ’ s  ‘ overwhelming presence ’ , which had  ‘ ruled out armed confl ict 
between the region ’ s Marxist regimes ’ . Ernest Gellner ’ s  Nations and 
Nationalism (1985) was also only obliquely concerned with contempo-
rary Central Europe even though one of his targets was clearly a kind 
of national mythmaking, which was recognizably central European. 67 
His stress on the constructed or synthetic nature of nations, arising 
from the need of modern industrial organization for a codifi ed homo-
geneous culture, was in principle equally relevant for civic nationalism 
as for ethnic: it could be achieved either by assimilation or by exclu-
sion. But the debunking thrust of Gellner ’ s argument, for example, 
his dig at the peasant dress code of Budapest urban opera goers, was 
more relevant to ethnic-based claim to authenticity. 68 Perhaps more 
striking is Gellner ’ s lack of concern about the destructive danger of 
ethnic nationalism. He refers dismissively to the  ‘ Dark Gods ’ theory, 
which holds that nationalism is  ‘ the re-emergence of the atavistic 
forces of blood or territory ’ . Against this theory (the third of four 
 ‘ false theories ’ of nationalism) he argues that 
 man of the age of nationalism is neither nicer nor nastier than men 
of other ages  . . . His crimes  . . . are more conspicuous only because, 
precisely, they have become more shocking, and because they are 
executed with more powerful technological means. 69 
 Five years later Gellner ’ s tone had changed. Addressing a (still) Soviet 
academic audience, he concluded that with the benefi t of hindsight 
both Marxism and liberal social thought had  ‘ underestimated the 
political vigour of nationalism ’ . 70 Whereas in 1985 Marxism had been 
one of his four false theories, now he explained that it shared the 
mistake of liberalism of assuming that ethnicity-like cultural differ-
ences  ‘ will go down the drain ’ under the conditions of work in indus-
trial society. Gellner concluded that, contrary to both,  ‘ Modern 
industrial High Culture is not colourless, it has an  “ ethnic ” colouring, 
which is of its essence ’ . 71 Though Gellner was clearly greatly affected 
by the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe he was far from the rather apocalyptic interpretations offered 
by Michael Ignatieff and others. 72 
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 Anthony Smith (Gellner ’ s former student) also recognized the 
relevance of the worsening situation for his earlier stress on the 
primacy and historicity of ethnic identities. Initially he had greeted 
the Eastern European revolutions as the continuation of the eman-
cipatory movement in western Europe. It meant that  ‘ the interven-
tionist state ’ had  ‘ rekindled among its ethnic minorities those 
aspirations for autonomy and even separation that had previously 
been muted or repressed ’ . 73 Now he noted more sombrely that vio-
lence was the inevitable accompaniment of competing ethnic 
claims. He predicted that there could be  ‘ little escape from the 
many confl agrations that the unsatisfi ed yearnings of ethnic nation-
alism are likely to kindle ’ . 74 
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 Chapter 2 
 Re-thinking Ethnicity and the Origins 
of the Cold War: The Austrian-Hungarian 
Borderlands 
 Mark  Pittaway 
 Following the deportations of ethnic German residents from the city 
of Sopron and its surrounding villages in April 1946, a small number 
of those so identifi ed were allowed to remain. Their continued pres-
ence in village communities that often lay little more than a thirty 
minute walk from Hungary ’ s border with Austria attracted the ire of 
the Hungarian Communist Party ( Magyar Kommunista P á rt /MKP), 
and the recently constituted Hungarian State Police that they effec-
tively controlled. This ire was heightened by the paranoia prevailing 
within the MKP about its relative isolation from a largely hostile local 
society. This combined with the growing polarization between sup-
porters of the MKP and its opponents, the centre-right Independent 
Smallholders ’ Party ( F ü ggetlen Kisgazda p á rt ), who had won an over-
whelming victory in the parliamentary elections of November 1945. 
Determined to continue their project of building a political system 
centred around the MKP, the communists divided the population 
into supporters and enemies of the political system they were seeking 
to create. 1 
 The police ’ s treatment of ethnic Germans in the borderland around 
Sopron sheds important light on the way ethnic constructions became 
implicated in the state-led division of Hungarian society. In December 
1946, the local police, supported by border guard troops, raided houses 
in the village of Fert ő r á kos searching for evidence of smuggling. The 
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raids, which were accompanied by considerable brutality on the part of 
both police and border guards, were part of a calculated campaign of 
harassment against the ethnic German population. Those woken by 
the authorities in the early hours of the morning were warned  ‘ in a 
humiliating fashion ’ that they were considered politically suspect. One 
resident was dragged from his bed by the border guard troops at 
3.30 a.m. and taken to the village school, where a senior police offi cer 
demanded to know why he had  ‘ a moustache like Hitler ’ . 2 Another 
faced demands to show the border guard troops where he was hiding 
his  ‘ machine gun ’ as part of an attempt to fi nd evidence of German 
preparations for an armed rebellion. 3 
 Showing that they suspected that ethnic Germans harboured 
National Socialist sympathies, or were preparing an armed uprising 
against the Hungarian state, the raiders also accused them of being 
engaged in cross-border smuggling. Given the continuing poor liv-
ing standards of Hungary ’ s urban population, and the memories of 
hyper-infl ation (which had continued until the currency reform of 
August 1946), the spectre of  ‘ speculators ’ was conveniently linked by 
the MKP to the different political opponents of the new order and 
in order to mobilize their limited support base within the industrial 
working class and rural poor. Those raiding the homes in Fert ő r á kos 
were determined to link ethnic Germans to smuggling and specula-
tion and they confi scated almost everything not bolted to the fl oors 
of the houses to back up the charge. One family was subject to the 
confi scation of  ‘ one pair of children ’ s shoes, one pair of girl ’ s baby 
shoes, two pairs of children ’ s stockings, three metres of woven cloth, 
two hundred and fi fty grams of salt and six hundred Schillings. ’ Even 
though they were legally owned, they could be used to label the 
 family as  ‘ speculators ’ . 4 The raids can also be interpreted as part of 
the process of separation of ethnic German communities from the 
broader Hungarian society of which they were part. In this way, they 
underpinned the expulsions and were central in establishing the 
social roots of Hungary ’ s socialist dictatorship in ethnically mixed 
regions. 5 On the other side of the border, the expulsions also played 
a fundamental role in the reconstruction of provincial identities in 
the Austrian province of Burgenland. In 1949, the social logic of sep-
aration which they generated between the Austrian and Hungarian 
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components of the borderland culminated in the effective closure of 
the international border. 6 The political legacy of this local separa-
tion process was the background for the tension, which residents on 
both sides of closed border experienced until the summer of 1956, 
when the physical border between the two countries was temporary 
dismantled. But the brief thaw of the summer of 1956, which was 
abruptly terminated by the outbreak and subsequent suppression of 
the Hungarian Revolution, led to a renewal of mistrust between 
Budapest and Vienna. 7 
 In the past decade-and-a-half, there has been an explosion of his-
torical research and writing about post-war expulsions. Often inspired 
by the  ‘ myth of ethnic war ’ that dominated interpretations of the 
confl icts between Yugoslavia ’ s successor states, 8 this literature has 
equated the process of post-war expulsion with the ethnic cleansing 
that characterized those confl icts, and sometimes broader, and more 
serious patterns of the twentieth-century genocide. Married to this is 
an interest in issues of nationalism and nation-state building, in which 
post-war expulsion has been seen as part of a process of completing 
the creation of  ‘ perfectly formed ’ nation-states in Central Europe. 9 
While there is much to say in criticism of the misplaced assumptions 
of much of this literature, here it is suffi cient to note fi rst that  – save 
for a few honourable exceptions  – the early post-war and cold -war 
political contexts of the expulsion process and its consequences have 
been neglected. 10 Second, the literature has privileged perspectives 
from nationalism studies, which rarely concede the notion that 
nationalism plays different and sometimes contradictory roles within 
different political cultures, and that nation-building across Europe 
has been an incomplete and discontinuous process. Third and per-
haps most seriously, it essentializes ethnic identities, and fails to 
account for their constructed, discontinuous and contradictory 
natures. As Rogers Brubaker and his colleagues put it in their study 
of the attempts to mobilize ethnic identities in the Transylvanian city 
of Cluj in the mid-1990s, few scholars of ethnic confl ict have asked 
the  ‘ basic questions about ethnicity: where it is, when it matters, and 
how it works. ’ 11 In relation to the politics of the early Cold War that 
suggests that instead of seeing events like post-war expulsions as 
 ethnic confl ict pure and simple, we need to examine how ethnic 
AQ: Please 
confi rm the 
shortened 
running head.
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identities were implicated, constructed and deployed within the 
scope of broader political confl icts. If we adopt this approach and 
take the questions that follow from it seriously, we can begin to ask 
how far ethnicity played a role in the Cold War. 
 We also need to de-centre some of our understanding of the Cold 
War politics. In Europe, these have been largely determined by the 
way in which the military outcome of war meant the constraining of 
the juridical and practical sovereignty of European states, initially by 
the four victorious powers, and then increasingly by the ever more 
powerful superpowers. While most writing on the Cold War has con-
centrated on this post-war political dynamic of politics, less attention 
has been paid to the way in which local confl icts, both within and 
between states, persisted across the historical watershed of 1945, and 
reproduced themselves in a variety of ways, according to post-war 
 circumstances. 12 Often our grasp of this aspect of the post-war settle-
ment has been obscured by the hegemonic notion of the twentieth 
century as a century of  ‘ two halves ’ . 13 Instead, we need to see that the 
dynamics of the Cold War politics arose from the mutual infl uence of 
the local, the national and the international. 14 This also means that 
when considering the early post-war period, we need to pay more 
attention to the ways in which ethnicity was politicized in the preced-
ing period. 
 Before 1918, the border region under discussion here  – consisting 
of northern Burgenland in Austria and the counties of Gy ő r-Moson 
and Sopron in Hungary  – had formed a unifi ed region. It constituted 
a wealthy agricultural region within Hungary whose products went 
not just to Vienna, but also to industrial centres in Wiener Neustadt, 
Pozsony/Bratislava, and Gy ő r. It was also ethnically diverse: on the eve 
of World War I, 46 percent of the population were German, 43 per 
cent were Magyar, while a further 10 per cent were Croatian. 15 Politi-
cal polarization after World War I was linked to ethnic polarization 
between Germans and Magyars, and resulted in the incorporation of 
the western parts of the region into Austria, as the province of Burgen-
land. What had been an advanced agricultural region of  Hungary 
found itself in the inter-war years with an economically and politically 
peripheral status. At the same time its multiethnic population and 
many of its public institutions, shaped by Hungarian rule, marked it 
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out from the rest of Austria. 16 The territories left on the Hungarian 
side, especially Sopron, the principal city, were severed from the mar-
kets centred on Vienna and plunged into economic  crisis. They 
attempted to compensate  – with mixed success  – by emphasizing their 
political loyalty to Budapest. 17 Austria ’ s incorporation into Germany 
in 1938 and the onset of war changed the situation. Though Burgen-
land disappeared as a political unit, it was treated by Berlin as a dis-
tinctive space that could serve as a bridge between the National 
Socialist regime and the ethnic German minority in Hungary. Radical 
racist measures decimated Burgenland ’ s Jewish and Roma popula-
tions, while in Hungary, the growing prestige of radical right-wing 
ideas among the population led the state to respond with anti-semitic 
measures. It also forced national and local authorities to fi ght a rear-
guard action against a German minority, which radicalized under the 
infl uence of Berlin, as the country became increasingly entangled in 
the war. Throughout the war years, interaction between the German 
and Hungarian sides of the border remained intense and the frontier 
was porous. It was only the popular experiences of the end of the war 
which initiated the dynamic of separation. 18 
 Expulsion was a fundamental part of this dynamic. The politiciza-
tion of the German minority in the Sopron and Moson regions had 
produced sporadic political confl ict between Magyar nationalists and 
local members of the  Volksbund  – the pro-Berlin organization of the 
German minority. This culminated in 1942 in serious tensions and 
violence between nationalist Magyar students (supported tacitly by 
the authorities) and  Volksbund students during recruitment drives 
by the Waffen SS. 19 However, the depth of this confl ict should not be 
exaggerated. Ethnic identities in Hungary ’ s western borderland were 
fl uid. The published results of the 1941 census recorded that 719,762 
or 4.9 per cent of Hungary ’ s population identifi ed themselves as Ger-
man speakers  – although it is worth mentioning that these fi gures 
were strongly contested by the political representatives of the German 
minority. 20 In many western border districts the proportions were 
higher  – in the Moson Magyar ó v á r district, 37.2 percent of the popula-
tion declared themselves German speakers, in the Sopron district the 
fi gure was 39.3 percent, while in the cities of Mosonmagyar ó v á r and 
Sopron, the fi gures were 29.9 and 12.7 percent, respectively. 21 Many 
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ethnic Germans had a  ‘ dual ’ Magyar and German identity, with Ger-
man often functioning as a local language rarely used beyond the 
boundaries of home villages, while kinship and friendship ties often 
transcended the ambiguous ethnic divide. 22 It is also important to 
note that ethnic German identity did not necessarily mean sympathy 
for Germany ’ s political goals;  Volksbund organizations only ever oper-
ated in twenty-fi ve villages in Gy ő r-Moson and Sopron counties. 23 Fur-
thermore, the patterns of support for Berlin in communities where 
ethnic German identities were strong, displayed remarkable similari-
ties with those among Magyars for the Arrow Cross. It had increased 
its support and prestige during the late 1930s, in reaction to virtual 
elimination of unemployment after Austria ’ s incorporation into 
 Germany. 24 But its support collapsed after 1942 as the costs of partici-
pation in a war became clearer. 25 
 All this suggests that while there was clearly a pre-history to the 
political mobilization of ethnic identities at the end of the war, we 
should be wary of tracing an unproblematic or direct link between 
these earlier confl icts and the confused expulsion drives of 1945 – 48. 
Expulsion was the project of a state that was suffering from confusion 
about goals and facing considerable diffi culties in implementing 
them because of the fl uidity of ethnic identities and the sporadic 
nature of political confl ict. Rather than being a successful case of the 
mobilization of ethnic difference in support of state-builders, and 
especially the MKP, it proved deeply unpopular among most of the 
population, and in the western borderland, it actually undermined 
the legitimacy of the  ‘ new ’ state. In large part, the diffi culty stemmed 
from confusion as to whether the state intended to hold all those 
identifi ed as ethnic Germans collectively responsible for the tragedy 
of World War II, or whether it was more interested in anti-fascist ret-
ribution against those who had supported Berlin and collaborated 
directly with the German occupation. This confusion in turn was the 
legacy of the ambiguous attitude of the Hungarian state towards its 
national minorities. Since 1867, Hungarian governments had sought 
to strengthen the Magyar nature of the state  – a process that intensi-
fi ed following the shock of the Treaty of Trianon, but it was always 
legally and ideologically possible both to be a loyal Hungarian citizen 
and to preserve one ’ s separate language and cultural autonomy. 26 
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This ambiguity had been used by local representatives of the Hungar-
ian state in the Sopron and Moson regions to beat back the challenge 
of the  Volksbund . They had intimidated those who co-operated with or 
joined the  Volksbund with accusations of  ‘ political disloyalty ’ , while 
still maintaining that those who demonstrated loyalty to Hungary by 
supporting the governing party, and state-sponsored cultural organi-
zations, were free to use their native language and celebrate their 
ethnicity. 27 
 This practice infl uenced the ways in which local authorities were 
asked to draw up their lists of candidates for expulsion after the 
arrival of Soviet troops in April and May 1945. The state asked local 
authorities for lists of residents who were  ‘ German citizens ’ , had  ‘ lost 
German citizenship by virtue of taking on Hungarian citizenship, ’ 
had  ‘ volunteered for military service in the  Waffen SS ’ or had been 
 ‘ members of the Volksbund ’ . Those who spoke German as a fi rst lan-
guage, but had remained  ‘ loyal to Hungary ’ were exempt. Thus, 
while much propaganda proclaimed that Hungary ’ s Germans were 
to be held  ‘ collectively responsible ’ as an ethnic group, actual prac-
tice stressed politically  ‘ fascist ’ behaviour, or perceived  ‘ disloyalty ’ to 
the Hungarian state as the criteria for removal. 28 The confusion that 
resulted could be manipulated by residents and the local authorities; 
a strategy that was strengthened by the fl uidity of ethnic identities. In 
K ó ph á za, a predominantly ethnically Croatian village south-east of 
Sopron, adjacent to the border with Austria, the local notary main-
tained that of the eleven German citizens living in the village, nine 
were of Croatian ethnicity, two were ethnically Magyar, and none eth-
nically German! He argued furthermore that none  ‘ had fascist sym-
pathies ’ and, by implication, should not have their property 
confi scated or be marked for expulsion. 29 
 There was also an arbitrariness about the criteria used to draw up 
the lists. One example was the way Austrian citizens were dealt with; 
while arguing that Austrian citizens could not be regarded automati-
cally as German citizens, the authorities also had to  ‘ pay attention to ’ 
Austria ’ s  ‘ true relationship to the German Reich, which had existed 
over several years ’ , a euphemism for almost automatically classifying 
Austrian citizens as Germans. 30 Similar practices were deployed by 
local authorities to classify those minors who had formally been 
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 citizens of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia as Germans, even 
where their ethnicity was identifi ed as Czech, and to mark them for 
expulsion on the lists. 31 Arbitrary practice in drawing up expulsion 
lists was re-inforced by the destruction of documentary evidence 
about political behaviour in the days before the Red Army arrived. In 
 Á gfalva the notary admitted that his list had been drawn up on his 
personal view of who the  ‘ Germans ’ in the village were and not on 
the basis any documentary evidence; it had also contained the names 
of some he believed to be patriotic Hungarians. 32 
 The way ethnic identities were implicated in what was essentially an 
act of collective political retribution was often contradictory. These 
contradictions frustrated both the disorganized expulsion efforts 
in 1945 and the organized deportations of spring 1946. Frustration 
among the MKP and its supporters grew. Raids like that in Fert ő r á kos, 
described above, were an attempt to bridge some of the contradic-
tions of the expulsion process. The outcomes of the raids could be 
manipulated in order to shape propaganda that Germans as an 
 ‘ ethnic group ’ were the enemy, thereby supporting arguments for 
continuing the expulsions. 33 
 Contradictions can also be seen in responses to the expulsion pro-
cess just over the border in northern Burgenland. In these communi-
ties it played a crucial role in the reconstruction of Austrian national, 
and Burgenland provincial identities, and in this way helped defi ne 
the process of social separation between the two sides of the border 
at the start of the Cold War. At fi rst sight, however, this process was far 
from an obvious one, and revealed the complex entanglement of dif-
ferent identities in a fl uid political situation, and the international 
constraints of four-power occupation. The newly restored Austrian 
state defi ned itself against Germany, in ways that went much further 
than mere rhetoric. In spring 1945, the provisional government in 
Vienna instructed districts to separate residents into  ‘ Austrians ’ and 
those it termed  ‘ Germans who came from the Reich ’ ( Reichsdeutsche ) 
as a prelude to their removal from Austrian soil. 34 In 1946 local 
authorities faced a steady stream of appeals from female Austrian 
partners married to German citizens, who discovered that they were 
denied Austrian citizenship because of their marital status, and faced 
deportation to Germany. 35 
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 Post-war constructions of  ‘ Austrianness ’ did not merely demarcate 
Austria and Germany they also celebrated provincial identities. 36 In 
the case of the borderland, this meant that Austrian identity was 
closely tied to the identity of the province of Burgenland. The prov-
ince had been carved out of Hungary at the end of the First World 
War, after its German minority demanded that it be ruled by Vienna, 
rather than Budapest. Owing its origin in part to a political project of 
ethnic Germans within the pre-war Kingdom of Hungary, the pre-
dominant versions of its provincial identity in the inter-war years had 
claimed that it had a fundamental kinship to those western  Hungarian 
counties populated by German speakers. 37 Pan-German nationalists 
dreamed of the territorial extension of the province. While the prov-
ince was divided after Austria ’ s incorporation into Germany, between 
the  Gaue of Lower Donau (Niederdonau) and Styria, Burgenland ’ s 
own Nazis had argued - against Berlin - that their province should 
become a  Gau in its own right within the expanded Reich, because of 
its a distinctive  ‘ mission ’ as a  ‘ borderland ’ ( Grenzland )  acting as a 
bridge between Germany, and German speakers in Hungary. 38 Ber-
lin ’ s only concession to this pro-Burgenland sentiment was to estab-
lish a Nationality Groups Offi ce ( Volkstumstelle ) in the former capital 
of Eisenstadt. Its task was to supervise the territories ’ ethnic minori-
ties, and maintain close contact with pro-Berlin, ethnic German activ-
ists in the neighbouring city of Sopron. 39 
 The post-war context was less than favourable for a revival of these 
ideas of Burgenland identity, precisely at the time the Hungarian 
state was engaged in a campaign for the expulsion of the German 
minority. The waves which followed between 1945 and 1946 gener-
ally, and especially the deportation of 1946, played a fundamental 
role in the construction of Burgenland and, by extension, Austrian 
identities in the region and shaped perceptions of the Hungarian 
neighbour that strengthened the authority and legitimacy of the Aus-
trian state. In border villages, where ties of kin often spread into 
 villages on the Hungarian side, the expulsions provoked particular 
outrage. When ethnic Germans returned home to north-western 
Hungarian villages like Magyarkimle in late 1945 to fi nd their homes 
and land had been re-distributed to settlers, they launched an armed 
uprising with the goal of re-claiming their property, using fl ight over 
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the border, and networks of solidarity with kin on the Austrian side, 
to sustain their fi ght. Although they were beaten back by the armed 
police who then fl ooded the region, both Budapest and its local rep-
resentatives remained worried at their lack of control. 40 
 Public opinion, the political parties, opinion formers and even offi -
cials in the Burgenland government responded to Hungarian vio-
lence against borderland Germans by claiming them as  ‘ Austrians ’ 
and arguing that the lands they inhabited were, in fact, eastern Bur-
genland. This adaptation of earlier pan-German arguments to post-
war circumstances sought to differentiate Hungary ’ s German speakers 
from Germans proper, and underline their kinship to  ‘ Austrians ’ 
 living on the Burgenland side of the border. In the words of one 
opponent of expulsion, used by Burgenland offi cials to make the 
case against Hungary,  ‘ Hungary ’ s German speakers refer to them-
selves as  n Donau Swabians [ Donauschwabe ] and Heathland farmers 
[ Heidebauern ] and are so known by the Hungarians; they know noth-
ing of Germany. ’ These offi cials of the Burgenland government also 
lobbied Vienna to intervene with the occupying powers  – especially 
the Red Army  – against the expulsions, on the grounds that ethnic 
Germans settled right on the border  ‘ can be seen as good  Austrians ’ . 41 
Others argued for a solution that allowed for the Moson and Sopron 
districts closest to the border to be removed from Hungary and incor-
porated into Burgenland. 42 
 Neither the Hungarian state nor the left-wing parties who most 
enthusiastically supported expulsion were prepared to make any con-
cession to calls for the exemption of borderland German speakers on 
grounds of their  ‘ Austrianness ’ . Aware of calls in the Burgenland 
press for a re-drawing of the border, the Hungarian police rounded 
up fi ve ethnic Germans for spreading pro-Austrian propaganda in 
Sopron early in 1946. In a political trial designed to serve as a warn-
ing to authorities across the border, prosecutors accused them of 
conspiring with leading Burgenland politicians to launch an armed 
uprising in Hungary aimed at securing territorial changes. The barely 
concealed aim of this show trial was to warn Vienna to restrain the 
Burgenland administration. Vienna, worried that the Hungarian 
authorities might complain effectively to the Soviet military adminis-
tration, complied. 43 Early in 1946 the Hungarian state prepared for 
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the organized deportation of most of those it identifi ed as Hungary ’ s 
ethnic Germans to Germany. The MKP press in western Hungary cel-
ebrated what it believed would be the end of the tension generated 
by the more generalized expulsion efforts, it had organized since 
spring 1945:  ‘ The time is coming fast, when we will be able to start 
deporting the Hungarian Swabians ’ . 44 
 In spring 1946 the MKP-controlled Ministry of the Interior pressed 
ahead with deportation ever more ruthlessly. Aware of the possibility 
for manipulation, they attempted to scrap the local lists prepared a 
year earlier and draw up their own, but these were still mired in the 
same contradictions about who was to be expelled and why. Further-
more the implementation was heavy-handed. In Sopron, 300 police-
men were imported from outside the region in order to ensure that 
order was kept during the process. 45 As the lists were prepared over 
the Easter weekend the city was sealed from the outside world, the 
serving of alcohol was banned in local restaurants, and a night-time 
curfew enforced. 46 The police hunted down those on the list who 
were in hiding; during one night-time raid in early May 1946 almost 
80 per cent of the city ’ s houses were searched. 47 
 The 1946 deportations were a demonstration of arbitrary state 
power. The impression of a despotic state it left created a real fear that 
transcended the ethnic divide. The sight of deportees being rounded 
up and placed on cattle-trucks recalled popular memories of the 
deportation of local Jews in 1944. In Moson Magyar ó v á r, the local 
organ of the left-wing Social Democratic Party, normally supportive of 
the MKP, refl ected a commonly held opinion when it equated the 
removal of Germans with the events of two years earlier: Expulsion  . . . . 
two years ago it was called deportation. 48 Reactions to expulsion there-
fore refl ected the way it demonstrated the power and will of the state 
to act against the civilian population. Despotism weakened the state ’ s 
legitimacy and its institutions found that as a consequence the willing-
ness of the population to co-operate with them weakened. For exam-
ple the MKP mayor of Moson Magyar ó v á r complained in April 1946 
that the deportations were having a corrosive effect on the political 
authority of the organs of the new state in his city. 49 
 Faced with the threat of deportation from Moson or Sopron to 
Freilassing in southern Bavaria in 1946, many fl ed over the border, 
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with the intention of returning at a later date. 50 To pre-empt its con-
fi scation some took their property with them. 51 When they reached 
the Austrian side of the border these  ‘ German ’ refugees were met 
with sympathy from the population. Furthermore the  ‘ settlers ’ who 
had taken their homes and property were unpopular, and were 
blamed in border villages like Nickelsdorf and Zurndorf for cross-
border crime. 52 Minor offi cials showed similar sympathy for the plight 
of the refugees, granting border passes (in contravention of the regu-
lations) so that they could return to Hungary to visit relatives and 
provoking the fury of the Hungarian authorities. 53 This sympathy and 
the belief that those expelled were of  ‘ Austrian character ’ provoked 
a relaxation of both work permit and citizenship regulations that 
made it easier for them to claim Austrian citizenship. 54 
 Overall the deportations created a dynamic of mutual suspicion on 
both sides of the border which drove the process of separation. While 
in Austria they led many to see the state beyond the border as threat-
ening, and generated considerable local sympathy for refugees, in 
Hungary these reactions helped foster a climate of suspicion. Both 
the local and national state saw the relatively open border as an active 
threat to the country ’ s security. This was reinforced by the apparent 
attempts of deportees to return home. In one of several such inci-
dents, police were called Fert ő r á kos in March 1947 after fi ve former 
residents returned from Austria in order to re-settle and take back 
the property that had been confi scated from them and re-distributed 
to new settlers. 55 The border also played a central role in the Hungar-
ian left ’ s politics of economic security. During 1947 the MKP smashed 
the Small-Holders Party by using the police to cement its control of 
the popular front coalition and thus prepare the ground for the con-
struction of communist dictatorship. A vital part of this campaign was 
the mobilization of industrial workers and the poor, by putting the 
blame for their poor material situation, persistent high prices, and 
the food shortages, on  ‘ speculators ’ and  ‘ the reaction ’ . 56  ‘ Germans ’ 
who had escaped deportation were often blamed for  ‘ smuggling ’ and 
 ‘ speculation ’ and these accusations were then used to justify further 
confi scation of property and expulsion in 1948. 57 
 The deterioration of cross-border relations and the politicization of 
smuggling continued as the dictatorship became overt in 1948 and 
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1949. With opponents of the emerging regime fl eeing in large num-
bers and Hungary gripped by Cold War paranoia,  ‘ Germans ’ returning 
to Hungary and Austrian smugglers were labelled as  ‘ spies ’ and  ‘ ene-
mies ’ against whom Hungary ’ s western border needed to be secured. 
One piece of propaganda of this kind in March reported that 
 ‘ the cells in the Moson Magyar ó v á r police station were full yester-
day of illegal border crossers. Horse and livestock traders, ethnic 
Germans [ sv á bo ] seeking to return, German and Austrian citizen 
after food and escaping fascists waited out the afternoon ’ . 58 
 Budapest implemented a scheme that involved the physical closure 
of the border, the creation of barbed wire fences separating the two 
countries, the construction of a network of watch-towers, and the 
clearing of all land of vegetation within fi ve hundred metres of the 
border. 59 When it demanded that Austria create a similar zone on its 
side of the border, and Vienna refused, Hungary retaliated by closing 
the border to all Austrian farmers with properties on their side, caus-
ing furious reactions in Burgenland border villages. 60 The Iron Cur-
tain was in place. 
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 Chapter 3 
 Identity, Sovereignty and the Cold War at 
the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Between Empire, 
Nationhood and Class 1 
 Sabina  Mihelj 
 1 Alternatives to Homogeneity? 
 ‘ The working men have no country ’ reads the beginning of a well-
known passage from the  Communist Manifesto , which is often quoted 
as evidence of communism ’ s internationalist inclinations and hostil-
ity to nationalism. 2 At fi rst sight, nationalism and Marxism do indeed 
appear to rest on mutually incompatible visions of humanity: while 
the former sees humanity as fundamentally divided into nations, the 
latter insists that the truly important divisions within the social world 
are aligned with class and cut across national loyalties. Given this 
basic divergence, it is not diffi cult to see why nationalist and commu-
nist leaders have often tried to discredit the others ’ views by portray-
ing them as distorted or misleading representations of social reality. 
According to classical Marxist theory, nationalism is little more than 
an ideological veil, which serves to obscure underlying class confl ict 
and prevents the proletariat from realizing its own interests. By con-
trast, nationalist leaders opposed to communism have often insisted 
that communism is itself an ideologically distorted view of society, 
which threatens to tear apart national unity and even endangers the 
survival of the nation. 
 Although certainly apt in many cases, this black-and-white contrast 
between nationalism and communism is of little help when investi-
gating the role of nationalism in the Cold War. A closer look at the 
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historical development of communist doctrine and political strate-
gies reveals several points at which nationalist and communist coex-
ist or even fuse. For a start, the rise of communism itself owes a great 
deal to its successful manipulation of nationalist aspirations. This 
was justifi ed by both Marx and Lenin as an acceptable means of fur-
thering the communist cause in pre-revolutionary societies. 3 The 
successful appropriation of nationalist sentiments also proved cru-
cial in ensuring the long-term survival of communist regimes, once 
established. Though the operations of the repressive apparatus and, 
in Eastern Europe, the threat of the Red Army were certainly essen-
tial, they were not suffi cient to keep communists in power for over 
four decades. To shore up popular support for their regimes, com-
munist elites had to resort to other solutions, and nationalist narra-
tives, folkloric traditions and symbols provided a rich and effective 
resource. 4 In this way, communist leaders, like their predecessors 
and successors, sought to capture the legitimating potential of 
nationalism and deploy it to their own advantage. Yet this does not 
mean that communist regimes simply manipulated nationalism. As 
will be argued here, an instrumentalist explanation cannot ade-
quately account for the complexity of nationalist manifestations 
under communism. 
 ‘ Classic ’ nationalism theory does not much help our understand-
ing of communist nationality policies. For example, Ernest Gellner ’ s 
well-known defi nition of nationalism as  ‘ primarily a political princi-
ple, which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent ’ requires that nationalism demands culturally homoge-
neous nation-states and runs counter both to the mixing of different 
nations under the same political roof and to the dispersal of a single 
nation across different states. 5 One problem with this and similar 
theories is the broad-brush portrayal of the link between moderniza-
tion, cultural diversity and the state. It assumes that cultural homoge-
neity is unavoidable for modern social organizations, that nation-states 
have become the ubiquitous container for it and that all nationalist 
movements therefore must ultimately aspire to achieve the conver-
gence of the state with the nation. As Brendan O ’ Leary puts it,  Gellner 
 ‘ appeared to assume that the range of possibilities in modern times is 
bifurcated: there is a simple choice between nationalist  homogenisation 
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through assimilation, and nationalist secession, which produces 
another nationalist homogenisation ’ . 6 
 Admittedly, there is plenty in the long historical record of state par-
tition, ethnic cleansing, coercive assimilation and forced population 
transfers to support this account. Yet, it is surely too indiscriminate to 
encompass the full range of responses to cultural diversity in the 
modern world. While many modernizing states have indeed embraced 
the nation-state ideal as the only legitimate model of socio-political 
organization, cultural heterogeneity, fuelled by the contemporary 
reality of migration fl ows, has actually persisted to a far greater degree 
than Gellner ’ s defi nition implies. In 1971 when the term  ‘ nation-
state ’ was already well entrenched in everyday language, political 
debate and scholarly discussion, only about a third of all the states in 
the world contained a nation that accounted for more than 90 per 
cent of the total population. 7 Four decades later little has changed. 
Admittedly, as a result of the breakup of multinational socialist fed-
erations, the total number of would-be nation-states has increased. 
But the vast majority still contains at least one signifi cant ethnic (or 
national) minority. Although extreme nationalist movements may 
still fi nd it undesirable, many mainstream forms of nationalism have 
largely accepted the legitimacy of national minorities. The overall 
trajectory of the nation-state into modernity has been fraught with 
diffi culties, far from linear, and constantly entangled with other forms 
of socio-political organization. 8 
 Communist federations such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia represented one of these  ‘ rival ’ types of socio-politi-
cal organization. Their nationality policies often explicitly encour-
aged the cohabitation of different nations within the same political 
unit. They recognized the existence of distinct, autonomous national 
identities at the sub-state level while at the same time promoting a 
common Soviet (Czechoslovak, Yugoslav) identity. These communist 
nationality policies are not the only ones that seem to escape Gell-
ner ’ s defi nition. 9 
 If the nation-state is indeed seen as only  one among several modern 
forms of polities, then it is plausible to assume that the cultural homo-
geneity discussed by Gellner should also be seen as only one possible 
modern form of identity and legitimacy. Building on this assumption, 
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the remainder of this chapter examines the competing forms of iden-
tity and legitimacy at the Italo-Yugoslav border in the decade follow-
ing World War II. Its key proposition is that in this border region, the 
Cold War entailed not only an ideological confrontation between two 
different political visions but also a confrontation between two com-
peting forms of nationalism. Nationhood remained an important 
basis of collective identifi cation and political legitimization in all 
parts of the region. But it was incorporated into the political system 
and public discourse in signifi cantly different ways on opposite sides 
of the Iron Curtain. 
 2 Competing Forms of Legitimacy and 
Identity at the Italo-Yugoslav Border 
 Observed from afar, the history of border formation in the north-
eastern Adriatic may appear to be a textbook example of the linkage 
of nation-state building and ethno-cultural homogenization. As part 
of the former imperial borderland, the region has seen many admin-
istrations come and go, including the Venetian and Austro- Hungarian 
empires, the Kingdom of Italy, Nazi Germany, Allied Military Govern-
ment, the Italian republic and Tito ’ s Yugoslavia. Each of them con-
tributed to a complex patchwork of cultural legacies and left the 
north-eastern Adriatic with a culturally and ethnically mixed popula-
tion; the region ’ s main urban centre, the port city of Trieste, was 
home to Italians, Slovenians, Croats, Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, 
Jews, Armenians, Greeks and Serbs, as well as several smaller minori-
ties. 10 From the late nineteenth century, this multiethnic tapestry 
began to unravel. The rise of nation-states triggered confl icting 
visions of identity and borders, and processes of cultural assimilation 
and inter-ethnic violence and migration, all of which gradually sim-
plifi ed ethno-cultural complexity and fostered homogeneity. 11 Today 
most of the four countries whose borders meet in the region  – Italy, 
Austria, Slovenia and Croatia  – are effectively conceived of as nation-
states with an  ‘ ethno-cultural ’ majority of 90 per cent of the total 
population or more. 
 While this account is not incorrect, its insight into the nature of 
nationalism and ethnicity in this part of the world is rather limited. 
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From early on, the ethnic and cultural complexities of the region 
inspired principles of sovereignty and border legitimation in which 
cultural diversity was seen less as an obstacle to be eliminated than as 
an asset to be preserved. For instance the Austro-Hungarian settle-
ment of 1867 allowed Slovenes and Croats in Carniola and Istria to 
establish a range of cultural institutions and obtain considerable pub-
lic prominence in order to accommodate their increasingly vocal 
nationalist demands. 12 Although these policies in turn provoked 
resentment among local Italian nationalists, and certainly did not 
bring about a harmonious multiethnic coexistence, they were repeat-
edly invoked by later administrations and pressure groups. Even the 
Nazi occupiers, who took over power after Italy ’ s capitulation in 
 September 1943, sought to present themselves as heirs of the Hab-
sburg Empire, promising to restore the multiethnic harmony and 
commercial prosperity which the region had supposedly enjoyed 
before the advent of fascism. These promises were designed to appeal 
to the local Slav population, which had been disenfranchised by fas-
cist assimilationist policies but now had to be mobilized in the anti-
communist struggle against the partisans. They were also aimed at 
the Italian-speaking mercantile elites, frustrated by the dwindling vol-
ume of overseas trade, which had followed Trieste ’ s incorporation 
into  Italy. 13 Similar nostalgic ideas, organized around the image of 
Habsburg Trieste as a cosmopolitan commercial hub, were evoked by 
various autonomist movements, which argued that Trieste should 
enjoy the status of a  ‘ free city ’ and as such serve the needs of the hin-
terland while still maintaining a measure of local autonomy. 14 
 Following World War II alternative principles of identity and legit-
imacy like these were given a new lease of life. Poised at the southern 
tip of what was soon to be known as the Iron Curtain, the disputed 
territory assumed an unprecedented geopolitical signifi cance, which 
fi rmly anchored its fate to the logic of the Cold War. 15 This changing 
geopolitical context was also refl ected in the fl uctuating fortunes of 
competing proposals for the solution to the  ‘ Trieste problem ’ . The 
Council of Foreign Ministers (United States, the Soviet Union, 
France and Britain) initially put its faith in a  ‘ scientifi c ’ solution 
aimed at establishing  ‘ objective ’ patterns of ethnic settlement. But it 
soon became clear that this was a blind alley: the members of the 
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international boundary commission could not agree on a defi nition 
and method of measuring and came back empty-handed. 16 The 
assumption that borders should be drawn by making ethnicity coin-
cide with polity had to be discarded and the Council of Foreign Min-
isters turned to alternative solutions. This resulted in the proposal 
for establishing an independent, multinational and multilingual 
state, to be called the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT), whose admin-
istration would be entrusted to the United Nations  – an arrange-
ment modelled on the League of Nations administration of Danzig 
in the interwar period. 17 This solution was eventually enshrined in 
the Paris Peace Treaty, signed in February 1947. 
 However, by the time the FTT was due to be translated into polit-
ical reality, the global geopolitical situation had changed. In spite 
of growing local support for the new territorial and political 
arrangement 18 the intensifi cation of the rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union made the day-to-day functioning of the 
Free Territory impossible. The fact that many local supporters of 
the Free Territory had pronounced left-wing leanings, and favoured 
an autonomous Trieste under Yugoslav sovereignty aroused suspi-
cions among pro-Italian groups (of various political colours) and 
Western observers alike. 19 Trieste ’ s socialists were known for their 
support for multinational coexistence and communist internation-
alism, inspired by Austro-Marxist conceptions of sovereignty and 
 ‘ personal autonomy ’ . 20 Their views on the nationalities question 
also had a lot in common with those defended by South Slav social 
democratic groups in the Habsburg Empire 21 and appeared dis-
concertingly similar to solutions adopted in Tito ’ s Yugoslavia at the 
time. Despite the fact that Trieste ’ s autonomist movement also 
encompassed a right-wing group that eventually formed a separate 
party 22 the apparent overlaps with  ‘ communist ’ principles  – in 
 particular, the fact that both envisaged the accommodation of eth-
no-national difference under the same political roof  – proved dis-
turbing. In the end this contributed to the gradual abandonment 
of the Free Territory as a solution to the Trieste problem. Other 
proposals, including those based on the requirement to make 
political borders coincide with ethnic ones, were allowed back onto 
the negotiating table. 
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 The persistence of nationalist animosities in the region was a major 
factor as well. The permanent blockade against normal political and 
economic functions provided a breeding ground for discontent in 
the Free Territory and a stimulus to permanent mass mobilization. 
There were often violent clashes, even bloodshed, as well as mass 
migration. As ethnic tensions showed no sign of abating, representa-
tives of the Anglo-American military administration became increas-
ingly willing to listen to Italian nationalist arguments about the 
 ‘ natural ’ antipathy between Italians and Slavs. 23 In this sense, the 
abandonment of the Free Territory also indicated the acceptance by 
 ‘ high politics ’ of the persistence of local nationalist antagonisms. 
Equally important was the electoral defeat of the Italian Communist 
Party in the national elections in February 1948 and Yugoslavia ’ s 
expulsion from the Cominform later in the same year. These events 
made the threat of a Soviet take-over of Trieste seem far less likely and 
steadily downgraded the Italo-Yugoslav border dispute from a major 
Cold War front line to a more limited quarrel. In October 1953, after 
another round of mass demonstrations and escalating tensions 
between the two neighbouring states, Western allies announced the 
imminent withdrawal of their units from the Free Territory, provid-
ing both sides with a further incentive for reaching a compromise. 24 
The following year, the FTT was fi nally dismembered and divided 
between the two neighbouring states. Although no principle was offi -
cially adopted as the basis of the division, and decisions were largely 
driven by pragmatic considerations, the infl uence of ethno-national 
criteria and beliefs in the inherent hostility between Italians and Slavs 
was unmistakable. 25 
 Throughout this volatile period, the north-eastern Adriatic effec-
tively became a battleground for competing conceptions of nation-
hood. They were promoted both by the Italian and the Yugoslav 
authorities, as well as by the Allied administration and various local 
interest groups. The remainder of this chapter takes a closer look at 
two of the most infl uential competing conceptions of nationhood. 
The fi rst was promoted by Italian nationalist groups opposed to com-
munism, and was based on a racialized idea of the Italian nation as 
the bearer of a superior civilization, destined to rule over the north-
eastern Adriatic and protect it from  ‘ slavo-communist barbarism ’ . 
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The rival conception of belonging, defended by the Yugoslav author-
ities, was premised on the idea of Yugoslavia as a multinational fed-
eration whose unity depended primarily on common ideological 
affi liations and class consciousness rather than ethno-cultural ties. 
Both of these conceptions suggested alternatives to  ‘ Gellnerian 
nationalism ’ , yet for the border dispute to be settled, both were even-
tually displaced by the notion of the ethno-culturally homogeneous 
nation-state. 
 To elucidate the key elements of each of these conceptions of 
nationhood and sovereignty, the rest of this chapter draws on politi-
cal speeches, offi cial announcements, reports and commentaries 
published in major pro-Yugoslav and pro-Italian newspapers distrib-
uted in the region between 1947 and 1954, as well as on a selection of 
secondary sources. The pro-Italian newspapers covered here all were 
published in the Free Territory: they included  La Voce Libera and 
 Giornale di Trieste (otherwise known as  Il Piccolo ) and the weekly review 
of political affairs  Trieste . Among these,  Giornale di Trieste was most 
unequivocally in favour of the annexation of Trieste to Italy, and rep-
resented the voices of those Triestines who  ‘ recognised themselves in 
[. . .] the Western, Atlantic, and European camp ’ . 26 The pro-Yugoslav 
newspapers comprise the Croatian daily  Rije č ki list , later renamed 
 Novi list , the Slovenian bi-weekly  Nova Gorica , later renamed  Primorske 
novice , and the Italian minority daily  La Voce del Popolo , all published 
on the Yugoslav side of the border. Together with the Slovenian bi-
weekly  Slovenski, Jadran and the Slovenian minority daily  Primorski 
Dnevnik , both published in the Free Territory, most of these newspa-
pers had their roots in clandestine anti-fascist, pro-communist peri-
odicals established during World War II. 27 After the establishment of 
the Yugoslav federation, these newspapers were placed under the 
close supervision of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and func-
tioned as a conduit for communist agitation and persuasion. 28 
 3 Pro-Italian Newspapers: Between the 
Empire and the Nation-State 
 Pro-Italian and anti-communist Triestine newspapers shared an 
unambiguous commitment to the Italian national cause, and appealed 
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to those Italians who felt that Trieste, and the north-eastern Adriatic 
as a whole, formed an integral part of Italian national territory. The 
opening issue of  Giornale di Trieste (6 March 1947) presented the 
newspaper as  ‘ above all an Italian newspaper ’ , whose coverage sought 
to  ‘ correspond with the exigencies of a population that is largely Ital-
ian in terms of culture, language and sentiment ’ . According to an 
editorial published in the same newspaper shortly afterwards (3 May 
1947) Trieste  ‘ was and remains an Italian city ’ , and its streets were 
 ‘ our streets ’ . The opening editorial of  La Voce Libera (23 July 1945) 
was permeated by similar sentiments, speaking about  ‘ the love we 
bring to our Trieste, to the tormented Julian lands, and to the whole 
of Italy ’ , thus signalling a belief in the national tie that links both 
Trieste and the surrounding region to Italy. Yugoslav claims to this 
territory, the same editorial argued, were  ‘ clearly opposed to designs 
of history and culture ’ , and were therefore not destined to last. 
 At fi rst sight the notion of  ‘ Italianness ’ ( Italianit à ), which under-
pinned these writings  – associated with history, culture, language 
and sentiment  – conforms to a cultural, perhaps even  ‘ civic ’ concep-
tion of national belonging, since it appears to be open to everyone, 
regardless of racial or ethnic descent. Yet, as Pamela Ballinger has 
pointed out, this interpretation is rather misleading: from the nine-
teenth century onwards, ideas of nationhood in Italy were character-
ized by a slippage between culture and race, with language and 
culture often standing for ethnic descent and biological  ‘ race ’ . 29 The 
notion of  civilt à , which blends modern ideas of culture, civilization 
and civility, stands at the centre of this slippage and ties modern 
conceptions of Italian culture and language to a hierarchy of human 
races. The historical roots of this notion stretch back to the ideo-
logical universe of enlightenment Venice, within which the eastern 
shore of the Adriatic appeared to be poised mid-way between barba-
rism and civilization, and so demanded the enlightened interven-
tion of Venetian  civilt à . 30 
 Over the course of the nineteenth century, as the notion of the 
enlightening, assimilatory  civilt à became one of the core elements of 
Italian national identity, it gradually assumed racist overtones. Admit-
tedly these were not overtly biological: in the eyes of many Italian 
nationalists nothing prevented  ‘ Slavs ’ from becoming civilized. Yet 
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they could do so only by shedding their Slavic background and assim-
ilating fully into Italian civilization or culture. 31 In the twentieth cen-
tury this racialized notion of  civilt à was incorporated into fascist 
understandings of Italian identity, its imperial past and its future role 
as the bearer of a fascist empire. Fascists often spoke of Dalmatia, as 
well as the north-eastern shore of the Adriatic, as a land in need of 
Italian civilization, or singled out particular cities in Dalmatia as supe-
rior to other towns that were permeated by barbarism, irrationality, 
low levels of hygiene and a general  ‘ balkanism ’ . 32 The  ‘ new ’ fascist 
civilization was believed to be morally responsible for saving human-
ity, including the inhabitants of the Balkans, from the combined 
threats of democracy, communism and Jewish conspiracy. 33 At the 
same time, this civilizing mission also served to justify fascist colonial 
expansion and thus helped secure  ‘ living space ’ for the expansion of 
the fascist  ‘ New Order ’ . 34 
 This imperial, racialized belief in the superiority of Italian  civilt à , 
provided the basis for much of the reporting in the pro-Italian news-
papers circulating in the region. This was particularly evident in the 
reports from Dalmatia and those parts of Istria under Yugoslav 
rule, which repeatedly drew a sharp contrast between the glorious 
achievements of Italian civilization and the ingrained barbarity of 
Yugoslavs. In the eyes of  Il Piccolo (27 October 1954) the north- 
eastern Adriatic was characterized by a Roman, Venetian and Italian 
confi guration ’ , associated with  ‘ an unbroken progression of a 
 two-thousand-year old civilisation ’ whose heritage was now being 
destroyed by the barbaric actions of Yugoslav communists. In a char-
acteristic comment accompanying the photo reportage from the 
Istrian town of Pula/Pola, published in  Giornale di Trieste , the town ’ s 
Roman amphitheatre was used to symbolize the towering and time-
less presence of  ‘ Italianness ’ , and to provide a stark contrast with 
what was described as a pitifully small and lonely group of pro- 
Yugoslav protesters. 
 Similar rhetorical constructs, based on dichotomies of past and pres-
ent, imperial glory and communist barbarism, life and death, can be 
found in  La Voce Libera (14 June 1948). A photo-reportage from Zadar/
Zara, one of the major urban settlements on the  Dalmatian coast, was 
composed exclusively of images of ruins, decaying buildings and 
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empty streets. As one of the graphically most  prominent subtitles sug-
gested, the images represented a  ‘ Venetian city ’ , which is  ‘ dying in a 
long and grey agony ’ . The message is clear: the Slavic inhabitants of 
Istria and Dalmatia have no legitimate claim to the eastern shores of 
the Adriatic and are incapable of preserving the achievements of Ital-
ian civilization. The presence of the Yugoslav authorities in the region 
is therefore an  ‘ occupation ’ and evidence of  ‘ Yugoslav expansionism ’ 
(1 April 1948). Evidently the understanding of Italianness shown in 
these articles has a racial boundary: the benefi ts of Italian  civilit à can 
be generously extended to Slavs, but only insofar as they remain sec-
ond-class citizens, and refrain from challenging the primacy of ethnic 
Italians as the only legitimate heirs of the Roman and Venetian 
Empires. 
 In several articles the contrast between Italian civilization and Slavic 
barbarity overlapped with the characteristic Cold War dichotomies of 
communism and democracy, totalitarianism and freedom. Differ-
ences in economic and political systems were presented as stemming 
from cultural and mental predispositions and anchored in racial dif-
ferences. As the frequently-used derogatory term  ‘ slavo-communist ’ 
suggests, Slavs were perceived as inherently prone to communist 
 ideals, and hence to non-democratic, totalitarian modes of political 
rule. Such ideas were conveyed by visual elements such as caricatures 
and comic strips, where Slavs typically appeared rather intimidating, 
wearing a uniform and sometimes even barefoot and with hairy legs 
(e.g.,  Giornale di Trieste , 2 November 1953). Pro-Italian newspapers 
also  frequently included reports about the cruel measures employed 
by the Yugoslav authorities to deal with the opposition in the newly 
acquired territories. Reports on various cases of  ‘ infoibamento ’  – that 
is, the politically motivated killings of local inhabitants opposed to 
communist rule, followed by the mass burial of corpses in karstic pits 
known as  foibe  – were particularly common. One such report was 
accompanied by a photo of a group of people looking at an array of 
human remains  – bones and skulls  – retrieved from one of the local 
pits, which served as a material  ‘ proof ’ of Slav brutality ( Giornale di 
Trieste , 1 April 1948). Such reports and images helped solidify the 
perception of Slavs as intrinsically prone to cruelty, oppression and 
totalitarianism. 
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 Given the racial conception of Italian  civilt à , and a similarly racial 
understanding of communism, it should not come as a surprise that 
pro-Italian commentators were suspicious of Yugoslav efforts to pro-
mote a multinational identity for the region. The activities of the 
Italo-Slav Antifascist Union, the major communist organization in 
the region in the early post-war years, were dismissed as being inter-
nationalist in name only: in reality they were inherently Slav and ulti-
mately aimed at slavicizing the whole region and  ‘ erasing, as soon as 
possible, every trace of Italianness in the name of the Italo-Slav frater-
nity ’ ( La Voce Libera , 1 April 1947). Following a similar logic, commu-
nist activities in Italy were presented as inherently anti-Italian. In one 
editorial, the newspaper linked to the local branch of the Italian 
Communist Party,  Il Lavoratore , was described as  ‘ the organ of Panslav-
ism in Trieste ’ and as  ‘ a panslavic daily ’ ( La Voce Libera , 28 May 1947). 
Another article, published in the runup to the 1948 Italian elections, 
argued that the name and image of the Italian communist leader 
Palmiro Togliatti  ‘ were raised on banners around the streets of Tri-
este by Slav communists in order to negate Italians ’ and suggested 
that communist appeals to internationalism were nothing but a cun-
ning ploy. Yugoslavia, claimed the commentator,  ‘ is a Slav nation ’ 
while Italy was not, and because of that, if Italy became communist, 
Yugoslav interests would always take precedence over Italian ones, 
and despite Togliatti ’ s claims to the contrary, Trieste would not go to 
Italy ( Giornale di Trieste , 10 September 1947). 
 It is important to note that the pro-Italian newspapers examined 
here were not alone in perpetuating an imperial and implicitly racial-
ized notion of Italianness. At the time the whole of Italy was undergo-
ing a diffi cult process of transition from its short-lived empire to an 
ethno-culturally homogeneous nation-state  – a process which has 
often been discussed in relation to other Western states, but which is 
rarely acknowledged as an important part of Italy ’ s post-war experi-
ence. Italy ’ s democratic leaders initially fought hard to separate colo-
nialism from Fascism, arguing that Italy should be allowed to maintain 
some form of temporary control over its pre-fascist colonies, and facil-
itate their orderly transition to independence under the aegis of the 
United Nations. 35 Regaining control over territories in the north- 
eastern Adriatic, in particular over Trieste, ranked even higher on the 
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agenda. Many Italian observers felt that the city and the  surrounding 
region were an integral part of Italian national territory, with histori-
cal ties with Italy which went much deeper than those of other territo-
ries. 36 Clearly the newspaper coverage analyzed here echoed such 
sentiments. 
 Yet appeals to the civilizing mission and imperial duty no longer 
enjoyed the kind of international support they once had. In a world 
organized around the global contest between the Soviet Union and 
the United States  – both staunch supporters of decolonization move-
ments at the time 37 – colonialist appetites and imperial models of sov-
ereignty were falling out of favour. In addition, domestic support for 
colonial possessions was in decline. At a time when continental Europe 
was itself stumbling under the burden of post-war reconstruction, and 
had to resort to outside help to feed and clothe its population, the 
expense of colonial possessions was increasingly hard to justify. 38 In 
Italy the task was made even harder due to the stigma associated with 
Fascism. Italian citizens returning from the former colonies, includ-
ing those coming from the north-eastern Adriatic, were not looked 
upon with much sympathy. Their new neighbours, the inhabitants of 
Italy ’ s urban centres, tended to see them as both competitors for 
scarce resources and living reminders of a shameful fascist past. 39 
Given these domestic and international pressures, Italian authorities 
had little choice but to forego their imperial dreams and adapt to the 
reality of Italy as a nation-state. By 1952 Italy had lost all its colonies, 
except for Somalia, and although the territorial contest over the 
north-eastern Adriatic took somewhat longer to settle, its outcome in 
the end was a rejection of Italy ’ s claim to its former territories. 40 
 In this context, territorial claims like those advanced in the Tries-
tine newspapers were beginning to sound anachronistic, at least from 
the perspective of Italian metropolitan centres. Nevertheless, some 
elements of the imperial conception of Italianness, in particular, its 
racial assumptions, proved tenacious. For instance, beliefs about the 
deeply engrained hostility between Italians and Slavs, and about the 
incompatibility of their ways of life, proved infl uential in determining 
the fi nal shape of the Italo-Yugoslav border. Faced with persistent 
inter-ethnic prejudice and confl icts in the area, members of the Allied 
Military Government were becoming more and more prone to accept 
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that the only solution to the dispute was to make ethnicity coincide 
with the state border as far as possible. 41 The reports appearing in the 
Triestine pro-Italian newspapers at the time reinforced these ideas, 
and sometimes themselves explicitly resorted to ethno-national prin-
ciples of border formation  – for instance, when they mourned the 
loss of  ‘ ethnically ’ Italian villages and towns annexed to Yugoslavia 
(e.g.,  Il Giornale di Trieste , 19 October 1954). 
 Ethno-racial markers also continued to play a role in assessing the 
eligibility of applicants for Italian citizenship from the former colo-
nies. According to the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, all Italian citizens who 
were domiciled in the territories annexed to Yugoslavia prior to World 
War II not only were to be automatically granted Yugoslav citizenship, 
but also were given the right to opt for Italian citizenship, provided 
that their customary language was Italian. 42 Since Slovenians and Cro-
atians residing in the region normally spoke Italian fl uently, this clause 
in principle gave them the possibility of opting for Italian citizenship 
as well. But on the Italian side, this prospect prompted worries about 
Italian-speaking ethnic Slavs deliberately  ‘ abusing ’ the provisions of 
the Peace Treaty to  ‘ infi ltrate ’ the Italian part of the region. 43 Although 
local authorities could not legally reject such applications, they often 
required the applicants to relocate to other regions in Italy, or else to 
register with the local authorities as foreigners. 44 Much like the impe-
rial understanding of Italian nationhood found in Triestine national-
ist newspapers, the notion of Italianness underpinning these decisions 
had a clear ethno-racial rationale. In this way, old ethno-racial markers 
were re-inscribed into the new, nation-state centred idea of Italian-
ness. Yet the uses of the racial boundary in the two contexts differed: 
in the fi rst case, racial markers served to justify territorial expansion 
and the inclusion of Slavs  – albeit as second-class citizens  – while in the 
second case, the boundary was used as a means of exclusion, and pre-
vented Italian-speaking Slavs from acquiring citizenship. 
 4 Pro-Yugoslav Newspapers: Between Ethnic 
Nations and Nations of Comrades 
 Even a quick glance at the front pages of pro-Yugoslav newspapers in 
the fi rst post-war decade shows that appeals to national belonging 
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were an integral part of their coverage. Articles regularly addressed 
their readers in national terms, and some of the newspapers also fea-
tured recognizable national symbols, such as the Slovenian national 
coat of arms, complete with the  ‘ national mountain ’ ( Triglav ) and sea 
waves. Yet these national references and symbols were typically com-
bined with symbols of communism, references to the overarching 
 ‘ brotherhood and unity ’ of Yugoslavia ’ s nations, and appeals to non-
national collectivities, in particular, to workers and peasants. Further-
more, the categories normally used to refer to the nation, such as the 
words  ‘ narod ’ in Serbo-Croatian,  ‘ ljudstvo ’ in Slovenian and  ‘ popolo ’ in 
Italian, evoked different shades of meaning. Like the English usage 
of  ‘ people ’ they could connote simultaneously an ethno-culturally 
homogeneous collectivity as well as an ethno-culturally mixed group 
which shared a common allegiance to proletarian rule. Thus a char-
acteristic announcement of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on 
Labour Day in 1947, reproduced word-for-word in several newspa-
pers, was addressed simultaneously to  ‘ the peoples/nations [ narodi ] 
of Yugoslavia ’ as well as to  ‘ workers ’ ,  ‘ peasants ’ ,  ‘ the intelligentsia ’ , 
 ‘ the youth ’ ,  ‘ women ’ ,  ‘ citizens ’ ,  ‘ soldiers ’ and  ‘ offi cers ’ ( Rije č ki list , 
1 May 1947). A similar array of collective subjects was invoked in an 
editorial in the Italian minority daily. Its author described the Labour 
Day as 
 . . . a luminous day, when the working class and the peasants, 
people ’ s intelligentsia, the youth and women, all of the Croatian 
and Italian nations/peoples [ popolo ] of our land, along with other 
peoples/nations [ popoli ] of Yugoslavia and with comrade Tito, 
are reconfi rming their conscious and resolute effort to bring to 
completion all of the tasks of the fi ve-year plan. ( La Voce del Popolo , 
1 May 1947) 
 This mixture of appeals to national belonging and working-class com-
radeship, underscored by the ambiguity of the categories of collec-
tive identity used, was wholly in line with the offi cial socialist Yugoslav 
approach to nationality and statehood. Modelled on the Soviet 
 federal system, the Yugoslav constitution recognized the existence of 
distinct, autonomous national identities at sub-state level while at the 
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same time assuming a common Yugoslav identity, rooted in a shared 
loyalty to the communist cause. 45 The simultaneous emphasis on 
national distinctiveness and overarching Yugoslav working-class com-
radeship was presented as the only form of nationhood that was capa-
ble of guarding Tito ’ s Yugoslavia against the shortcomings which 
were held to have led to its bloody inter-ethnic confl ict in World War 
II. 46 Particular targets were the attempts by Yugoslav elites in the inter-
war period to build a ‘ synthetic ’ Yugoslav culture, based on the belief 
that Yugoslav peoples, despite being culturally, linguistically and reli-
giously different, in fact constituted a single national whole. 47 This 
understanding of Yugoslavism came to be perceived by many non-
Serbs as an attempt to Serbianize the country, and despite the gradual 
abandonment of  ‘ integral Yugoslavism ’ in the 1930s, 48 inter-war 
 Yugoslavia was subsequently remembered as an oppressive state intent 
on forcibly assimilating Yugoslav peoples into a single nation. 
 This selective memory enabled the communist elites to construct 
their project of Yugoslav  ‘ brotherhood and unity ’ as an entirely unprec-
edented endeavour to link the South Slavs together under a single 
political roof while at the same time maintaining their national distinc-
tiveness. In contrast to inter-war Yugoslavia, the argument went, Tito ’ s 
Yugoslavia was addressing the true causes of pre-war oppression and 
war-time bloodshed. These were not only limited to exploitative rela-
tions between nations, but also encompassed capitalist exploitation, 
nationalist antagonism between different national bourgeoisies and 
the continuing infl uence of other  ‘ forces of the past ’ including feudal 
relationships, the Church and imperial interests. 49 Following this argu-
ment, the true solution to the Yugoslav national question could not be 
found solely in the continuation of the South Slav national liberation 
struggle. Instead the struggle had to be integrated into the interna-
tional struggle of the working classes against both domestic capitalists 
and imperialist forces abroad. In short, the equality and brotherhood 
of Yugoslav nations had to go hand-in-hand with, and where neces-
sary be subordinated to, working-class comradeship and allegiance to 
a communist vision of modernity. 
 The notion of Yugoslav  ‘ brotherhood and unity ’ as a new and 
unique form of collective belonging was prominent in public speeches 
and news reports at the time. Yugoslavia, as Tito declared in an 
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 interview, was building a  ‘ new community ’ , a community within which 
 ‘ every nation/people [ narod ] represents a specifi c unit on its own, yet 
they all together also form a strong unit ’ ( Glas Istre , 6 June 1947). 
Eros Sequi, the fi rst secretary of the Union of Italians and one of the 
few  ‘ good Italians ’ trusted by the Yugoslav regime, 50 defended a simi-
lar vision of Yugoslavism, and described the new Yugoslavia as  ‘ a state 
in which nationality is fully free to develop, and where economy, 
political power and every human activity are based on a new founda-
tion of collaboration between humans and nations ’ ( La Voce del Popolo , 
1 January 1947). Italians living on the Yugoslav side of the border 
were regularly mentioned as equal members of the new Yugoslav 
nation. As one article argued, the  ‘ great idea of brotherhood and 
unity ’ , forged in the common struggle against Fascism, was capable 
of overcoming the hostility between Italians and Croats in Istria, and 
helped unite them in  ‘ a strong front ’ ( Rije č ki list , 2 March 1947). 
 It is no coincidence that none of these examples provides a particu-
larly clear defi nition of Yugoslav unity. Up to about mid-1947, party 
offi cials deliberately avoided mentioning their communist creden-
tials, and instead emphasized the equality and freedom of Yugoslav 
nations, the need for economic rebuilding and development and the 
importance of education and women ’ s rights, etc. 51 The principal 
motivation for such a policy was not only the need to consolidate the 
position of the Communist Party at home without alienating the gen-
eral population, but also the fear of damaging Yugoslavia ’ s position 
vis- à -vis the West. Given the mounting tensions between the two 
superpowers, it was strategically much wiser to sound the trumpet of 
national liberation and equality than to provoke unwanted attention 
with loud proclamations of loyalty to the communist cause. Similarly, 
local activists involved in preparations for the visit of the international 
boundary commission in 1946 were asked to avoid using any symbols 
that would signal loyalty to the Soviet cause, and instead prepare graf-
fi ti, banners and fl ags that emphasized Slovenian identity and loyalty 
to Yugoslavia. Communist symbols such as the hammer and sickle, 
found on the walls across the towns and villages in the region, were to 
be erased immediately, and replaced with  ‘ writings in the national 
spirit ’ , such as  ‘ Slovenians have been here from times immemorial ’ 
and  ‘ For us, life exists only in Yugoslavia ’ . 52 
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 From about mid-1947, references to the common communist cause 
became more common. As a commentary published on the Day of 
the Republic (the anniversary of the declaration of the republic on 
29 November 1943) made clear, Yugoslavia was  ‘ a country in which its 
nations/peoples [ narodi ], united in brotherhood, are building for 
themselves a better future, building a socialist society ’ ( Rije č ki list , 29 
November 1947). Following a similar logic,  ‘ workers ’ were now often 
singled out as the key bearers of the new Yugoslav identity. A speech 
delivered by Tito, reproduced in  Glas Istre (5 September 1947), is a 
case in point. When talking about the fi ve-year plan, Tito started by 
pointing out that the tasks of the plan were shared by  ‘ all citizens of 
Yugoslavia ’ , but then emphasized that workers were expected to bear 
the brunt of responsibility for fulfi lling the plan, and had the duty  ‘ to 
work day and night ’ ,  ‘ selfl essly ’ , to achieve the goal. Given its leading 
role in the country ’ s reconstruction, working-class comradeship was 
also expected to provide the connecting tissue of Yugoslav unity, tying 
the different nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia into a single indi-
visible whole.  ‘ In our country ’ , argued Tito,  ‘ there is only one collec-
tivity . . . All our working people merged into one single, huge 
collectivity, into a strong fi st, united in thought and action ’ . 
 To be sure, these idealistic proclamations of  ‘ brotherhood and 
unity ’ were far from the everyday reality of inter-ethnic relations in the 
region or in Yugoslavia as a whole. While cross-national collaboration 
and trust were certainly not absent, and indeed were often motivated 
by shared political persuasion and, in particular, loyalty to communist 
ideals, they were often paralleled and sometimes even outweighed by 
hatred and violence. This was especially true in the case of relations 
between Slavs and Italians. The decades of fascist rule had left a legacy 
of bitter memories and mutual suspicion that proved diffi cult to dis-
pel, and forced many Italians to  ‘ opt ’ for exile. 53 Newspapers on both 
sides of the border were instrumental in keeping these memories and 
suspicions alive. Pro-Yugoslav newspapers were full of reports about 
the continuing discrimination faced by the Slovenian minority in Italy, 
about the persistence of fascist attitudes on the other side of the bor-
der and about the devastation left behind by decades of Fascist rule in 
the region (e.g.,  Slovenski Jadran , 5 November 1954;  Novi list , 29 
November 1954). According to one commentator, Italians  were also 
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particularly prone to  ‘ bourgeois ’ values, since their cultural capabili-
ties were  ‘ most ruthlessly manipulated and made deviant by decades 
of Fascism ’ ( La Voce del Popolo , 1 January 1947). Despite frequent ref-
erences to Italo-Slav fraternity, such reports and assertions did little 
to undermine the assumption that Italians were inherently prone to 
Fascism and hostile to both Slavs and communism. 
 At the same time, there is plenty of evidence that adherence to 
communism among local Slovenians and Croats did not automati-
cally mean that ethno-national interests were subordinated to the 
common proletarian cause. Here too the diffi culties of determining 
Italian citizenship among inhabitants of former Italian territories 
annexed to Yugoslavia after World War II serve as a useful example. 
As mentioned earlier, the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty technically allowed 
local inhabitants of Slav descent  – however that was determined  – to 
apply for Italian citizenship, as long as they could prove that Italian 
was their  ‘ customary language ’ . However, the defi nition of  ‘ custom-
ary language ’ was slippery, leaving the local administration consider-
able room for manoeuvre. In the instructions distributed to the local 
People ’ s Committees in Yugoslavia  ‘ customary language ’ was trans-
lated as  ‘ doma č i jezik ’  – literally,  ‘ home language ’  – thus suggesting 
that in order to qualify, applicants had to use Italian not only in the 
public realm or at work, but also in the private sphere. 54 This transla-
tion provided the necessary grounds for refusing to grant Italian 
citizenship to all those applicants of non-Italian origin who were 
judged to be using Slovenian or Croatian language in their family 
environment. Thus a female applicant from  Š empeter, whose hus-
band remained on the Italian side of the border, was sent a letter 
explaining that the People ’ s Committee  ‘ cannot issue a document 
assigning Italian citizenship to a person who is Slovenian [. . .] since 
this would lead to serious consequences ’ . 55 Evidently, local commu-
nist offi cials were reluctant to accept a complete fusion between 
nationhood and allegiance to communism inscribed in the offi cial 
version of Yugoslavism and continued to uphold the ethno-cultural 
conception of Slovenian identity. Yugoslav newspaper coverage, 
replete with references to territories that  ‘ ethnically ’ belonged to 
Yugoslavia, did little to discourage such views (e.g.,  Slovenski Jadran , 
7 October 1954). 
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 These different meanings and usages of Yugoslavism suggest that 
communist support for nationalism was not just instrumental. It may 
be, of course, that some party members used the rhetoric of national 
liberation and equality merely as a propaganda ploy to promote com-
munist goals. Yet there is little doubt that many communist Yugoslav 
offi cials were genuinely concerned about the fate of  ‘ their ’ nations 
and became attracted to the communist cause at least in part because 
of its commitment to national equality. This led the highest echelons 
of the Party to take every opportunity to present communist goals as 
entirely commensurate with particular national interests, and in fact 
to insist that allegiance to the proletarian cause was the only route 
towards the fulfi llment of national liberation. For instance, accord-
ing to Milovan Djilas, then one of the top leaders of the Yugoslav 
Communist movement, Yugoslavia was undergoing both  ‘ a social 
transformation ’ and  ‘ a national rebirth ’ :  ‘ While fi ghting for the 
 freedom and independence of our nations/peoples [ naroda ] we are 
simultaneously building a new society, a new social order in which 
people will be equal ’ ( Rije č ki list , 15 April 1947). The constant oscilla-
tion between working class identity and national belonging was there-
fore more than just an exercise in manipulation. It can be seen as a 
compromise that made Tito ’ s Yugoslavism appear attractive to a rela-
tively broad range of interest groups and helped broaden the regime ’ s 
popular support. Yugoslavia thus functioned  – like any other nation 
 – as a symbol with multiple meanings, which were  ‘ offered as alterna-
tives and competed over by different groups manoeuvring to capture 
the symbol ’ s defi nition and its legitimating effects ’ . 56 
 Given its malleability, it is not surprising that the double-layered 
nature of Yugoslavism persisted throughout the existence of com-
munist Yugoslavia, regardless of the substantial political, economic 
and cultural changes that it underwent. In the years that followed 
the Tito – Stalin split in 1948, Yugoslavia ’ s political leadership 
embraced a new set of political and economic principles, centred 
on the ideal of  ‘ workers ’ self-management ’ and premised on a rejec-
tion of  ‘ Soviet ’ or  ‘ Stalinist ’ models. 57 The Party was expected to 
refrain from commanding and managing all aspects of social, polit-
ical and economic life in the country, and limit its role to political 
education and persuasion. 58 In the aftermath of these shifts, new 
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tropes  entered Yugoslav public discourse, organized around slogans 
such as  ‘ debureaucratization ’ ,  ‘ decentralization ’ , and of course 
 ‘ workers ’ self-management ’ . 59 These shifting discourses crystallized 
around a new understanding of Yugoslavism, based on the idea of 
Yugoslavia as a meeting point of East and West, which lasted until 
the early 1960s and was accompanied by a renewed emphasis on a 
common Yugoslav culture. 60 As Tito put it in 1954,  ‘ [w]e are follow-
ing our own path into socialism, and we will not allow anyone, nei-
ther those in the East nor those in the West, to make us stray from 
this path ’ ( Primorske Novice , 2 April 1954). 
 Despite these changes, the understanding of Yugoslavism that 
underpinned newspaper coverage in the northeastern Adriatic 
remained broadly the same: the Yugoslav nation was portrayed as a 
multinational community of workers, united in the support for social-
ism. For instance, in an editorial published in  Novi list on the day of 
the Republic, both  ‘ working class ’ and  ‘ Yugoslav peoples/nations ’ 
were mentioned, perpetuating the characteristic fusion of class soli-
darity and nationhood (29 November 1954). In contrast, explicit 
proclamations of belonging to a Yugoslav community of brotherly 
nations and working peoples, such as those encountered in the late 
1940s, were now rather rare. By the mid-1950s, the particular Yugo-
slav mode of belonging had, arguably, become so deeply engrained 
that its existence was taken for granted. In other words, the commu-
nist version of Yugoslavism had become a form of  ‘ banal national-
ism ’ 61 . As such, it was sustained by small, barely noticed reminders, 
such as references to  ‘ us ’ ,  ‘ our president ’ or  ‘ our country ’ , without 
repeatedly specifying what the  ‘ we ’ referred to, or how it related to 
communism, nationhood and working-class comradeship. 
 Exceptions to this rule were those exalted moments of national cel-
ebration that accompanied major national holidays, as well as major 
international events involving Yugoslavia. On such occasions, explicit 
references to Yugoslav  ‘ brotherhood and unity ’ and its particular 
combination of socialist values and national belonging came to the 
fore again. As in the late 1940s, communist offi cials and newspaper 
commentators alike insisted that communist goals were entirely 
 consistent with particular national interests, and provided the best 
possible guarantee for the attainment of full national liberation. A 
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commentary published in a Slovenian bi-weekly a few days before 25 
May, which as the offi cial day of Tito ’ s birth, was celebrated as the 
Youth Day, is a case in point: 
 In our struggle for national liberation, for the unifi cation of all the 
parts of our national body, Slovenians of the littoral have found in 
Tito our most powerful supporter. His resolute words, supported by 
the common will and actions of all Yugoslav nations, have recently 
prevented great evil and a new injustice that was being prepared 
for us by our greedy neighbors with the support of their godfathers 
 ( Slovenski Jadran, 21 May 1954). 
 The reports accompanying the dismemberment of the FTT and 
the signing of the London Memorandum in 1954 are particularly tell-
ing in this respect. Once the shape of the new ItaloYugoslav border 
had fi nally been defi ned, the Yugoslav authorities were faced with the 
diffi cult task of justifying the  ‘ loss ’ of Trieste. To do so, they not only 
presented Yugoslav willingness to sacrifi ce a part of its ethnic territory 
as an admirable gesture and a model for solving similar disputes else-
where in Europe, but also repeatedly emphasized that Yugoslavia had 
effectively achieved everything it could realistically be expected to 
(e.g.,  Novi list , 7 October 1954). At the same time, it was made clear 
that Yugoslavia was entitled to much more, and that the new arrange-
ment of borders was not there to stay, since it did not coincide with 
the ethnic distribution of the population. As argued in a speech by 
the Slovenian writer France Bevk, reproduced in  Primorske novice 
(15 October 1954), even though the London Memorandum was the 
best possible solution under the circumstances,  ‘ if we look into the 
more distant future, we should not forget that unnatural borders, 
which unjustly cut into the body of a nation, cannot endure ’ . Yet 
again we see that the Yugoslav formula of nationhood was capable of 
accommodating rather different relationships between national 
belonging and communist ideals. This malleability also helps explain 
why and how Yugoslavism could function alongside ethno-cultural 
principles of border legitimation, and thus help formulate a territo-
rial arrangement that was, in no small part, underpinned by nation-
state-centred ideas of sovereignty. 
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 4 Conclusion 
 The notions of belonging that were fostered by pro-Yugoslav and by 
pro-Italian newspapers in the northeastern Adriatic both departed 
from the ideal of an ethno-culturally homogeneous nation-state, but 
did so in very different ways. The understanding of Italianness in pro-
Italian newspapers was centred on the imperial notion of Italian  civilt à 
as a transnational force, which gave Italy the right to expand into for-
eign territories and rule over populations that were considered civili-
zationally inferior. By contrast, pro-Yugoslav newspapers promoted a 
form of collective belonging and sovereignty anchored in transna-
tional working-class comradeship and allegiance to proletarian rule. 
At the same time, these transnational bonds of identity and loyalty 
coexisted and sometimes merged with ethno-cultural and even racial 
notions of identity and sovereignty. Within pro-Italian nationalist 
 discourse,  civilt à was implicitly based on racial categories and hierar-
chies, most evident in portrayals of Slavs as inherently barbaric and 
totalitarian, and in the anxieties about granting Italian citizenship to 
applicants of Slavic descent. Likewise, Yugoslav  ‘ brotherhood and 
unity ’ often drew on an ethno-racial understanding of belonging, in 
which Italians appeared intrinsically prone to Fascism, claims to terri-
tories in the north-eastern Adriatic were ethnically based and appli-
cants for emigration were occasionally prevented from setting aside 
their Yugoslav citizenship on the grounds of their descent. These fi nd-
ings strengthen the view that we need to move beyond the narrow 
defi nition of nationalism as a political doctrine that requires ethnicity 
and polity to coincide, and instead acknowledge that the ideal of the 
ethnoculturally homogeneous state was just one of several available 
responses to manifestations of the rise of nations as political subjects. 
Even where it was in the end asserted, it coexisted and sometimes 
competed with other principles of national sovereignty and other 
forms of national belonging, in this case, those found in multiethnic 
empires and multinational communist federations. 
 To account for these alternative forms of nationhood and sover-
eignty, we need to revise the idea that nation-statehood was the only 
truly decisive and politically infl uential form of collective belonging in 
the modern era. Rather than being studied in isolation, the links 
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between nationhood and political systems need to be situated in the 
broader context of competing projects of collective identifi cation and 
popular legitimacy in the nineteenth and twentieth century, not least 
those based on class and racial ideology. The close proximity of class 
and nation is not a coincidence: they both call for an abstract sense of 
community in an analogous, universalistic way, and they are also both 
related to political power and to the state. 62 Due to these commonali-
ties, national and class ideologies typically spread together and were 
often in competition for the same mass allegiance. 63 As argued here, 
racial categorization, sometimes disguised as  ‘ culture ’ or  ‘ ethnicity ’ , 
was an integral part of the same mixture. Arguments about racial and 
civilizational superiority often appeared side-by-side with notions of 
national sovereignty and working class allegiance and were used 
together with them to buttress claims to sovereignty and territory. 
Gender categories, though left unexplored in this analysis, were often 
also part of the mix. To be sure, such interlinkages were not only lim-
ited to post-war Italy and communist Yugoslavia, but also appeared, 
for example, in imperial and post-imperial South Africa 64 and several 
European countries in the inter-war period, 65 and can be seen in con-
temporary contexts, including contemporary immigrant societies in 
the West. 66 Needless to say, the encounter between these different 
forms of identity and loyalty, and the associated principles of legiti-
macy and sovereignty, was resolved in very different ways. 
 This discussion has also suggested that different models of nation-
hood and sovereignty, including those that appear logically incompat-
ible, could often exist alongside each other. The persistence of 
ethno-racial prejudice in pro-Yugoslav and pro-Italian newspapers, 
and in everyday negotiations over citizenship in the northeastern 
Adriatic, provides some telling examples. In spite of offi cial proclama-
tions of multinational brotherhood and unity in the Yugoslav case, 
and proud endorsements of  civilt à as a transnational force on the 
 Italian side, ethno-racial perceptions of belonging and sovereignty 
were widespread, and occasionally received indirect endorsement in 
public discourse. The malleability of identity categories often contrib-
uted to that as well. As the Yugoslav case shows, the categories used to 
refer to the nation were often rather ambiguous. This allowed the 
communist notion of Yugoslavism appealing to a variety of interests 
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groups and segments of the population, including some that were not 
particularly attracted to communist ideals as such, but could be swayed 
by arguments about national liberation and equality. 
 When considering the particular case of communist Yugoslavia, it 
may be tempting to interpret these ambiguities of nationhood as the 
result of conscious manipulation devised by the communist authori-
ties. Yet this interpretation is too rigid to account for the range of 
meanings and uses attached to Yugoslavism. As Oliver Zimmer points 
out, scholarly observers are often too consumed by the quest for logi-
cal consistency to notice that social actors are not particularly both-
ered by internal paradoxes and contradictions in their perceptions of 
national identity. 67 The notions of belonging and legitimacy motivat-
ing their actions and claims are often guided by disparate pragmatic 
considerations and tacit assumptions, including, in particular, the 
need to construct a national identity that makes sense and allows 
them to achieve particular goals within a specifi c local, domestic or 
international context. As we have seen, the negotiation of identity 
and loyalty in the north-eastern Adriatic was constrained by historical 
legacies and memories of the war and the inter-war period, the grow-
ing opposition to colonialism in the international arena, as well as 
the need to justify territorial demands and consolidate domestic sup-
port in a crisis-ridden situation. To this we could add the shared con-
demnation of Fascism and Nazism, and the need to create a distance 
from war-time atrocities. At some level the emphasis on transnational 
loyalties, whether rooted in allegiance to communism or in the notion 
of  civilt à , allowed both pro-Italian and pro-Yugoslav actors to sidestep 
the issue of their own complicity in the advance of Fascism. 
 As for the Cold War, it is undeniable that from the crisis of May 
1945 onwards  ‘ high politics ’ signifi cantly affected the course of the 
dispute. But once we take a closer look at the notions of identity and 
sovereignty promoted by different social actors, and the sociopoliti-
cal and historical context in which they were embedded, it becomes 
apparent that nationalism could not simply be manipulated at will by 
policymaking elites. Although numerous manifestations and compet-
ing symbolic displays of national belonging in the border region 
clearly were supported or carefully managed by the political elites, 
nationalist identifi cations went beyond conscious manipulation. They 
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were often guided by genuine feelings of national loyalty, which were 
consistent transnational allegiances. The power of nationalist senti-
ments within the population as a whole should not be discounted 
either. To be considered legitimate any solution to the border dis-
pute therefore had to take into account nationalist sentiments as 
well. The fi nal shape of the Italian-Yugoslavian border was in the end 
not the product of a  diktat from on high but the outcome of complex 
negotiations in which nationalist and ethnic pressures played a cen-
tral part. 
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 Chapter 4 
 Kicking Under the Table: Minority Confl ict 
Between Hungary and Romania 1 
 Martin Mevius 
 1 Introduction 
 The basic context of ethnic tensions between Hungary and Romania 
was created long before the Cold War by the Treaty of Trianon (1920), 
which meant that Hungary lost two-thirds of its prewar territory and 
40 per cent of its population to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Roma-
nia. Over the following two decades, Hungarian foreign policy was 
completely dominated by the demand for territorial revision. 
Although Hungary ’ s military destruction in World War II removed 
the revision of borders from the mainstream political agenda, Hun-
garian concerns about the minorities living beyond them remained. 
By the same token its neighbours continued to eye Budapest with 
suspicion and to see their Hungarian citizens as disloyal. Relations 
with Romania, which had the largest Hungarian minority (about 
2 million), were especially problematic. During the Cold War,  Western 
observers found it extremely diffi cult to gauge the nature of this rela-
tionship. Lacking solid sources, diplomats and journalists pored over 
offi cial communiqu é s, carefully weighing every word in order to 
determine its precise signifi cance. Their fi ndings were limited: for 
example, in the 1970s and 1980s, Radio Free Europe knew that 
 Hungary and Romania were increasingly at loggerheads over the 
minority 2 but could not establish any details. 3 Even in the 1980s when 
confl icts between the two countries erupted, they found it diffi cult to 
establish motives and policies. Not surprisingly, there was also little 
academic work on the ethnic confl ict between the two states. 4 
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 More recent publications have shed new light on the relationship 
between the two countries and their respective communist parties. 
They show that relations between Romania and Hungary were marred 
by serious confl ict, not just from the mid-1980s, but throughout the 
Cold War. Hungarian historians Mih á ly F ü l ö p and G á bor Vincze even 
speak of an  ‘ Iron Curtain ’ standing between the two states from 1948 
to 1955. 5 According to Stefano Bottoni, the seeds of Ceau ş escu ’ s par-
ticular national communist ideology were sown in the 1956 Hungar-
ian revolution: the unrest this created among ethnic Hungarians 
deepened Romanian distrust of the minority and led to Ceau ş escu ’ s 
 ‘ national megalomania. ’ 6 Katalin Mikl ó ssy argues that even under 
the rule of J á nos K á d á r (1956 – 1988) Hungarian foreign policy was 
dictated by national interests. 7 This suggests that the charge that has 
often been levelled at his regime by  é migr é critics, that it was not inter-
ested in the fate of Hungarians abroad, needs to be questioned. On 
the contrary, the fate of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania was 
a constant preoccupation of the communist leadership, not least 
because it refl ected badly on itself. Hungary attempted to infl uence 
Romania ’ s minority policy by the use of  ‘ quiet diplomacy ’ but its 
attempts were largely unsuccessful. Instead of leading to an improve-
ment of minority rights it triggered further confl icts between the two 
states. According to Gy ö rgy F ö ldes, two different  ‘ national ideologies ’ 
were involved; whereas in Hungary communist leaders attempted to 
differentiate between patriotism and nationalism, in Romania they 
actively promoted a unitary, ethnically homogeneous nation. Liberal 
reforms in Hungary were a threat to Romania ’ s Stalinist regime, while 
the minority itself posed a threat to the centralized concept of the 
Romanian nation-state. 8 
 On the wider question of ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern 
Europe during the Cold War, the consensus that prevailed, at least 
until recently, is summarized by Benett Kovrig ’ s view that  ‘ ethnic dis-
crimination and interests were laid to rest ’ but  ‘ over time ’ national-
ism once again resurfaced. 9 Shared ideology, membership of the 
same political-economic bloc and Soviet dominance supposedly com-
bined to inhibit national confl icts between the two states. In the 
 following contribution, I take a different view, arguing that there 
were serious confl icts between Hungary and Romania and they lasted 
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from World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall. I concentrate espe-
cially on the genesis of these disagreements immediately after the 
war, a period that has been often neglected by historians. Since both 
the Romanian and Hungarian communist parties wished to appear as 
national parties, disagreements over borders and the treatment of 
the Hungarian minority were probably inevitable. In the end, com-
munist ideology failed to reduce ethnic strife because ethnicity was 
embedded in the lives and mentalities of those who were meant to be 
implementing policy. Party members were not mindless automata, 
ruthlessly implementing policy in conformity with Leninist princi-
ples. On the contrary, their attitudes and sentiments, refl ecting their 
milieu and recent history, were national and sometimes nationalist. 
 The potential for confl ict can be seen in the theory and practice of 
the communist movement itself. The writings of Marx and Lenin pre-
sented communists with ample ammunition for either supporting or 
suppressing nationalism and national movements. Marx himself 
believed that nationalism could have a progressive function: it might 
forge larger economic units or, as in Poland or Hungary, foment bour-
geois revolutions against dominant conservative forces. Before the 
working class could move towards a world revolution, it had to become 
 ‘ the leading class of the nation ’ , indeed it had to become the nation 
as such  ‘ although not in the bourgeois sense of the word ’ . 10 Lenin too 
conceded that workers could develop a strong national identity, not-
ing in 1914 that  ‘ [w]e are full of a sense of national pride ’ . 11 This basic 
notion of a progressive national identity was developed in the Soviet 
policy of  korenizatsiya ( ‘ indigenisation ’ ), which encouraged the nation-
alities of the USSR to use their own languages and culture in order to 
spread socialism. In the 1930s, appeals to broader Soviet patriotism 
also became more prominent. Above all the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union led to the rallying of the population in the  ‘ Great Patri-
otic War ’ and an infusion of patriotism with Russian national symbols. 
Under the direction of the Comintern, this appeal to national senti-
ments was followed by other communist parties. Stalin and Georgi 
Dimitrov, general secretary of the Comintern, now called on all  ‘ sec-
tions ’ of the Comintern to fl y the fl ag of national liberation and 
 downplay the call for revolution. All European parties followed this 
 ‘ national line ’ . The dismantling of the Comintern in 1943 was meant 
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to  underline this policy, by proving that communists were not, as their 
enemies claimed,  ‘ agents of Moscow ’ . 
 After the war European communist parties continued this policy 
and presented themselves as patriots. In seeking to square this stance 
with Marxism, they contrasted the  ‘ nationalism ’ of capitalist states 
with the  ‘ true patriotism ’ of communist states. Whereas the former, 
often labelled  ‘ chauvinism ’ , was based on racism and the oppression 
of other nations, the latter supported movements of  ‘ national libera-
tion ’ and respected other cultures. This  ‘ socialist patriotism ’ was 
deemed compatible with  ‘ socialist internationalism ’ . 
 2 The Hungarian-Romanian Border 
 Both Hungarian and Romanian communist parties followed the 
Comintern line as they moved from working for the resistance to 
becoming masters of their own states. But presenting themselves as 
 ‘ socialist patriots ’ was not easy, and even after the disbandment of the 
Comintern, both parties continued to be seen as Soviet stooges. In 
Romania, the communists had a particularly unpatriotic reputation 
because they had rejected Trianon and the cession of Transylvania to 
Romania. Worse still, in Transylvania thousands of Hungarians had 
fl ocked to join the party and formed the largest ethnic group within 
it. In 1946, as many as 70 per cent of Communist Party members in 
Transylvania were Hungarians, Jews or ethnic Germans (Saxons). 12 In 
popular perceptions the presence of so many Hungarians, alongside 
Jewish activists confi rmed the  ‘ alien ’ or  ‘ un-Romanian ’ character of 
the party. 13 On the other side of the border, Hungarian communists 
had attacked the Trianon treaty from the start. 
 The Transylvanian question thus served as an indicator of the 
extent to which the two parties were prepared to make appeals to 
nationalism. For example, at the end of the war both parties changed 
their names into more patriotic-sounding ones; the PCdR (Commu-
nist Party of Romania) became the Romanian Communist Party 
(PCR) and the Communists ’ Hungarian Party (KMP) was renamed 
the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP). Both appropriated national 
heroes and staunchly defended national interests. But, as the Transyl-
vania case shows, the two  ‘ fraternal ’ parties also came into confl ict. 
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 Crucially, the outcome of the dispute depended on the Soviet 
Union. Before the German invasion it had approved the terms of the 
 ‘ Second Vienna Award ’ of 1940, which paved the way for the annexa-
tion of northern Transylvania by Hungary, but then it shifted towards 
Romania. The PCR in exile in Moscow was quick to pick up on the 
change and its underground broadcasts argued that Romania ’ s real 
enemy was not the USSR, but Germany and its ally Hungary. 14 The 
Hungarian communists also attempted to take a national line but 
soon found themselves constrained by the Soviet leadership. In 1942 
Georgi Dimitrov, as head of the Comintern, delayed the publication 
of an article by the Hungarian communist leader M á ty á s R á kosi on 
the grounds that it was too  ‘ pro-Hungarian ’ . 15 However, Stalin him-
self remained noncommittal. The Romanian communist diplomat 
Valter Rom á n later recalled that he promised Transylvania to which-
ever country would switch sides earlier; when Romania abandoned 
Nazi Germany in the coup of 23 August 1944, R á kosi immediately 
 ‘ understood that we had lost Transylvania ’ . 16 Yet Stalin had not yet 
actually made a fi nal decision. The ceasefi re agreement with Roma-
nia was itself ambiguous in that it stipulated that Transylvania  ‘ or its 
greater part ’ was to be returned to Romania. This qualifying clause 
made Romanian politicians  – including communists  – nervous and 
Hungarian politicians hopeful. 
 Soon afterwards, the Hungarian communist leadership discussed 
its post-war party programme in Moscow. J ó zsef R é vai, the party ideo-
logue, explicitly left open the possibility of a peaceful border revi-
sion, and also made it clear that the party would not pursue an openly 
revisionist policy. The main reason he gave for this restraint was not 
sensitivity towards his Romanian comrades but his understanding 
that border revisionism was a  ‘ provocation ’ that could damage Soviet 
interests. 17 Though R é vai was not explicit he may have believed that 
overt Hungarian nationalism could harm communist prospects in 
Romania, which Stalin at the time was  ‘ bolshevizing ’ more speedily 
than Hungary. For Stalin, keeping the dispute over Transylvania 
unresolved was above all a useful lever in post-war power struggles. In 
January 1945 he told Romanian party leader Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej 
and Secretariat member Ana Pauker that only a  ‘ left wing ’ and  ‘ pro-
Soviet ’ government in Romania would win Transylvania. 18 The way he 
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used the issue to reward  ‘ good behaviour ’ was shown soon afterwards. 
On the very day that the pro-Soviet Petru Groza government was 
installed (6 March 1945) the Red Army transferred the civilian admin-
istration of Northern Transylvania to the Romanian authorities. 19 In 
September 1945 and again in March 1946 the Soviet government 
repeated its support for Romania ’ s claim at the London Council of 
Foreign Ministers (CFM). 
 Though the Soviet stance encouraged Romanian politicians, it was 
not clear-cut enough to discourage Hungary ’ s leaders from pursuing 
border revision. Both R á kosi and Ern ő Ger ő (a leading member of 
the Secretariat) were still convinced that the terms of the ceasefi re 
agreement gave Hungary a chance at the negotiation table. 20 R á kosi 
proposed to the foreign minister, J á nos Gy ö ngy ö si, that Hungary 
demand a strip of land along the eastern border, (amounting to 
between 4,000 and 10,000 km 2 ) and hinted that Stalin supported the 
demand. 21 This became more plausible after a meeting in Moscow on 
10 April 1946 when the Soviet leader did not reject Hungarian claims 
out of hand but told a Hungarian delegation, including Gy ö ngy ö si 
and R á kosi, that the clause in the ceasefi re agreement  ‘ gives Hungary 
the possibility to receive part of Transylvania ’ . 22 Although he made no 
specifi c promises, Stalin did offer to support further investigation of 
the Hungarian claims at the Paris CFM. Yet shortly afterwards  Molotov 
assured Romanian offi cials that the Soviet Union fully supported the 
Romanian position. 23 
 Molotov ’ s assurance makes it clear that when he urged the Hungar-
ians to initiate bilateral negotiations on the border issue on 15 April, 
it was a purely cosmetic exercise. The Soviet leadership wanted to pass 
the buck to avoid incurring unpopularity for the decision to support 
Romania. Nevertheless, it allowed the Hungarian delegation to return 
to Budapest in a mood of optimism. The Hungarian Smallholders 
Party (the largest party in the government coalition) now declared 
that the country could count on Soviet support on foreign policy 
issues. The communist leadership shared this optimism. On 22 April 
R á kosi claimed that the delegation had won Soviet  ‘ benevolence ’ 
towards Hungarian peace aims. For the fi rst time Hungarian commu-
nists now publicly made territorial claims on Romania, when J ó zsef 
R é vai argued in favour of limited border revision in a speech at the 
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Budapest Music Academy. He said there was a  ‘ strip with a Hungarian 
majority ’ along the border, for which  ‘ we are striving in direct 
negotiations ’ , 24 and mentioned specifi cally the cities of Satu Mare, 
Baia Mare, Oradea, Salonta and Arad. He added that he had reason to 
believe that the USSR would support the claim. 25 The speech caused 
uproar in Hungary, because  ‘ everybody thought R é vai ’ s speech was 
based on serious promises ’ . 26 But, in fact, R é vai had gone a step too far 
and was reprimanded for not having presented his speech to the Polit-
buro for prior approval. In his defence, he claimed  – whether cor-
rectly or not is unclear  – that he had shown the speech in advance to 
the Soviet ambassador Pushkin. 27 For his part, R á kosi later claimed 
that Stalin and the  ‘ Romanian comrades ’ had been critical of the 
speech ’ s  ‘ nationalist tendencies ’ . 28 
 On 27 April 1946, the Hungarian envoy P á l Sebesty é n tried to per-
suade the Romanian Foreign Minister Gheorge Tatarescu and Prime 
Minister Petru Groza to open bilateral negotiations. He insisted that 
Hungary had support from  ‘ our joint great friend, the Soviet Union ’ . 29 
The Romanians, who knew better, rejected the proposal. At a meet-
ing with Romanian party leaders on 7 May, Ger ő presented a proposal 
for a border change of 37,000 km 2 in Hungary ’ s favour, which Gheo-
rghiu Dej rejected out of hand. 30 On the very same day Ferenc Nagy 
learnt not only that the Paris CFM had decided to transfer the whole 
of Transylvania to Romania, but also that Molotov, in particular, had 
insisted on this. 31 Gheorghiu-Dej could now proudly claim that Tran-
sylvania had been given to Romania in recognition of its  ‘ democratic ’ 
government. 32 The Hungarian communists saw things differently. As 
the party ’ s Moscow representative, Rezs ő Sz á nt ó put it,  ‘ [w]e expected 
a lot from the Russians, and when the baselessness for this became 
clear, an anti-Soviet atmosphere was established ’ . 33 
 None of the surviving records of the deliberations shows that either 
Stalin or other Soviet leaders specifi cally promised anything to R á kosi 
or Ferenc Nagy. But they did mislead them when they pointed out 
that the ceasefi re agreement had technically left open the possibility 
for Hungary to  ‘ regain ’ territory. Molotov then deliberately pushed 
for bilateral negotiations he knew to be futile. As he let slip to the 
Hungarians, this was little more than window-dressing, which would 
mean that  ‘ the Romanians either accept or decline, but you have 
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done your duty ’ . 34 Stalin and Molotov were clearly determined not to 
be blamed for directly rejecting Hungarian claims. But Soviet evasive-
ness was matched by a good dose of Hungarian wishful thinking. 
 Foreign minister Gy ö ngy ö si later admitted they had all exaggerated 
the success of the Moscow trip. According to Rezs ő Sz á nt ó , R á kosi 
and Ger ő had actually been told  ‘ clearly how far it was possible to go ’ 
but had then misrepresented the Moscow discussions on their return. 
R á kosi himself stated quite openly that 
 our people took the notion that Hungary has the right to take up 
certain territorial claims. . . a little further and presented it as if the 
rightfulness of taking up these claims means that the Soviet Union 
supports these claims with all its might. Without a doubt there 
occurred from the returning delegation a certain exaggeration. 35 
 This wishful thinking was in the end not just a lapse. It refl ected the 
Hungarian communists ’ desire to represent themselves as defenders 
of the national interest in order to counteract the widespread view 
that they could not be trusted. In that sense the border dispute gives 
a good insight into the way nationalism worked within the Eastern 
bloc as a whole. Stalin used Transylvania as a bargaining tool and left 
his Eastern European minions guessing about his intentions. The 
resulting uncertainty fuelled the confl ict between the Romanian and 
Hungarian parties. 
 3 The Practice of Romanian Minority Policy 
 Hungarian communists never pursued the goal of border revision 
more than half-heartedly: they could not afford to remain silent on 
the issue in public without incurring political embarrassment. But 
defending the Hungarian minority in Romania seemed an acceptable 
alternative and at fi rst sight the prospects looked promising: Roma-
nia ’ s post-war nationality legislation was certainly more liberal than 
that of its inter-war predecessors. 36 The (pre-communist) R ă descu gov-
ernment established a Ministry of Minority Nationalities, and on 6 
February 1945 the Decree on the Status of Minority Nationalities laid 
down a range of minority rights, including provisions on language 
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use. Rather than a  ‘ national minority ’ Hungarians were now dubbed 
a  ‘ co-inhabiting nationality ’ , which implied greater equality. 37 The 
treatment of Hungarians under R ă descu ’ s successor, Petru Groza, was 
highly praised by contemporaries and is still generally viewed posi-
tively. But in practice ethnic relations were marred by serious violence, 
and this in the end also affected the relationship between the Hungar-
ian and Romanian communist parties. 
 Hungarian rule in Northern Transylvania from 1940 to 1944 had 
been far from benevolent. In 1940 Hungarian troops and vigilantes 
killed 158 Romanians in Ip, and four years later 93 people in Treznea. 38 
When Hungarian offi cials left in autumn 1944 the area slid into a 
state of anarchy. After Romania had declared war on Germany and 
on Hungary (7 September 1944) Romanian paramilitary groups took 
advantage of the collapse of authority to wreak bloody revenge. 39 The 
Romanian Peasant party leader Iuliu Maniu called for the creation of 
voluntary military units for the reconquest of Transylvania. The com-
munist-dominated representative body for Hungarians in Romania, 
the Hungarian Popular Alliance ( Magyar N é pi Sz ö vets é g /MNSz), 
accused these  ‘ Maniu guards ’ (which it numbered at 10,000) of per-
petrating atrocities against Hungarians. 40 It compiled an exhaustive 
list of abuses right up to 1946, and sent it to the Hungarian foreign 
ministry in Budapest. 41 One of the most serious abuses had taken 
place in October 1944 in the Sz é kely town of Aite Seace when a self-
appointed captain called Gabril Olteanu led a troop of Maniu guards 
from door to door to round up the townspeople. They were assem-
bled in the school yard and forced to strip to their underwear before 
26 selected men were accused of  ‘ crimes against the Romanian army ’ 
and condemned to death. In the words of the report:  ‘ [i]n the yard 
of the school they erected a large scaffold. On the scaffold they fi rst 
tried to execute S á ndor Nagy with an axe ’ but  ‘ due to the large hump 
on his back they didn ’ t succeed in killing him ’ . The guards then shot 
him, killed eleven other people and started shooting into the crowd. 
Romanian villagers intervened and begged the guards to spare the 
lives of their Hungarian neighbours. 
 Olteanu and his band now moved on to other Transylvanian towns 
and villages. In S â ndominic they shot several villagers, both men and 
women. In Gheorgheni they shot a number of people in the local 
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brick yard. Maniu guards also murdered Hungarians in Cart, D ă ne ş ti 
and Madaras. According to the MNSz, the Maniu guards were also 
guilty of theft, rape, beatings and robbery. Istv á n Kov á cs from Sf â ntu 
Gheorghe complained that Maniu guards had plundered his home 
and  ‘ violated and defi led ’ his heavily pregnant wife. In the same 
town guards arrested B é la Lapikas for carrying a blue-yellow-red 
Romanian national armband. They beat him up and wrecked his 
shop. In Cozmas guards stole livestock and threatened to kill Hun-
garians who protested. In Miercurea/Ciucului they marched around 
town shouting  ‘ this is now Romania and we have come to kill all 
Hungarians ’ . They then searched houses for weapons, pillaged them 
and beat up their occupants. Elsewhere, armed troops  ‘ violated 
numerous Hungarian women ’ and set fi re to the library of the 
 primary school. 
 Though this detailed, day-by-day account compiled by the MNSz 
gives an impression of comprehensiveness, it should also be borne in 
mind that it was written in order to provoke a response from  Budapest. 
This may have led some distortions. For example ordinary neigh-
bourhood squabbles may have been  ‘ ethnicised ’ , while conciliatory 
Romanian actions, like the intervention of Romanian villagers in Aite 
Seace, which suggest that ethnic animosities were far from a sponta-
neous grass-roots upsurge, may have been ignored altogether. Over-
all, the inclusion of many relatively petty complaints in addition to 
the few examples of deadly violence in itself probably exaggerates the 
extent of tensions. Nevertheless, the point here is that Hungarians in 
the MNSz genuinely felt themselves to be collective victims. The 
detailed lists of anti-Rumanian complaints, which now began to circu-
late in Hungary, required a political response. 
 Abuses did not stop after the Red Army took control, the Maniu 
guards disbanded and authority was formally handed over to Bucha-
rest (March 1945). Killings occurred throughout the spring and sum-
mer of 1945, though beatings were now the most common outcome. 
In July 1945 a staff sergeant of the gendarmerie beat up a 17-year-old 
boy who had failed to understand his instruction in Romanian. In 
Tileagd (Bihor county)  ‘ chauvinist Romanian elements ’ attacked 
Hungarians for speaking Hungarian amongst themselves. In 
Ghurghiu, Romanians attacked Hungarian youths at a dance  ‘ because 
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they sang in Hungarian ’ . The murders, beatings, theft and petty vio-
lence continued into 1946. 42 
 Worse than these crimes, in the view of the MNSz, was the  ‘ mass 
deportation of Hungarian men ’ , including anti-fascist and even com-
munist activists. The MNSz newspaper Vil á goss á g blamed Romanians 
for misleading the Soviet authorities:  ‘ malignant circles tricked the 
fi ghting Soviet troops, who hauled away the Hungarians from Cluj on 
suspicion of being [anti-Soviet] partisans ’ . 43 According to the county 
union secretary P á l Veres, among the 3,000 Hungarians deported by 
the Red Army from Cluj were  ‘ countless communist and socialist 
 workers ’ . 44 Men were also deported from smaller towns. In Sandra, hav-
ing already deported the men, Soviet troops now threatened to deport 
the women as well. Only when the remaining children pleaded with 
them did local Red Army commanders intervene and release them. 
 The Romanian authorities also constructed several camps, with the 
stated purpose of detaining fascists and anti-Soviet partisans. The 
MNSz complained that the majority of those arrested and imprisoned 
in  ‘ bestial ’ circumstances, without either detailed charges or a trial, 
were  ‘ innocent ordinary people ’ . 45 The camp which had by far the 
worst reputation was Feldioara near Brasov, where Olteanu brought 
his captives from Northern Transylvania. 46 According to contempo-
rary press reports, the camp had 6,000 inmates, many of whom died 
of cold and hunger. After visiting the camp, one of the prisoner ’ s 
wives wrote:  ‘ I saw how the utterly weakened prisoners were made to 
dig graves, but they weren ’ t capable of digging enough graves in 
which to bury the daily dead ’ . According to another wife,  ‘ the prison-
ers insisted that someone do something for them, because if not they 
would be destroyed ’ . The day she visited the camp, inmates buried 15 
corpses, but had 30 fresh dead for whom they did not have the 
strength to dig graves. According to another correspondent, the 
death toll rose to between 20 and 30 per day during a typhoid 
 epidemic. Since the camp administration did not compile statistics, 
no reliable fi gures are available of the total number of victims, but 
in 1993 the Romanian Defence Minister Niculae Spiroiu claimed the 
death toll was 298. At the time Feldioara was popularly known as a 
 ‘ death camp ’ and the MNSz explicitly compared the Rumanian acts 
to Nazi genocide. 47 
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 There were also widespread complaints of systematic discrimina-
tion, including inequitable treatment by both Soviet Military courts 
and People ’ s Courts. 48 Economic discrimination was a further cause 
for concern and here the Decree on the Control and Monitoring of 
Enemy Property (CASBI) on 10 February 1945 was a particularly 
painful blow. 49 The government justifi ed it on the basis of the Roma-
nian-Soviet armistice of 12 September 1944, which had laid down 
that enemy assets would be frozen. But its application to Hungarians 
was controversial, because it meant that even though Hungary, hav-
ing declared war on Germany on 22 January 1945, was now offi cially 
an ally, Hungarians were defi ned as enemy aliens. 50 To fi nd a way 
around this, Romania ’ s (communist) Minister of Justice introduced 
the legal innovation of the  ‘ presumptive enemy ’ , which allowed 
Romanian authorities to appropriate the goods of some 30,000 
 Hungarians. Though formally aimed at Hungarians who had entered 
Northern Transylvania after its annexation in 1940, the decree actu-
ally affected all Hungarians who had fl ed from the approaching Red 
Army in 1944. It is a measure of the long-term complications caused 
by these expropriations that many were still unresolved in 2005. 51 
Land reform was another area of contention. According to the MNSz, 
the Transylvanian Hungarians suffered  ‘ very serious grievances ’ as a 
result of the  ‘ mistaken or tendentious application ’ of the new law. 52 
While Hungarian landlords were deprived of their land, the benefi -
ciaries were seldom Hungarian peasants. Instead most of the land 
was divided up among newly arrived Romanian migrants. 53 
 4 Hungarian Communist Reactions 
 By 1946 most of the positive effects of the Minority Nationality Decree 
had been nullifi ed by the violence and discrimination applied to the 
Hungarian minority. The Hungarian communist leadership closely 
followed the deteriorating situation and in August 1945 two young 
party offi cials, G é za Losonczy and S á ndor Haraszti, visited Transylva-
nia and wrote an extensive report. Although it noted that the Hun-
garian minority  ‘ enjoy precious little of the solemnly proclaimed 
national rights ’ promised by the Groza government, it did not put 
the main blame on Groza but on  ‘ reactionary offi cers ’ ,  ‘ iron guardist 
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elements ’ and  ‘ Maniu guards ’ , who had  ‘ completely fl ooded the state 
apparatus ’ and  ‘ openly opposed the government ’ s intentions ’ . Espe-
cially in the countryside the  ‘ serious atrocities ’ committed by  ‘ reac-
tion ’ had provoked much bitterness. The assault by  ‘ Romanian 
chauvinism ’ had led to a strong Hungarian chauvinist atmosphere ’ , 
so that  ‘ the chauvinist mood has to an extent fl owed over into the 
Hungarian workers and village toiling masses as well ’ . 54 
 The report then described the changed stance of the Romanian 
party and the attitude of the Hungarian minority towards it. Before 
the war many Hungarians had joined the party when it had stood up 
for minority rights and rejected Trianon. Now the PCR applauded 
Trianon and even though it did not explicitly reject minority rights, it 
subordinated them to the  ‘ democratic transformation of Romania ’ . 
The Bucharest party leadership had sent instructors to Transylvania 
in order to enforce this line  ‘ very rigidly ’ and was banning any discus-
sion in the press or in meetings of the  ‘ daily repeated Romanian 
chauvinist attacks ’ . Transylvanian communist leaders condemned 
this policy of  ‘ waiting ’ as  ‘ false and incorrect ’ . Losonczy and Haraszti 
also argued that a continued failure by the Hungarian party to act 
would only embolden  ‘ the Romanian reaction ’ and would alienate 
the working classes in Transylvania, 85 percent of which, they claimed, 
were Hungarian. 55 
 The kind of local opposition to central party authorities described 
in the report was not unheard of in post-war Eastern Europe. During 
the war, communist activists in Hungary (and elsewhere in occupied 
Europe) had often refused to abandon the internationalist, revolu-
tionary line in favour of the new national line advocated by the Mos-
cow emigration. Now some more radical Hungarian communists 
rejected the Romanian party ’ s new national policy altogether. Some 
even called for a union with the Soviet Union, for example, at a meet-
ing attended by 40,000 people in the Upper Tisza region. Similar 
demands were voiced in the Sz é kely region but were successfully sup-
pressed by the party leadership. 
 Outside the ranks of the Romanian party, this kind of separatist 
agitation only strengthened the conviction that communism as a 
whole was alien and unpatriotic. What Losonczy and Haraszti called 
 ‘ these serious errors ’ strengthened  ‘ the Romanian chauvinist wave ’ . 
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Conversely, the minority communist leaders who rejected the Roma-
nian party line were  ‘ genuinely popular with the workers and even 
with the party membership ’ . The Transylvanian communist leader 
Lajos Jord á ki, for example, was the  ‘ most popular man of the work-
ing class movement ’ because he  ‘ gladly makes concessions to the 
chauvinist mood of the Hungarian masses ’ . This contrasted starkly 
with the popular assumption that the MNSz was passive or inactive in 
representing minority interests. In fact the MNSz did protest about 
atrocities and expropriations, and in the end this helped get the 
camps closed 56 but the protests generally took place behind closed 
doors. Losonzcy and Haraszti concluded that this caution had become 
 ‘ untenable ’ since it meant that local Hungarians saw most MNSz rep-
resentatives as  ‘ traitors ’ and  ‘ Romanian mercenaries ’ . 57 
 In summary, then Transylvania witnessed a growing tension between 
two variants of communist nationality policies. The new Romanian 
communist line of presenting the party as a patriotic, mass party 
departed from its longer-standing support for Hungarian minority 
rights. The Romanian party leadership condemned Hungarian pro-
tests against the new line as  ‘ left wing exaggerations ’ and cracked 
down on local communists. The Minister of Justice Lucre ţ iu P ă tr ă ş canu 
told the Hungarian communists their demands for equal treatment 
were  ‘ exaggerated and chauvinist ’ . 
 Despite the orthodox Marxist idiom in which it was expressed, 
there was also a clear ethnic dimension to this and the other purges 
of Hungarian leaders in Transylvania (including Jord á ki). At its heart 
was the policy of  ‘ Romanianising ’ the Communist Party, which led to 
an infl ux of new members. 58 Throughout the confl ict between local 
Transylvanian communists and the national leadership of the PCR, 
Marxist analysis and ethnic (national) arguments were intertwined. 
For example, Haraszti and Losonczy, refl ecting the view that the 
working classes were the engine of history, had been understandably 
alarmed by signs that the party was losing the support of Hungarian 
workers. The mirror image of their concern was the attempt by the 
PCR to ethnically  ‘ reengineer ’ the workforce in the train assembly 
yard in Cluj by demanding the sacking of hundreds of Hungarian 
workers at the yard, and their replacement by ethnic Romanians. The 
combination of class and ethnic factors can also be seen in the 
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 demolition by vandals of the statue of the nineteenth-century Hun-
garian politician Count Tisza K á lm á n in Oradea. Losonczy and 
Haraszti did not really know what to make of this but in the end they 
decided to see it as a nationalist, anti-Hungarian attack: 
 Obviously Tisza K á lm á n was a reactionary, but the bombing of 
the statue was not aimed against the reactionary, but against the 
 Hungarian Tisza K á lm á n and was therefore a chauvinist  provocation 
of the Hungarians. 
 Losonczy and Haraszti themselves were treated by the Transylvanian 
Hungarians as Hungarians rather than communists. A speech which 
Losonczy gave in Cluj was greeted with tremendous approval; every 
time he mentioned the names of the MKP or Hungarian communist 
leaders such as R á kosi, the audience demonstrated its approval 
through an  ‘ explosive, gigantic applause ’ . Losonczy saw this show of 
support for communists as evidence of a  ‘ chauvinist atmosphere ’ as 
the auditorium was not only composed of workers, but members of 
the local bourgeoisie as well. 
 Regardless of this assessment it is clear that a gulf was opening up 
on the minority question, which would continue throughout the 
Cold War. While the Romanian party could not afford to appear  ‘ soft ’ 
on the issue, the Hungarian party could not afford to be silent. This 
was especially the case after J ó zsef R é vai in effect had abandoned 
border revision as hopeless and shifted the focus of policy to a defence 
of Hungarian minority, not just in Romania but also in Slovakia, 
where authorities were pursuing a policy of mass deportation. 59 But 
R é vai felt that while the MKP was ready to condemn Hungarian 
nationalism and attacks on Romania in public, the PCR was not recip-
rocating. His irritation can be seen in a letter to Vasile Luca (L á szl ó 
Luka), a leading Romanian communist of Hungarian origin. Accord-
ing to R é vai, while the MKP was struggling against  ‘ Hungarian chau-
vinism ’ ,  ‘ tactical considerations ’ forced it to break its silence about 
 ‘ certain complaints of the Transylvanian Hungarians ’ . But he com-
plained to Luca that  ‘ from your statements it somehow appears as if 
such complaints do not exist ’ . This  ‘ did not correspond to the truth ’ 
and  ‘ would unnecessarily provoke the already sensitive Hungarian 
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public opinion ’ . As a solution he proposed a deal:  ‘ [a]s we under-
stand your situation, understand ours as well ’ . 60 
 5 The Cold War and Ethnic Confl ict 
 With the hardening of the confrontation between East and West the 
confl ict between the Romanian and Hungarian communist parties 
intensifi ed. Formally, of course, the establishment of Cominform 
(1947) and the Treaty of Mutual Friendship and Cooperation placed 
the relationship between the two countries on a  ‘ fraternal basis ’ yet 
in many ways relations actually worsened. First, confl icts over the 
implementation of the CASBI decrees and other expropriations 
increasingly soured relations. The Romanian government not only 
blocked Hungarian efforts to have property restituted but on 11 June 
1948 went a step further by nationalizing factories and companies. 
The measure even included the property of the Hungarian state, now 
under the control of the MKP. Second, the position of the Hungarian 
minority deteriorated markedly. On 21 November 1948, R á kosi 
secretly met with Gheorghiu-Dej and Vasile Luca in the Hungarian 
border town of Mez ő hegyes. R á kosi complained that the Hungarian 
minority was now  ‘ more isolated than under Antonescu ’ and  ‘ the 
more securely we [communists] are in the saddle, the worse this situ-
ation gets ’ . 61 The main points at issue were not education, cultural or 
language rights, about which the Romanian communists seemed to 
be taking a relatively tolerant line, but the orientation of the minority 
towards Budapest, which Romanian communists saw as evidence of 
disloyalty. According to Vasile Luca,  ‘ a part of Romanian Hungarian 
communists expects instructions from Budapest and not from 
Bucharest ’ . 62 This attitude, which Haraszti and Losonczy had also 
observed, was confi rmed when Hungarian embassy offi cials visited 
Transylvania. When an embassy car visited Cluj Hungarian villagers 
mobbed the vehicle and  ‘ stroked ’ the offi cial fl ag of the People ’ s 
Republic. 63 They seemed indifferent to the fact that it was the fl ag of 
a communist state. 
 The Romanian response to these signs of  ‘ disloyalty ’ was a policy of 
isolation. This started with a purge by the Romanian Foreign ministry 
not just of  ‘ reactionaries ’ but also of experts on Hungarian affairs. 64 
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Subsequently, representatives of the minority were forbidden to 
approach the Hungarian embassy in Bucharest, while other Roma-
nian Hungarians were intimidated into keeping their distance from 
the embassy. 65 Ambassador Jen ő Sz é ll was personally affected by this 
isolationist policy when the entry of his 4 to 5 year-old children into a 
nursery was  ‘ expressly sabotaged ’ . 66 Sz é ll also reported that as the gov-
ernment tried to excise every reference to Hungary from offi cial state-
ments, he himself was introduced to the 1948 conference of the MNSz 
as  ‘ a foreign diplomat ’ and mostly cold-shouldered. He also noted 
that although the pictures of the Hungarian national poets Ady and 
Pet ő fi  were displayed at the meeting, there were none of Hungarian 
communist leaders:  ‘ It was conspicuous, at least it was conspicuous to 
me, that M á ty á s R á kosi in particular was not mentioned ’ . 67 R á kosi 
then complained bitterly to Gheorghiu-Dej that the local organizers 
 ‘ very correctly elected communist leaders from Mao Zedung to Thorez 
into the honorary presidency, but not one Hungarian communist 
leader was among them ’ . While Hungary permitted  ‘ unlimited ’ quan-
tities of Romanian communist literature to enter the country, Roma-
nia continued to restrict literature from Hungary, even when it was 
communist. R á kosi also complained that it was impossible to subscribe 
to communist newspapers from Hungary. Neither were Hungarian 
classics allowed into the country, even when they were published by 
communist publishers after 1945. This was  ‘ diminishing the worth of 
other measures that you took in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist national-
ity policy ’ and was  ‘ grist to the mill of Hungarian nationalists ’ . R á kosi 
therefore asked the Romanian leadership to put an end to  ‘ these dam-
aging incidents ’ . 68 
 His complaints had little effect. In order to further isolate the 
minority the Romanian government now shut down the border with 
Hungary altogether. Just as the Iron Curtain was  ‘ descending across 
Europe ’ border controls between these two Iron Curtain states were 
being tightened. In 1948 the Romanian government proposed build-
ing a 500-metre zone along the border in which there was to be no 
high foliage. 69 After negotiations in Mez ő hegyes the Romanians cut 
off low-level border traffi c altogether, which, as R á kosi noted,  ‘ affects 
in the fi rst place the Hungarians, who live on both side of the 
border ’ . 70 He also complained that the Romanian authorities were 
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not implementing the visa arrangements which had been agreed 
between the two countries on 16 October 1948. With a normal (i.e. 
non-diplomatic) passport it was now  ‘ impossible to travel from Tran-
sylvania to Hungary or the other way round ’ . There were even  ‘ armed 
Romanian border violations ’ , 71 as when border guards arrested sev-
eral peasants who were working on Hungarian territory in August 
1947, shot four of them and beat up several others. 72 In the same year 
Romanian border guards shot and killed a Hungarian farmer. After-
wards, the Hungarian authorities accused the Romanians of forging 
offi cial documents in order to prove he had been smuggling. 73 In 
April 1948 Romanian border guards wandered into Hungarian terri-
tory, arrested several people and took them back across the border. 74 
Later in the year they even shot at peasants working in the fi eld in 
Hungary. 75 In 1952 Romanian guards practised with live ammunition 
and shot across the border with it. The situation was apparently so 
tense that warnings had to be given to avoid shoot-outs with Roma-
nian border guards. 76 At the same time, the term  ‘ violent border 
crossing ’ did not always live up to its dramatic implications, and could 
signify no more than a single armed guard crossing the border. On 
24 July 1948, for instance, Hungarian authorities opened an investi-
gation into a  ‘ violent incursion ’ by the border guard Kokolean Val é r 
who allegedly  ‘ crossed the border bearing weapons and there physi-
cally abused Julianna Medgyesy, an inhabitant of Garbolcs ’ . Val é r 
denied the accusations, and stated he  ‘ had only pushed her, but had 
not hit her ’ . 77 The Romanian justifi cation was that as the  ‘ forward 
bastion ’ of the USSR, Romania needed to protect its borders with 
particular care. This was clearly meant as an insult to the Socialist 
credentials of Hungary, or in R á kosi ’ s phrase,  ‘ not in accordance with 
the relationship between two People ’ s Democracies ’ . 78 
 In the early 1950s, as the Cold War entered its deepest freeze, rela-
tions between Hungary and Romania further worsened. Admittedly in 
some areas there was progress: the CASBI issue was buried, albeit only 
temporarily. And in 1952 Gheorghiu-Dej presented a show-piece of his 
nationality policy in the form of the Hungarian Autonomous Region. 
This was meant to offer a modicum of self-rule to some of Romania ’ s 
Hungarians, albeit within the limits of Stalinist  dictatorship. 79  Hungarian 
culture was positively promoted, along similar lines to the Soviet policy 
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of  ‘ indigenization ’ . However, the tight grip of the PCR on the adminis-
tration meant that the actual level of autonomy was lower than that of 
the Soviet republics. 80 And  ‘ self-rule ’ in a Stalinist state was, of course, 
in any case a relative concept; even as the Autonomous Region was 
being constructed, Transylvanian Hungarians were being accused of 
 ‘ espionage ’ in a series of show trials. The fi rst in 1951 was the secret 
trial of the  ‘ revisionists ’ , Marton  Á ron, Gyarfa Kurk á s and others, who 
were accused of espionage for Belgrade and attempting to get Hun-
gary to re-annex Transylvania. 81 In 1954 a second show trial was held, 
this time of the  ‘ Transylvanists ’ : the former MNSz leader Edg á r Balogh 
and the one time popular local communist Lajos Jord á ki were put 
behind bars for having sought the re-annexation of Northern Transyl-
vania to Hungary. 82 When Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca were purged 
from the Communist Party leadership in 1952, Luca was himself 
accused of irredentism. 83 
 Above all, the major source of Hungarian complaints, namely the 
isolation of the minority from Budapest, was not addressed. Despite 
encouraging local Hungarian culture the border remained tightly 
sealed and access to information about Hungary was severely 
restricted. Though locally produced Hungarian newspapers could 
reach print-runs of up to 50,000 there was  ‘ no material referring to 
Hungary in them ’ . 84 The Romanian press published few articles about 
Hungary. According to a Hungarian Embassy report of 1950, press 
coverage was not  ‘ rich ’ but  ‘ showed all the important things briefl y ’ . 
The report also noted that, despite an increase in the number of 
articles, the Hungarian press still wrote more about Romania than 
the other way round. 85 Romania also continued to forbid the distribu-
tion of the Hungarian press in Transylvania and even the party news-
paper  Szabad N é p was restricted. In 1948 the newspaper had sold out 
within a matter of hours 86 but now only 1,000 issues were permitted 
for the entire country, 87 despite constant efforts by the Hungarian 
embassy to increase its print run (and that of other Hungarian publi-
cations). However, the embassy did not support the Hungarian gov-
ernment ’ s decision to retaliate by restricting Romanian magazines in 
Hungary. It described this as a  ‘ serious political mistake ’ since it 
would give Romanian party offi cials a further argument for restrict-
ing the distribution of Hungarian publications. 88 
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 6 The Hungarian Revolution and After 
 The 1956 Hungarian uprising was the defi ning moment in the rela-
tions between the two countries. It came as a  ‘ sense of panic ’ was 
spreading within the leadership of the PCR in the aftermath of 
Khrushchev ’ s  ‘ secret speech ’ to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Com-
munist Party. 89 The fears were as much about territorial revision as 
about liberalization. Before the revolution the Romanian diplomat 
Valter Rom á n accused R á kosi of raising the possibility of population 
transfers and border revision. 90 Even if Rom á n was lying (as R á kosi 
later claimed) his intervention illustrates how preoccupied Roma-
nia ’ s leaders were about a possible threat to their position in Transyl-
vania. Their sensitivity did not come out of thin air: as the situation in 
Hungary became increasingly volatile, anti-Stalinism in Transylvania 
took an increasingly national form. From the start the Hungarian 
population in Romania had followed developments in Budapest, like 
the reburial of L á szl ó Rajk. The state ’ s initial response to the fi rst 
murmurs of protest was to make concessions, like admitting Hungar-
ian authors to the Writers Union and restoring the birth house of 
poet Endre Ady. 91 But when the revolution threatened to cross the 
border the situation began to escalate. On 24 October a meeting of 
students in Cluj turned into a show of solidarity with Budapest revo-
lutionaries in Budapest. 92 Then on 30 and 31 October Romanian and 
Hungarians teachers and students at the Timi ş oara Polytechnic pre-
sented a range of political and economic demands and booed offi -
cials sent by the Central Committee. In Transylvania there were 
spontaneous meetings at the T î rgu Mure ş University, and even in 
Bucharest students protested. In October and November the security 
services arrested 1,120 people. 
 The 1956 revolution cast a lasting shadow over the already poor 
relations between Romanian and Hungary. Although Romanians were 
also involved in the unrest, and some were arrested and executed, the 
regime chose to interpret it primarily in ethnic terms, as confi rmation 
of the basic disloyalty of its Hungarian citizens. It also increased Roma-
nian suspicion that irredentism was being supported from Hungary. 
Partly as a response Romanian nationalism as a whole became more 
marked. This can be seen, for example, as Stefano Bottoni argues, in 
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the crackdown on the Hungarian minority, which started with the 
fusion of the Hungarian Babes University with the Romanian Bolyai 
University in 1959 and led, in the following year, to the curtailment of 
Hungarian autonomy in the Autonomous Region. 93 Ultimately, the 
1956 revolution was at the root of what Bottoni calls Ceau ş escu ’ s 
 ‘ national megalomania ’ . 94 
 The linked fear of irredentism and liberalization also helps 
explain the Romanian shift towards an increasingly independent 
stance within the Warsaw Pact. In 1961 the Plenum of the Central 
Committee of the PCR had already rejected its allotted role within 
the Eastern bloc as an agricultural producer and instead opted for 
a policy of autarky. 95 In the famous  ‘ April Declaration ’ of 1964 it 
announced its independent position within the Soviet bloc. Later, 
Ceau ş escu fl irted with China and the United States and in 1968 
condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. This pol-
icy of  ‘ going it alone ’ caused further confl ict with Hungary, in 
effect reversing the roles of the two countries within the Soviet 
camp. In 1958 the Soviet Union had rewarded Romania for its sup-
port in crushing the Hungarian revolution by withdrawing its 
troops. By the end of the 1960s it was Romania which was the 
pariah. Whereas Brezhnev accepted K á d á r ’ s reforms, however, 
grudgingly, he saw Ceau ş escu as a major irritant. But rather than 
openly voicing criticism of Romania, the Soviet leadership devolved 
the task to Hungary. According to Katalin Mikl ó ssy, although there 
were no explicit Soviet instructions to criticize the Romanians, Bre-
zhnev made his disapproval of Ceau ş escu abundantly clear behind 
closed doors. And the Hungarian leadership clearly thought they 
had been given a green light to criticize Romania in public. 96 Ten-
sions were further increased by the impact of Hungarian economic 
reforms. K á d á r ’ s  ‘ New Economic Mechanism ’ , which was intro-
duced in 1968, brought a relaxation of economic controls, which 
was anathema to the Romanian leaders. It provided them with a 
further reason to restrict contacts between the Hungarian minority 
and its  ‘ kin-state ’ . 
 For all Ceau ş escu ’ s independent line, the issues which plagued the 
Hungarian-Romanian relationship were basically the same as before: 
minority rights and the isolation of the minority from Hungarian 
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infl uence. In the early 1960s travel restrictions were eased on paper 
but in practice Hungarians wishing to visit Romania still faced huge 
obstacles. A secret annex to the 1961 bilateral visa agreement stipu-
lated that they were obliged to report to the local police upon  arrival. 97 
Though tourism became possible in the 1960s and 1970s, visiting 
Hungarians complained about the behaviour of Romanian border 
guards, including extortion, confi scation of property (including 
Hungarian literature) and police brutality, including beatings. Hun-
garians also continued to be cut off from news about Hungary. In the 
early 1970s, Hungarian reports stated that the Romanian press stuck 
to the bare facts when writing about Hungary, omitting any analysis. 
The Hungarian press did not return the favour but instead toed the 
Soviet line, including open criticism of Ceau ş escu ’ s rapprochement 
towards China. 98 In the early 1980s a growing number of negative 
articles started appearing about both countries. At a Budapest cock-
tail party in 1982, Romanian diplomats loudly argued with the Bucha-
rest correspondent of the Hungarian state press agency (MTI), 
complaining that  ‘ 90 percent ’ of Hungarian articles on Romania 
were negative while the comparable fi gure for Romanian articles on 
Hungary was  ‘ only 40 per cent ’ . 99 
 In theory the only way for Hungarians to evade these restrictions 
(apart from a small number of offi cial subscribers) was through the 
post. Howevermail tended to be intercepted and returned, which, 
according to the Hungarian embassy in Bucharest was something 
that even capitalist countries (with the apparent exception of Argen-
tina) did not do. 100 Romania also jammed Hungarian radio and TV 
broadcasts. 101 In 1977, the Hungarian embassy complained once 
again about the way the Romanian authorities stopped publications 
getting through and noted that it was almost impossible to fi nd pub-
lications from Hungary in Romanian-speaking districts. 102 The answer 
Hungary came up with in the 1980s was hardly fraternal: it smuggled 
Hungarian publications into the country. By means of this so-called 
 ‘ remainders action ’ ( remittenda akci ó ) the embassy  ‘ discretely ’ and 
 ‘ carefully ’ disseminated  ‘ politically important ’ unsold stock of Hun-
garian publishers. 103 The Hungarian foreign ministry fully supported 
the scheme since, even though it  ‘ cost a lot of energy ’ it was an  ‘ impor-
tant ’ part of propaganda work. 104 
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 On top of these long-standing complaints, there were some new 
public squabbles about history and public memory. In 1961 Hungary 
complained about a Romanian history of Transylvania, arguing that 
because of its emphasis on the Romanian origins of the region it was 
 ‘ nationalist ’ . 105 The publication in 1965 of the memoirs of Admiral 
Horthy caused major misgivings in Romania, and there were heated 
debates about it at the Romanian-Hungarian summit of July 1964. 106 
Hungarian diplomats also complained that the Romanians were 
 ‘ appropriating ’ their national heroes. One of the bitterest confl icts 
came with the 1970 celebration of the anniversary of Gheorghe Doja, 
the sixteenth-century peasant rebel. Known in Hungary as Gy ö rgy 
D ó zsa, he had long been portrayed by Hungarian communists as 
their spiritual predecessor in the struggle for national and social lib-
eration. Hungarian embassy offi cials were therefore horrifi ed when 
the Romanian government claimed that he was Romanian. The Hun-
garian state staged its own D ó zsa year in 1972. 
 Controversies continued throughout the 1970s and reached 
another low point with the publication on 12 April 1982 of Ion Lan-
cranjan ’ s pamphlet  One Word about Transylvania . This bitter attack on 
Hungary was met with extreme displeasure by the Hungarian Politi-
cal Committee (Politburo), which saw it as part of the  ‘ anti-Hungar-
ian propaganda that has been printed in the Romanian press organs 
for over a year now ’ . 107 Another controversy was sparked by the pub-
lication four years later by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences of a 
three-volume  History of Transylvania . There was an offi cial outcry in 
Romania, and the debate raged far outside Eastern Europe. A paid 
advert in the London  Times denounced the work as a falsifi cation of 
history, and an offi cial brochure was published condemning it as a 
 ‘ conscious forgery ’ . 108 
 Just before the Iron Curtain fell, the breakdown of Romanian- 
Hungarian relations was complete. Ceau ş escu ’ s bulldozing of Transyl-
vanian villages, combined with poverty, repression and discrimination 
led thousands of Hungarians to fl ee to Hungary. Rumours of war were 
in the air. The Hungarian foreign minister Rezs ő Nyers complained to 
Ceau ş escu that Romanian publications were clamouring for a  ‘ mili-
tary solution ’ to the Hungarian problem. 109 A year after he presided 
over the dismantlement of the border between Austria and Hungary, 
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Foreign Minister Gyula Horn voiced concerns over Romanian plans 
to build nuclear weapons and Romanian threats to Hungarian territo-
rial integrity. 110 
 7 Public Opinion and Nationalism 
 The disputes that hit the headlines after 1989 were not a break with 
the past but its continuation. The two governments had been vigor-
ously kicking each other under the table for decades. The argument 
that this and similar confl icts were suppressed during the Cold War 
wrongly implies that communists, as internationalists, were ready to 
bury their national confl icts in the interest of socialist solidarity. In 
reality, as I have sought to show here, both regimes pursued national 
interests and saw the world with national eyes. This also applies to 
Communist Party members themselves in both Hungary and  Romania. 
They operated within a frame of reference which was national and 
frequently displayed national sentiments and national resentment 
towards their neighbours, in fact, all those feelings which were nor-
mally condemned in offi cial propaganda as  ‘ chauvinist ’ . Evidence of 
this can be found in the sneeringly sarcastic tone adopted by Hungar-
ian diplomats when they derided Romanian propaganda aimed at 
demonstrating  ‘ what glorious revolutionaries the Romanian people 
are ’ . 111 It is also evident in the numerous petty complaints that litter 
the archives of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. 112 At the same time, 
they were sensitive to subtle shifts in the language of Romanian con-
gratulatory telegrams: addressing  ‘ the entire Hungarian people ’ 
instead of  ‘ the friendly Hungarian people ’ , for instance, or dropping 
the word  ‘ warm ’ from the phrase  ‘ warm comradely greetings ’ . 113 It is 
striking how similar this kind of close textual analysis was to that 
adopted by Radio Free Europe and Western diplomats in order to 
gain insights into Romanian politics. Evidently, the Hungarians found 
this world no less inaccessible. 
 Ordinary Hungarian party members were even more hostile. Exten-
sive instruction about socialist patriotism and proletarian interna-
tionalism seems to have had little impact. Local party secretaries 
frequently reported about meetings where national sentiment was 
freely vented. Here  ‘ socialist patriotism ’ , however compatible with 
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internationalism in principle, appeared to contradict it in practice. 
Appeals to display pride in the  ‘ Socialist Fatherland ’ often brought 
an implicit disparagement of other Socialist countries.  ‘ Our agricul-
ture is so good, that the entire Socialist community can learn from it ’ , 
local party members in the J á r á s district boasted. In Budapest local 
party members took pride in the assertion that  ‘ in western eyes our 
form of socialism is the most acceptable ’ . 114 Sometimes this sense of 
superiority looked more like  ‘ socialist nationalism ’ than socialist 
patriotism. 
 When it came to the minority, this disparaging attitude also under-
cut the communist claim to have found a  ‘ solution ’ to the issues that 
plagued the capitalist world. Hungarian propaganda had long empha-
sized the mistreatment of minorities in the West and especially 
decried the fate of blacks in the United States, which was contrasted 
with the supposedly progressive treatment of Hungary ’ s Slovak minor-
ity. Yet the Hungarian public was more inclined to apply the com-
parison to the disadvantage of Romania. As Party members in Vas 
county put it: 
 our mass communications whine about Negroes, Basques and 
Arabs, but keep quiet about the grievances of Hungarians living 
abroad, especially those of the minorities living in neighbouring 
countries. 115 
 The party secretary of a factory in Budapest noted the workers ’ 
national pride in the People ’ s Republic  ‘ because we do not have a 
national question at all ’ . But the same workers were highly critical of 
Romania:  ‘ [s]everal measures by the Romanian People ’ s Republic 
cause indignation, one can say, animosity ’ . 116 It is hard to escape the 
conclusion that one reason these party members were proud of Hun-
garian nationality policy was because it made Romania ’ s treatment of 
Hungarians look bad in comparison. Elsewhere the depth of racism, 
anti-semitism and anti-Arab sentiments among party members 
emerged clearly. 117 The Vas party secretary complained about  ‘ hid-
den nationalist views ’ , which included an  ‘ anti-Soviet attitude ’ , and 
opposition to Hungary ’ s membership of the Warsaw Pact. In  Budapest, 
authorities noted  ‘ especially strong worries ’ regarding the Romanian 
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situation and  ‘ nationalist and chauvinist ’ views among party mem-
bers about the Trianon settlement, the legitimacy of which was still 
being questioned 30 years after the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties. 118 For 
some older party members,  ‘ Transylvania and Slovakia were still  “ an 
issue ” ’ . 119 Some expressed national pride in the beauty of Transylva-
nia and openly said how  ‘ great ’ it would be if it could be part of Hun-
gary again. They were still bitter about the way Soviet Union had then 
shifted away from the Hungarian position. 120 One local party secre-
tary noted that party members  ‘ condemn the methods used against 
the minorities ’ in Romania and strikingly added his own view that 
this was  ‘ in part with just cause ’ . 121 In Vas  ‘ quite extreme opinions ’ 
about Romania were reported. Some thought the Hungarian govern-
ment was too soft on Romania and wanted  ‘ hard, decisive behaviour ’ . 122 
By the 1980s these kinds of opinions were expressed openly at party 
meetings. Evidently, no one expected that criticism of Romania would 
get them into trouble. 
 8 Conclusion 
 On the eve of the collapse of communism, Gyula Horn wrote an 
appraisal of Romanian-Hungarian relations. Horn, who was a veteran 
of Hungarian foreign relations, did not differentiate between the 
pre-war Antonescu regime and communist RomaniaFor seven 
decades, he argued, Romanian politics had been was marked by the 
strategic goal of creating a unitary national state by forcibly changing 
ethnic composition, in order to maintain territories conquered by 
force of arms. 
 Hungarian foreign policy had failed because, through its silent 
diplomacy and emphasis on  ‘ internationalist solidarity ’ it had  ‘ played 
into the hands of realizing the Romanian leadership ’ s goals ’ . 123 Under 
communism, Horn argued, Romania had exploited the division of 
the globe in order to achieve its perennial anti-Hungarian aims. 
 Horn ’ s memorandum illustrates how the Cold War affected 
 Hungarian-Romanian relations and ethnic issues in general: as argued 
here, it did not bottle up ethnic disagreements, but actually deepened 
them. Though offi cially committed to eradicating nationalism, com-
munist regimes in both Hungary and Romania had perpetuated it. 
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Shared ideological ground did not prove an obstacle to this since both 
parties simply claimed that it was their policies that were genuinely 
Marxist. In private Hungarian party members voiced anti-Romanian 
views, which were in stark contrast to the offi cial doctrines of interna-
tionalism. Fraternal solidarity was often invoked but in reality the 
bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary functioned like 
those of any other neighbouring nation-states with minority issues. 
 These issues never ceased to be a source of confl ict and tension. In 
Romania, the Hungarian minority was feared as a source of compet-
ing communist authority or, even worse, of political liberalization. 
Though the Hungarian government often stated that minority policy 
was a Romanian  ‘ internal affair ’ , which it did not wish to intervene in, 
in practice, the Hungarian party was preoccupied by it. The main 
explanation for this is that Romanian policies refl ected badly on the 
standing of the MKP within Hungary. Soviet dominance of both states 
was unchallenged throughout the period, but this did not mean that 
confl ict and disagreement were contained; on several occasions 
Soviet interference actually worsened relations. Immediately after 
World War II, both the Romanian and the Hungarian communist 
parties strove to appear as patriotic members of national front 
 governments.  This was itself a Soviet-inspired policy, designed after 
1941 by Dimitrov and Stalin in order to mobilize the Russian popula-
tion in defence of the German invasion. It meant that each party 
strove to defend its national interests and came into confl ict when 
they diverged. In the case of the Hungarian-Romanian border, Soviet 
meddling also increased tensions between the two parties in 1946. 
Because communism in Hungary was perceived by the Romanian 
leadership as a threat to its own authority, the Cold War pushed 
Romania into greater isolation, cutting off the minority from  Budapest 
as much as it could by tightening border controls and limiting access 
to information. 
 The 1956 uprising delivered the death blow to Romanian- Hungarian 
relations by establishing the Romanian view of Hungary as a source 
of subversive  ‘ liberal ’ ideas and, by extension, of Hungarians in Tran-
sylvania as bad communists. From the 1960s Romania ’ s independent 
foreign policy put an added strain on the relationship,  especially as 
Budapest played the role of chief critic of the Ceau ş escu regime. In 
Ethnicity.indb   115 1/24/2012   6:59:48 PM
Ethnicity, Nationalism and the European Cold War116
the end Ceau ş escu ’ s virulent nationalism caused relations to collapse 
completely. 
 Throughout the period Hungarian offi cials operated within the 
logic of the nation-state rather than of the communist international. 
Even when their animosity was partly constrained by Soviet domi-
nance and the need to show a united front against the common, 
Western enemy, there was little love lost between them and their 
Romanian comrades. Offi cial attempts to instill a sense of interna-
tional solidarity into the party rank-and-fi le failed utterly and little 
separated them from the rest of Hungarian society. This suggests a 
broader conclusion: the party exercised absolute control over educa-
tion and the media, yet it did not succeed in changing basic national-
ist attitudes regarding Romania. Rather than the party succeeding in 
turning peasants into Bolsheviks, it imported nationalist attitudes 
and national prejudices into the party. It seems that by the 1970s, 
attitudes within and outside the party were not altogether different. 
Perhaps we therefore need to question some established wisdom 
about communist rule, not just in Hungary. Not only did communist 
dictatorships not exercise anything like absolute control over the 
minds of their subjects, but party members were themselves clearly 
far from devoid of national feeling. 
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 Chapter 5 
 Insecurity and Control: Bulgaria and its 
Turkish Minority 
 Vasil Paraskevov 
 1 Introduction 
 The Cold War had a signifi cant impact on the minority policies of the 
Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). At their heart was the basic sense 
of insecurity felt by the country ’ s rulers in their quest for total con-
trol. In the case of the Turkish minority, this was expressed in a deep 
suspicion that the Turkish  ‘ kin-state ’ might use its grievances to desta-
bilize the regime. The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 may have 
been intended by the US government to guarantee the defence of 
Turkey against communist destabilization, but in the eyes of  Bulgaria ’ s 
rulers, it heralded US backing for their neighbour and this was a 
threat. Its basis in reality was that the radical political and social 
reform programme which the BCP was implementing, was indeed 
provoking profound tensions and even military resistance. For exam-
ple, the  ‘ Forest People ’ ( Goryani ) continued fi ghting in the moun-
tains against communist rule well into the 1950s. Most of them were 
motivated by discontent with political repression, the suppression of 
constitutional rights and the collectivization of agriculture. Although 
the support given to them by foreign powers was insignifi cant and 
there is no evidence that Turkey and Greece delivered any weapons, 
the BCP nevertheless concluded that the American secret services, 
together with the Greek and Turkish authorities, were seeking to 
destabilize the regime. 1 
 Bulgarian fears were strengthened when Turkey came out in sup-
port of US policies during the Korean War and in 1952 joined NATO. 
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In addition to coordinating its policy with Washington, Ankara 
strengthened its relations with Greece and Yugoslavia by the creation 
of the Balkan Pact in 1953. Though this was aimed at defending 
member countries from Soviet aggression it too was seen in Sofi a, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, as an act of hostility. 2 Even more signifi cant 
were the fears that the developing ethnic tensions in Cyprus might 
cause similar unrest to spread to Bulgaria ’ s Turkish minority. Yet even 
though this suspicion and insecurity was never far from the Bulgarian 
communist  ‘ offi cial mind ’ , policy towards the Turkish minority was 
far from consistently repressive. Broadly speaking it evolved from an 
initial phase, lasting until the end of the 1950s, when cultural, reli-
gious and educational rights were supported by the state, to a period 
where the regime sought to  ‘ solve ’ the ethnic problem by restricting 
minority rights and promoting assimilation. 
 Any understanding of the political dimensions of this insecurity 
has to start off with the basic reality of the country ’ s subservience to 
the Soviet Union. That meant in the fi rst case the slavish imitation of 
the Soviet model in every aspect of policy, including the treatment of 
minorities. Second, Bulgaria was completely integrated into the 
political, economic and military structures of the Soviet bloc, while 
its southern neighbour Turkey, as the Truman doctrine envisaged, 
received substantial political, economic and military support from 
the West. This basic adversarial context shaped all Bulgarian assess-
ments of Turkey ’ s foreign policy. Third, the Communist Party (until 
1948, part of the Fatherland Front ( Otechestven Front )), the dominant 
force in Bulgarian society and politics, was irreconcilably hostile 
towards any individuals or groups which were not under its control. 
This hostility was greater when, as with the Bulgarian Turks, the 
group had the potential to maintain contacts beyond the country ’ s 
borders. Last not least, as a historically marginalized group with its 
own religious, cultural and educational traditions, Bulgaria ’ s Turks 
were widely seen as backward. In that perspective, their orientation 
towards Turkey was condemned not just as subversive but also con-
trary to the regime ’ s fundamental project of modernizing and  ‘ euro-
peanising ’ Bulgarian society. Taken together, all this made the 
minority a source of considerable unease among Bulgarian commu-
nists as they waged their double battle; the international fi ght for the 
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victory of Marxist – Leninism and the domestic struggle for radical 
social transformation. 
 The  way the BCP tried to  ‘ manage ’ ethnic confl ict, and particularly 
to deal with confl icts relating to the Turkish minority has been much 
studied. There is a broad consensus that its policy emerged from the 
interplay of domestic and international factors, though recent stud-
ies have given more weight to the former. Scholars have also analyzed 
the reasons for the shifts that took place in minority policy, from the 
initial phase of relative  ‘ toleration ’ to the more integrationist policies 
of the 1960s and mid-1970s, and fi nally to the intense assimilation of 
the last phase of communist rule. Several authors have recognized 
that the Cold War had an impact on minority policy but few have 
examined the relationship in any detail. For example, Evgenia 
 Kalinova argues that the Cold War had  ‘ direct infl uence on the behav-
ior of both countries [Bulgaria and Turkey] and their policy on the 
migration issue ’ . 3 Rumyana Todorova, Jordan Baev and Nikolai Kotev 
have also stressed the impact of the Cold War on Turkish-Bulgarian 
relations, showing how badly the atmosphere of mutual suspicion, 
mistrust and hostility affected Bulgarian Turks. 4 Another important 
infl uence has been noted by Valeri Stoyanov, who has established a 
connection between the treatment of the minority and the  Soviet 
stance on  ‘ the national question ’ . 5 He has shown that Bulgaria fol-
lowed the general line of Soviet politics in its attitude towards 
the Turkish minority. In short, policy was the outcome not just of the 
broad antagonisms of the Cold War but also of the country ’ s specifi c 
relationship with the Soviet Union on the one hand and Turkey on 
the other. 
 For reasons of space, the discussion here focuses more on the rela-
tionship between the Cold War and communist policy than on the 
political and cultural life of the minority itself. 6 Its main argument is 
that Bulgaria ’ s minority policy can be seen as a function of the coun-
try ’ s subservient relationship with the Soviet Union and the search by 
the state and communist party for the complete domination of Bul-
garian society. In particular it seeks to extend to the earlier period 
Vesselin Dimitrov ’ s argument that the assimilationist policies of the 
1980s  ‘ emerged as a result of a combination of threats and opportu-
nities on number of levels ’ . 7 It argues further that the division of the 
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world was seen simultaneously as a foreign policy  threat (Turkey), as 
an  opportunity for the government to  ‘ deal with ’ ethnic minorities free 
of fi rm internal or external pressure and, last not least, as a  source of 
stability in that it brought continuous political, economic and military 
support from the Soviet Union. 
 2 The Bulgarian-Turkish Context 
 Relations between Bulgarians and Turks have rarely been simple. At 
the establishment of the Modern Bulgarian state after liberation from 
Turkish rule by the Treaty of Berlin (1878), a signifi cant Turkish 
minority (usually estimated at about 10 per cent of the total popula-
tion) remained within the new national boundaries. In 1900,  Bulgaria 
had a total population of 3,744,283 of which Bulgarians made up 77 
per cent (2,887,860) and Turks 14 per cent (539,656). The other 
important ethnic minorities were Roma (2.4 per cent), Greeks (1.9 
per cent) and Jews (0.9 per cent), but in the aftermath of World War 
I, the number of Greeks decreased drastically to 10,564 (0.19 per 
cent). After World War II, the total population rose to 7,613,709 
(according to the 1956 census). Of these, 85.5 per cent were  Bulgarian 
(6,506,541), 8.6 per cent Turks (656,025) and 2.6 per cent Roma 
(197,865). 8 
 In the Bulgarian nation-building project, which stressed the coun-
try ’ s emancipation from its former rulers and fostered Bulgarian lan-
guage and culture, the Turkish minority tended to be marginalized 
and sometimes feared. At the same time, its treatment was also a sensi-
tive international issue. The Treaties of Berlin and Neuilly (1919) both 
contained clauses guaranteeing the rights of ethnic, religious and cul-
tural minorities (without including equivalent provisions for Bulgar-
ia ’ s neighbours). The wars that Bulgaria waged with its neighbours in 
the course of its national unifi cation also left a legacy of  bitterness, 
which persisted until after World War II. The most sensitive problems 
were posed by Macedonia and Thrace, both of which, having being 
part of the Turkish Empire, were incorporated into the newly estab-
lished, predominantly Christian successor states.  Macedonia was 
divided among Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, but many Bulgarians 
were deeply dissatisfi ed with this settlement because it left about 
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700,000 – 800,000 compatriots outside the country ’ s borders. In addi-
tion, the problem of Western Thrace, the area between the Mesta and 
Maritsa rivers, soured relations with Greece. While Turkey retained 
Eastern Thrace, Bulgaria fi rst gained Western Thrace after the Bal-
kans Wars but then lost it to Greece. In the course of these wars and 
the boundary changes that followed them about 18,000 Bulgarians 
were killed in Macedonia when Serb and Greek authorities entered 
the province. Of particular relevance here are the 280,000 Bulgarians 
who, out of fear of Serb, Greek and Turkish repression, migrated from 
these territories to the  ‘ mother country ’ and kept alive national resent-
ments about having  ‘ lost out ’ . 9 Relations with Romania were also trou-
bled: Bucharest obtained Northern Dobrudja at the Treaty of Berlin, 
and after the wars in the early twentieth century also gained control of 
Southern Dobrudja. 
 Nationalist revisionist agitation intensifi ed in the inter-war period 
in Bulgaria, as elsewhere in Europe, 10 but there was relatively little 
manifest ethnic confl ict, at least until the 1930s. The Bulgarian state 
generally observed the religious rights of the Turks and allowed 
 Turkish-language instruction in private schools, the publication of 
Turkish newspapers and magazines and the participation of Turks in 
a range of institutions. In the early 1920s, the government of the 
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union ( Balgarski zemedelski naroden 
saiuz ) allowed the minority to develop fairly successfully even though 
it was always kept at a low enough economic and cultural level to 
prevent any threat to Bulgarian predominance. Nevertheless, the 
spread of Kemal Atat ü rk ’ s vision of Turkey as the fatherland of all 
Turks, in combination with the presence of a compact Turkish popu-
lation at Bulgaria ’ s southern borders, did cause signifi cant worry to 
the authorities. They reacted by restricting  the minority ’ s educa-
tional rights and by increasing pressure on it to emigrate. In the 
mid-1930s, agreement was reached with Turkey providing for the 
annual migration of 10,000 Bulgarian Turks. At the same time, Bul-
garian nationalists exerted pressure to increase the fl ow. They were 
organized in pro-fascist organizations such as  ‘ Fatherland Defense ’ 
( Rodna zashtita) , which maltreated Turks, forced them to speak Bul-
garian, restricted religious rights and stopped the publication of 
Turkish newspapers. 11 
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 World War II changed the context of Bulgarian minority policy fun-
damentally. At the start many Bulgarians saw a chance to redress what 
they saw as an unjust territorial settlement by joining with Nazi Ger-
many. In 1940 the government of Bogdan Filov carefully rejected the 
Soviet proposal for a pact of mutual assistance and on 1 March 1941 
Bulgaria joined the Axis. Even before this the country had taken 
advantage of the efforts to gain its support being made by both Ger-
many and the Soviet Union. In 1940, both powers exerted pressure 
on Bucharest to return Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria because they 
hoped that this territorial change would ensure a favourable Bulgar-
ian attitude. 12 In 1941 German support allowed the Bulgarian army 
and administration to occupy all of Macedonia as well as Western 
Thrace. Within the country the decline of parliamentary democracy 
and the rise of authoritarianism meant that fascist and authoritarian 
groups began to put pressure on the Turkish populations, using phys-
ical violence, burning cultural symbols such as fezzes and desecrating 
mosques. At the same time, offi cials sought to keep the level of Turk-
ish education low enough to limit their political engagement. 13 
 3 The Stalinist Model 
 On 9 September 1944 following a Soviet declaration of war, a 
 communist-led  coup overthrew Bulgaria ’ s pro-German government. 
Once the tide of the war began to turn against Germany its foreign 
policy had become subject to mounting criticism. Now it was reversed 
altogether, as the country began its journey into the bloc of  ‘ socialist 
brotherhood ’ . The trajectory was already quite clear before the end of 
the war, well before it was institutionalized in the Cominform (1947), 
Comecon (1949) and Warsaw Pact (1955). The new orthodoxy on Bul-
garia ’ s international position was encapsulated in the statement of the 
BCP ’ s leadership in 1954 that  ‘ [t]he People ’ s Democracy of  Bulgaria is 
an indivisible part of the democratic and socialist camp led by the 
Soviet Union ’ . 14 In principle this allowed some long- standing national 
rivalries to be settled. Bulgaria ’ s relationship with Rumania, which 
had often been tense in the past, was now  – in theory  – a fraternal one 
between two socialist neighbours. And contacts between Sofi a and 
Bucharest over the following years were indeed good on the offi cial 
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level, even if there were few practical results. (This contrasted to rela-
tions with Yugoslavia, which were often soured by the long-standing 
Macedonian issue). The Dobrudja problem was buried when the two 
countries agreed in 1953 to liquidate Bulgarian property in Northern 
Dobrudja and Romanian property in Southern Dobridja. 15 Conversely, 
Bulgaria ’ s neighbours to the south were now part of a hostile Western 
camp. Turkey, which the Truman Doctrine had declared to be a threat-
ened outpost of the  ‘ free world ’ , received substantial fi nancial sup-
port from the United States in the form of Marshall Aid and other aid 
programmes. 
 At the same time, the communists consolidated their hold on power 
in a process that fi ts well the fi ve-phase framework proposed by Joseph 
Rothschild: the destruction of the monarchy, the emasculation of 
coalition partners, the liquidation of the opposition, the internal 
purges of the communist leadership and fi nally, complete Staliniza-
tion. 16 By silencing any substantial criticism, the one-party system 
blocked any possibility of correcting mistakes or simply mitigating 
the effect of some extreme decisions. 
 The treatment of ethnic minorities also broadly followed the Soviet 
model. But in its implementation signifi cant tensions emerged. Rog-
ers Brubaker and others have described how Soviet nationality policy 
allowed some leeway to local elites, noting that the regime institution-
alized  ‘ territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as fundamental 
social categories ’ . In practice, this created, however unintentionally, a 
political context in which nationalism could develop. 17 At the same 
time Stalin ’ s policy of moving  ‘ the backward nations and nationalities 
into the general channel of a higher culture ’ 18 was, of course, often 
not just extremely brutal but also uneven, since it was in the hands of 
communist elites who were themselves often nationally minded. Simi-
larly, there was a basic tension between the Party ’ s aspirations for the 
promotion of a cultural ethnic identity and its concern that this might 
encourage subversive nationalism. As Traicho Kostov (political secre-
tary of the BCP) put it to the Politburo on 6 February 1945 (recording 
the views of the party leader Georgi Dimitrov): 
 To the national minorities  – full rights, but with Turks  – carefully. 
They should have the same political and citizenship rights as the 
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Bulgarians, possibilities for education in their own language, text-
books and mosques. But as Turks they must not represent any 
particular Turkish national movement because this will create con-
ditions for Turkish agents in the country. . . We do not recognise 
Turkish nationalists. 19 
 In line with Dimitrov ’ s guidance, the Party gave  ‘ full rights ’ to ethnic 
communities. After 1944 the state-sponsored Turkish private schools 
(which had previously been run along religious rather than secular 
lines) allowed publication of Turkish newspapers and magazines and 
gave closer attention to Turks ’ social and economic situation, for 
example, by building new factories, roads and schools. Along with 
this the authorities guaranteed their religious freedom, and included 
Turks in local committees of the Fatherland Front and local adminis-
tration. 20 They also anchored minority policy in the 1947 constitu-
tion, which proclaimed that  ‘ the national minorities have the right of 
education in their mother tongue and of developing their national 
culture ’ though they were also obliged to learn Bulgarian. 21 Tradi-
tionally Turks were distinguished on the basis of their language, reli-
gion, customs (e.g., dress), history and self-determination. 22 In line 
with the Stalinist interpretation of the national question, Turks were 
allowed to determine their own national identity in the new passports 
which were introduced in 1952. They included a special column for 
 ‘ nationality ’ and this stayed in the offi cial documents until 1975. 23 
 On the other hand, while guaranteeing the minority ’ s cultural 
rights the new power-holders were undermining its economic basis 
by setting up agricultural cooperatives and liquidating private prop-
erty. Since most Turks lived in villages, they were disproportionately 
affected by these reforms. They were also offended by the atheistic 
aspects of communist propaganda, as well as the rhetoric (if not the 
practice) of gender equality. This meant that the overall outcome of 
this early  ‘ progressive ’ project of social transformation was less than 
satisfactory in the eyes of the communist elite. As Trifonov has shown, 
after initially supporting the development of those institutions 
(schools, mosque, newspapers, etc.), which in one way or another 
 ‘ nourish Turkish nationalism ’ . 24 the BCP soon began to see their dis-
advantages. 
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 The adversarial relationship of the Cold War intensifi ed Bulgarian 
fears of Turkey. Bulgaria ’ s rulers shared Soviet fears of a possible 
 Anglo-American intervention, with Turkey as an instrument of an 
aggressive  ‘ Western imperialism ’ . As the party newspaper  Rabotnichesko 
Delo put it in November 1947,  ‘ Greece and Turkey have become bases 
for Anglo-Saxon imperialists ’ and were bringing  ‘ a permanent threat 
to the independence and tranquility of our country ’ . 25 Communist 
leaders did not need much persuasion to take this view or to agree with 
Stalin that  ‘ the American imperialists are guiding the preparation of a 
new world war ’ . In contrast, the  ‘ People ’ s Democracies ’ were suppos-
edly concentrating their efforts on preserving peace in the world. 26 
 Bulgarian fears of Turkish destabilization were much exaggerated 
since, on the whole, the West actually made little effort to use the 
minority to subvert the regime. Yet they did contain a grain of truth: 
propaganda from Ankara was indeed being directed towards the 
Turkish minority and the Turkish mass media, in particular Turkish 
radio, did use the evidence of the unpopularity of communist poli-
cies to bolster their case that the internal situation in Bulgaria was 
unstable. Muslims were portrayed as the object of repression and 
assimilation while (in the sarcastic words of Bulgarian reporters) Tur-
key was presented as  ‘ an earthly paradise ’ and  ‘ a country of prosper-
ity ’ . Turkish radio propaganda appealed to Bulgarian Turks to  ‘ return ’ 
to  ‘ their fatherland ’ and promised them welfare support. 27 Accord-
ing to Rumyana Todorova, this propaganda struck a chord among 
those Turks who were unhappy with the centralizing economic poli-
cies of the new regime and increased their readiness to emigrate. 28 
 As early as 1947 a commission of the Ministry of Interior had con-
cluded that security concerns about the Turkish population living 
close to the border in south-east Bulgaria meant that it should be 
 ‘ diluted ’ . 29 Meanwhile, after a series of border incidents, tensions 
between Bulgaria and Turkey worsened. They reached a crisis-point 
in February 1948 when two Turkish military planes were brought 
down near Sozopol, on Bulgaria ’ s southern coast. In September of 
the same year, there were attacks on the Bulgarian consulate in Istan-
bul, which were countered by attacks on the Turkish consulate in 
Plovdiv. 30 In January, Dimitrov had already expressed his concern that 
important areas of the country, such as Shumen and Razgrad, where 
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compact Turkish communities lived, were displaying signs of nation-
alism and allegiance to Ankara. He also described the  ‘ non- Bulgarian ’ 
 population at Bulgaria ’ s southern border as a  ‘ permanent ulcer for 
our country ’ . It was the party ’ s task to move Turks from this area and 
populate it with Bulgarians. 31 
 Here an important model and counter-example were Bulgaria ’ s 
Jews. After the establishment of Israel and the establishment of diplo-
matic relations they were allowed to emigrate to Israel. Between 1948 
and 1950 about 40,000 did so, motivated both by the pull of Israel 
and the push of the BCP ’ s radical programme. The main difference 
between Jews and Turks in the eyes of the regime was that before the 
war Jews had not lived in isolation. Despite some anti-semitism they 
had generally been well integrated in society, had a high educational 
and professional level and as committed communists, many of them 
had, actively participated in the resistance movement against the 
bourgeois governments and Germans troops deployed in the coun-
try. Perhaps most importantly, Israel was not at this stage considered 
as part of a capitalist threat. On the contrary, the Soviet Union sup-
ported the creation of Israel and the Bulgarian party leadership natu-
rally followed that lead in their decision to allow Jewish migration. 32 
 Despite these differences, the Turkish community was led by the 
growth of Jewish migration to nurture similar ambitions. 33 Initially it 
was encouraged to do so by both Bulgaria and Turkey, albeit from 
entirely different motives. On the one hand, the imposition of com-
munism affected the traditional Turkish way of life; on the other 
hand, Turkey ’ s readiness to receive Turkish migrants refl ected its 
commitment to Western values and the propaganda of the Cold War. 
Over time, Bulgarian fears that the border regions where Turks lived 
in compacted masses, could be destabilized led the government to 
accept migration. At times, it even encouraged it as a useful vent for 
the release of pent-up social tensions. 
 The start of the shift was already visible in July 1949 when a Bulgar-
ian delegation in Moscow discussed the fate of the Turkish minority 
with the Soviet leadership. When Stalin described the Turks as an 
 ‘ unreliable ’ element and stated emphatically that Bulgaria should get 
rid of them 34 there was little scope for further discussion. On August 
1949, the BCP Politburo decided to allow Turks to emigrate. In the 
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fi rst wave, which continued until Turkey closed its borders in Novem-
ber 1951, over 150,000 people left the country. 35 The number of peo-
ple who wanted to migrate was even greater: according to Bulgarian 
sources, about 250,000 Turks made special applications to the Bulgar-
ian  authorities. The BCP tried  ‘ to stimulate the migration by all 
means ’ especially from the southern regions of Bulgaria. 36 
 Although Turkey ’ s propaganda had initially encouraged migration, 
its response to this infl ux was ambivalent. The wave of migrants put 
enormous pressure on the Turkish economy and, as a Turkish diplo-
mat in Sofi a put it in 1954 Turkey was also afraid of the infi ltration of 
 ‘ communist agents ’ . This led them, perhaps naively, to require 
migrants to sign a declaration about their political beliefs. Turkey 
also began to vacillate over its visa policy, repeatedly closing the bor-
ders in order to stop the fl ow. 37 These shifts further fuelled Bulgarian 
suspicions. In 1950 the Bulgarian minister in Ankara, Iordan Cho-
banov, declared that Turkey had no intention of solving the migra-
tion issue but was actually seeking to increase instability in Bulgaria. 
Their true aim, he alleged, was for the Turkish population to stay in 
Bulgaria but with its gaze permanently directed towards its southern 
neighbour. 38 
 In their efforts to counteract what they saw as dangerous national-
istic tendencies, special branches of the Central Committee,  Komso-
mol (the communist youth organization), and the Fatherland Front 
were now created in order to penetrate the Turkish community. Yet 
at the same time Turkish national identity was fostered by measures 
such as Turkish language instruction, the development of Turkish 
theatres, schools and nurseries, and special fi nancial assistance to 
Turkish regions and the development of infrastructure. All this 
helped stimulate the separation of the Turkish minority from the rest 
of the population. 39 
 4 Overcoming Stalinism through Integration 
 A further decisive impetus for change came in the mid-1950s from 
Moscow, where the direction of minority policy began to shift after 
Stalin ’ s death. Two months after Nikita Khruschev ’ s  ‘ secret speech ’ in 
February 1956 the BCP held a plenum, which led to some important 
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changes at the top of the party. Valko Chervenkov, who was Party 
leader and Prime Minister, was removed and Todor Zhivkov, who, 
despite being fi rst secretary, had lived in Chervenkov ’ s shadow for 
the previous two years, strengthened his hold on power; Anton Iugov, 
who had been the Interior Minister during the  communist take-over, 
became Prime Minister. In general, the Bulgarian leadership fol-
lowed the new Soviet critique of Stalinism  – denouncing the cult of 
personality and political repressions from the previous years while at 
the same time, trying to avoid any profound political, economic and 
cultural reforms that might upset the party elite. 40 
 The new line on the Turkish minority also fi tted in with Khrush-
chev ’ s claim that the nationalities of the Soviet Union were progres-
sively becoming integrated. 41 The Bulgarian authorities sought to 
lessen Turkish alienation by integrating Turks into the development 
of socialism. Ethnic differences were now to be eliminated by restrict-
ing religious and educational rights. Some observers saw this as mean-
ing a policy of assimilation. 42 To soften its impact, the regime began to 
pay more attention to the minority ’ s economic and social grievances. 
 In its new programme, the party leadership declared squarely that 
 ‘ Bulgaria is not a multiethnic country ’ and the development of the 
minority ’ s culture was to be restricted since the Turks were an  ‘ insep-
arable component of the Bulgarian nation ’ . 43 Two years later the BCP 
endorsed new guidelines, which were meant to take it down the  ‘ path 
of integration ’ . They stated explicitly that the fatherland of the Bul-
garian Turks was not Turkey but Bulgaria. Imams were singled out as 
the main instigators of Turkish nationalist feeling; according to the 
State Security ( Darzhavna sigurnost ) they were responsible for dissem-
inating rumours and thus undermining loyalty to the state. Their 
numbers were then drastically reduced and they were placed under 
the control of the security services. The level of control and the inse-
curities that lay behind it can be seen in a comment by Pencho Kuba-
dinsky (a member of the Politburo) in 1967 that every imam  ‘ must be 
a person of the State Security. We must enter the mosques. There 
people are shaped. . . . ’ The other area where the impact of the new 
line was felt was education. The party leadership noted that some 
Turkish pupils not only  had no knowledge of Bulgarian because they 
had been educated only in the Turkish language but also showed no 
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wish to learn it. From then on, all education in Bulgarian schools, 
teacher training institutes and universities was to be in Bulgarian 
only. 44 In December 1967 Zhivkov laid down the main elements of 
Party policy: 
 we are implementing a line for the creation of a united  communist 
nation. Lenin advocated progressive assimilation. Specifi cally, 
in our case there is a progressive assimilation of nationalities in 
 Bulgaria, including the Turkish nationality and their fusion with 
the Bulgarian nation and the gradual creation of a united commu-
nist  nationality. 
 Nevertheless, for the moment Zhivkov also emphasized that  ‘ we do 
not advocate assimilation ’ but  ‘ the integration of the population as 
an integral part of the Bulgarian nation ’ . 45 The party leader clearly 
provided the blueprint for the future  – gradual dilution of the ethnic 
differences between  Turks and Bulgarians. Eventually, this policy was 
to lead to the incorporation of Turks into Bulgarian nation. 
 The change in direction amounted to an acceptance that the exist-
ing policy had failed. For two decades the authorities had recognized 
Turks as an independent ethnic group, seeking to convince them of 
the advantages of socialismand to overcome their pre-war marginal-
ization through measures of economic, cultural and social progress 
so that ethnic differences would slowly be diluted. Now the party 
began to reconsider its recognition of the Turks as an ethnic group 
altogether, defi ning them instead as Bulgarians who had been assim-
ilated by the Turks from the fi fteenth to the  seventeenth century. Its 
leaders inaugurated a massive propaganda campaign. In the 1970s 
and 1980s these efforts led to an increasing number of academic pub-
lications, which used old documents to prove the minority ’ s Bulgar-
ian origins, 46 introduced new socialist rituals to replace Muslim 
traditions and eventually (1984 – 85) changed all Turkish for Bulgar-
ian names. 
 Not surprisingly the new policy caused deep discontent within the 
Turkish minority and in the long run created a more fertile soil for 
Turkish nationalism. Several Turkish underground organizations were 
formed in the 1960s. At the same time appeals for the  reestablishment 
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of Turkish schools and for a resumption of emigration to Turkey 
increased, and were accompanied once again by the assertion that 
Bulgarian Turks were a part of the Turkish nation. Some organiza-
tions also called for autonomy and the promotion of Turkish as an 
offi cial language in specifi c regions, such as north-east and south-west 
Bulgaria. 47 This was a direct challenge to offi cial policy. 
 In parallel with these shifts in domestic policy Bulgaria ’ s foreign 
policy was also undergoing signifi cant changes, following  – yet again  – 
the Soviet lead. The new line of  ‘ peaceful coexistence ’ provided an 
argument for enhancing contacts with the West. It also raised the dif-
fi cult question of how to respond to the long-simmering confl ict over 
Cyprus between Bulgaria ’ s two western neighbours, Turkey and 
Greece. 48 In the early 1960s, Bulgaria concentrated on improving 
relations with Greece because it believed that this might encourage 
Ankara to be more fl exible in the impending negotiations on migra-
tion issues. Achieving agreement in 1964 with Greece over outstand-
ing fi nancial debts (in particular, the 45 million dollars reparations 
bill that the 1947 Peace Treaty had imposed on Bulgaria), as well as 
several other agreements on trade, transport, tourism, etc., eased ten-
sions between Sofi a and Athens. 49 
 In the light of Soviet support for Ankara in the Cyprus crisis the 
Bulgarian government also began to consider how to improve rela-
tions with Turkey. Discussions began on a trade agreement, and on 
ways of enhancing bilateral cultural and scientifi c contacts. But Turk-
ish insistence on the free migration of Bulgarian Turks and on the 
recognition of their status as a national minority were major sticking 
points. Sofi a declared the Turkish position to be unacceptable and 
therefore did not respond. 50 The great Bulgarian fear was of a 
knock-on effect within their Turkish minority. In 1964, Ivan Bashev, 
the Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs, reported to the Politburo 
that the  ‘ religious fanaticism ’ and  ‘ nationalist sentiments ’ of the 
Turkish minority were providing fertile soil for anti-Bulgarian propa-
ganda and  ‘ attempts at interference in the internal affairs of the 
country ’ . For Bashev the mere presence of a compact Turkish popu-
lation in some Bulgarian regions was a threat to the country since 
 ‘ without doubt the aspirations of the Turkish reactionary circles will 
be increased ’ . 51 Yet he also judged that the resurgence of the wish to 
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emigrate was in the country ’ s interest. He argued that this was a suit-
able moment to resolve the contradictions between the two countries 
since in its response to the Cyprus crisis Turkey had tried to maintain 
good relations with the Soviet Union. The minister also believed that 
migration would  ‘ decrease the basis of the Turkish government for 
the realization of hostile activity against our country ’ . 52 
 In the Politburo discussion of Bashev ’ s report in October 1964, the 
leadership ’ s fear that the Cyprus crisis would increase calls for auton-
omy was clear to see. The Turkish defi nition of the minority as  not 
merely  ‘ ethnic ’ but  ‘ national ’ was seen as only a step away from 
demanding collective rights, autonomy, independent institutions and 
parity with the state language. Once again, emigration was seen as the 
most convenient solution and it was decided to approach the Turkish 
government. The Turkish government, however, failed to respond to 
the Bulgarian suggestion for two years. When Bashev met his Turkish 
counterpart Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil in 1966 he signalled Bulgaria ’ s 
 willingness to relax restrictions on emigration but at the same time 
vigorously protested against Turkish advocacy of the minority ’ s cause. 
Summing up, he stressed that we  ‘ will never allow the Cyprus story in 
our country ’ . 53 
 In 1968, after two years of negotiations, Bulgaria and Turkey signed 
a new agreement, which allowed about 130,000 Turks to migrate to 
Turkey between 1969 and 1978. 54 This substantial emigration clearly 
did help reduce ethnic tensions to some extent. But it could not 
 ‘ solve ’ Bulgaria ’ s ethnic issues because of the strength of pro-Turkish 
sentiments and Turkish nationalism among the remaining Bulgarian 
Muslims. Moreover, the period of expanded East – West contacts in 
the 1960s  did not lessen Bulgarian fears of Western subversive activity. 
In 1966, after the Ninth Party Congress, the Party stepped up the 
struggle against the impact of foreign ideologies. 55 But growing Bul-
garian contacts with capitalist states meant more possibilities for 
Western infl uence and made the Turkish minority appear even more 
disruptive. Far from being fully integrated, many Turks appeared 
alienated and even hostile towards communist rule. Bashev ’ s pessi-
mistic statement summarized Bulgarian fears that Ankara might play 
the ethnic card in order to place Sofi a in a diffi cult position. This 
kind of nervous analysis was probably reinforced by the Turkish 
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 invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and the subsequent division of the island. 
In 1977, State Security reports noted that Bulgaria ’ s foreign adversar-
ies had increased their activities to a point where it had now assumed 
a  ‘ total nature ’ . It also stressed that Turkey was trying to prevent the 
fulfi lment of party policy within the Turkish population and among 
Bulgarian Muslims, and was fostering  ‘ migration psychoses ’ , nation-
alistic sentiments, anti-Bulgarian feelings and demands for autonomy. 
The secret service concluded that the objective of  ‘ bourgeois Turkey ’ 
was to use the Bulgarian Turks as a  ‘ fi fth column ’ . 56 
 5 Bulgarianization in the Last Phase 
 Alongside the long-standing fear that Turkey would exploit the minor-
ity and alienate it from  ‘ socialist developments ’ , demographic trends 
helped create a particular collective  Angst . The Turkish population 
had long been growing at a faster rate than the rest of the popula-
tion. From about 675,500 in 1946, it grew to more than 800,000 
in 1970 in spite of the emigration of around 260,000 – 270,000 people. 
For some in the BCP this was an argument for intensifying its assimi-
lationist policies. The dilemma they faced was aptly summarized by a 
British diplomat who pointed out that  ‘ within the country as a whole 
the main opposition to the regime is provided by the Turkish minor-
ity ’ and added that Bulgaria ’ s rulers had tried both appeasement and 
repression but  ‘ under appeasement the Turks fl ourish and multiply, 
while repression . . . merely increases their attachment to their 
national and religious distinctiveness ’ . 57 
 In 1971, the Politburo concluded that Turkey had altered its policy 
towards the Turkish diaspora in the Balkans as a whole. Instead of 
seeking to collect all Turks in the fatherland, the policy now seemed 
to be aimed at preserving Turkish identity and culture in the places 
where Turks were living. This prompted renewed fears that Bulgarian 
Turks might be  ‘ used by the Turkish state for its objectives at an 
appropriate moment ’ . 58 In an attempt to counteract this in 1971 the 
new constitution declared that there were no national minorities in 
Bulgaria, only citizens of non-Bulgarian origin. Attacks on Muslim 
traditions increased and the inculcation of a patriotic and commu-
nist spirit in the education system was intensifi ed. 59 At roughly the 
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same time as Brezhnev developed his thesis of a  ‘ unifi ed Soviet nation ’ 
Bulgarian party offi cials introduced the term of  ‘ the unifi ed socialist 
nation ’ . As part of a series of wider restrictions, curbs were introduced 
in the cultural sphere; limitations on lifestyle choices and on Western 
infl uences and name changes for Roma and Bulgarian Muslims were 
imposed. They also suffered from state pressure and interference in 
their social and private life. 60 The BCP ’ s aspiration to enforce the 
assimilation of the entire Turkish population can be seen in the 1971 
party programme. As Richard Crampton puts it,  ‘ the unifi ed socialist 
nation ’ was 
 interpreted to mean bringing about the end of the differences 
between rural and urban life and physical and mental labour. This 
would produce a nation entirely working class in its composition 
and thus the party of the working class, the BCP, would become the 
party of entire nation. 61 
 Along with political, economic and cultural uniformity, it now seemed 
time to move to ethnic unifi cation. In 1974, Aleksandar Lilov elabo-
rated on this idea, placing the emphasis on atheism, class-conscious-
ness, patriotism and the internationalist education of all Bulgarian 
citizens, on the development of new socialistic rituals and traditions, 
and of course alignment with the Soviet Union. 62 In February 1974 
the BCP adopted the doctrine of the  ‘ unifi ed socialist nation ’ and 
intensifi ed its efforts, not just to integrate the Bulgarian Turks but 
also to assimilate them completely. The new line required the Turk-
ish minority to gradually overcome its ethnocentrism, to be ideologi-
cally and politically integrated in order to be included in  ‘ the unifi ed 
socialist nation ’ .  The explicit goal was the fi nal assimilation of the 
minority and the abolition of all features of Turkish identity. The 
international backdrop to this fi nal stage was an increase in tension 
between East and West 63 and the establishment of the Turkish Repub-
lic of North Cyprus in 1983, which once again increased Bulgarian 
fears of Turkish intervention. 64 
 The culmination of the assimilation policy was the name-changing 
campaign from December 1984 to January 1985, when the  authorities 
forced about 800,000 Turks to accept Bulgarian names. The growing 
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tensions over the following years culminated in mass Turkish protests 
in May 1989. The roots of Turkish resentment were the state ’ s inter-
ference in their most private space  – the choice of personal names, 
denunciation of Muslim customs, ban on traditional clothes, as well 
as banning the use of Turkish in public places. Once again the BCP 
sought the release of domestic ethnic tensions in increased migration 
to Turkey. In June 1989, Zhivkov said that it was desirable for about 
200,000 – 300,000 Turks to migrate. 65 However, when in the summer 
about 330,000 people did move from Bulgaria to Turkey the agricul-
tural sector came close to collapse. 
 In contrast to other East European states, there were no mass 
upheavals or demonstrations in Bulgaria during communist rule. 
Turkish protests in the 1980s against offi cial restrictions were clearly 
the exception, which proved this rule. They reached a peak of activ-
ity with the participation of Turks in terrorist acts, demonstrations, 
hunger strikes and dissemination of propaganda materials. In 1984, 
that is, before the name-changing campaign, illegal Turkish groups 
organized explosions at Varna Airport and Plovdiv Train Station. 
Together with further terrorist acts, the following year they killed 8 
people and injured 50. 66 But this active resistance did not produce 
any effective results and was easily suppressed by the security forces. 
The protests of May 1989 did however have an impact on state  policy. 
In the context of the changing international situation and the sharp-
ening domestic ethnic and economic crisis, they pushed the BCP 
into allowing a new wave of migration to Turkey. Eventually, at the 
end of 1989, after Zhivkov ’ s retirement on 10 November 1989, the 
government allowed the resumption of Turkish names. 67 In general, 
Turks suffered from a range of state repressions in the late 1980s  – 
arrests, persecutions, intimidations and casualties. According to the 
documents of the State Security, 19 people were killed in the name-
changing campaign and protests in May 1989. 68 Passive resistance to 
the regime strengthened the isolation of the Turkish minority, edu-
cation in Muslim traditions and turned many towards a religion and 
confrontation with authorities. There were also long-term repercus-
sions for Turks on a personal level  – some of them migrated to Tur-
key in 1989, while others began political careers in post-communist 
Bulgaria. 
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 6 Conclusion 
 The context of the Cold War clearly marked the Communist Party ’ s 
policy towards the Turkish minority on many levels. First, long- 
standing friction with Turkey was aggravated by the East-West con-
fl ict. In the eyes of the party leadership foreign powers, such as 
Turkey, might use domestic problems, including ethnic issues in 
order to destabilize the country. At the same time, the Turkish-Greek 
confl ict was perceived as a dangerous stimulus to Turkish separatism, 
regardless of the fact that both sides were in the western camp. More-
over Bulgaria ’ s central place in the Warsaw Pact and the close rela-
tions between Sofi a and Moscow meant that Turkish interference in 
Bulgarian affairs risked leading to a confrontation between the East-
ern and Western blocs not just one limited to the Balkans. 
 In all this the BCP closely followed the shifts of Soviet nationality 
policy, starting with Stalin ’ s theory of  ‘ the national question ’ . 
 Furthermore, as should now be clear, Bulgarian policy towards the 
 Turkish minority oscillated between two poles, support for the devel-
opment of Turkish national identity from 1944 to the mid-1950s on 
the one hand, and restrictions on minority cultural, religious and 
educational rights from the late 1950s on the other. The fi rst approach 
was typical at the height of the Cold War and the Stalinist period. The 
demise of Stalinism led to attempts at integrating the Turkish popula-
tion into Bulgarian society. Both approaches produced ethnic ten-
sions and could not  overcome the Turkish isolation completely. The 
Party sought an outlet for domestic problems in the migration waves 
of Turks in 1950 – 1951 and 1969 – 1978. 
 Last not least communist policy has to be seen in the context of 
the totalitarian system. There were no alternative political views on 
offer that could question the communist line nor were there any 
social debates of sensitive ethnic issues. The Party ’ s ethnic policy had 
a strong connection with its grand project for modernizing and 
industrializing Bulgarian society. This policy led to far-reaching 
changes in the economic and social status of Bulgarian Turks, with-
out lessening either their separation or decreasing the popularity of 
emigration. This in turn increased the uncertainty of the party lead-
ership and further stimulated their search for more radical  solutions, 
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which in the 1980s led them to intensify assimilation. These attempts 
were cut short by the collapse of communism and the end of the 
Cold War. 
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 Chapter 6 
 South Tyrol: Ethnic Winner 
in the Cold War 
 G ü nther  Pallaver 
 1 Introduction 
 At the start of the Cold War South Tyrol could already look back on 
decades of acute ethnic confl ict. When the southern part of the Aus-
trian province of Tyrol was allocated to Italy after World War I, the 
treatment of its overwhelmingly German-speaking population 
became an international  cause c é l è bre . Nationalist and democratic 
parties in Italy, Austria and Germany  – as well as lobbies as far away 
as Britain  – disputed the fairness of the decision, and discussed the 
possibility of revising it. Mussolini ’ s policy of intense italianization 
increased the arguments and after 1933 important parts of South 
Tyrol ’ s political elite gravitated towards National Socialist Germany. 
But, in 1939, in an attempt to remove the bone of contention the 
two dictators came to an agreement. A euphemistically named 
 ‘ option ’ would give South Tyroleans the chance to choose either 
German citizenship and move to Germany, or Italian citizenship, 
which would mean remaining in Italy but without any minority pro-
tection. 1 This was meant to bring a defi nitive resolution of the prob-
lem but in fact it triggered further confl ict between  ‘ those who 
wanted to stay ’ ( Dableiber ) and those choosing to leave  (Optanten) . 
By the end of 1939, approximately 86 percent of the population 
(ca. 200,000) had decided to resettle to Germany and only the course 
of the war prevented them from doing so. 2 When the Italian surrender 
brought the  ‘ Pact of Steel ’ to an abrupt end in September 1943, trig-
gering the German occupation of Northern Italy, South Tyrol was 
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placed under direct German  administration (along with Trento and 
Belluno) as part of the  ‘ Operational zone of the Alpine foothills ’ 
( Operationszone Alpenvorland ). In this last phase of the war, though 
there was some (limited) resistance activity, both the  Wehrmacht and 
the Nazi rule were accepted by most of the population. 
 When Germany fi nally surrendered in May 1945 representatives of 
the Italian resistance movement ( Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale /
CLN) assumed power under the aegis of the U.S.-led Allied Military 
Government and at the start of 1946 South Tyrol was returned to Ital-
ian administration. Later in the year, the Paris Agreement was negoti-
ated between Austria and Italy. It was a compromise with Austria 
confi rming the 1919 Brenner border in return for an Italian guarantee 
of extensive autonomy. The implementation (or lack of it) of this 
agreement became the central point of dispute in the confl icted eth-
nic politics of the following decades. Only in 1992 was an agreement 
on the implementation of autonomy fi nally brokered by the United 
Nations in a way which was considered satisfactory to both the German-
speaking population and the Austrian government. 3 In the intervening 
decades, ethnic issues and rights were much debated and disputed 
between Bozen/Bolzano, Vienna and Rome, and between South 
Tyrol ’ s German-speaking and Italian-speaking populations. In the 
1960s these differences erupted into violence including bomb attacks. 
 As can be seen, the confl ict raged  – with varying degrees of inten-
sity  – at the same time as international politics was marked by the 
Cold War. How were the two related? Two historians ’ comments pro-
vide an initial point of orientation. First, there is Rolf Steininger ’ s 
view of Tyrol as  ‘ the fi rst victim of the Cold War ’ . In this perspective 
 ‘ South Tyrol became prematurely caught up in the millstones of the 
Cold War, and this  – and only this  – ultimately decided South Tyrol ’ s 
fate ’ . 4 A related perspective is implied by Mark Mazower ’ s observa-
tion that 
 On each side of the Iron Curtain, potentially destabilizing disputes 
were managed bilaterally, under the gaze of the presiding super-
power. Neither Austro-Italian differences over South Tyrol nor 
Hungarian-Romanian disputes over Transylvania were allowed to 
jeopardize bloc cohesion. 5 
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 Both comments see ethnic politics as in some sense at the disposal of 
 ‘ high politics ’ but they differ in their focus. Steininger empathizes 
with the frustration of regional leaders, apparently powerless in the 
face of the decisions of international power-brokers, while in Mazower ’ s 
synoptic view the Cold War appears as a  ‘ system ’ of equilibrium, in 
which ethnic confl ict is dysfunctional. 
 The argument presented here, by contrast, is that the leadership of 
South Tyrol ’ s minority often played an important active part in the deci-
sions that affected them and that the Cold War sometimes represented 
as much an opportunity to them as a threat (or a millstone). While anti-
communism did sometimes determine the mobilization against ethnic 
grievances, the relationship between high politics and regional politics 
was more complex than either Steininger or Mazower suggests. 
 One key to this understanding is that while, as Mazower rightly sug-
gests, the South Tyrol dispute brought into confl ict two states, which 
were both within the Western  ‘ bloc ’ in terms of values, economic 
organization and parliamentary democracy, there were also signifi -
cant differences between the two; their trajectories out of the war, 
their position in the burgeoning East – West confl ict and in the institu-
tions of Western Europe. 
 2 South Tyrol within the Western  ‘ bloc ’ 
 Although Italy formally remained in a state of war after September 
1943, diplomatic relations were soon re-established with the three 
main Allies. The fact that Italians had, at least on one interpretation, 
liberated themselves and then fought alongside the Allies for almost 
two years, decisively infl uenced the Allies in their favour. Although 
this did not stop Italy being held to account for its alliance with Nazi 
Germany, President Truman expressed the wish for it to become a 
full member of the United Nations. 6 The terms that were then unilat-
erally offered nevertheless seemed harsh to many Italians: the coun-
try lost its fl eet, all of its African colonies, some small border areas in 
the West and in the East, and all of Istria including the Dalmatian 
coast. 7 This put all the more pressure on Rome to defend the Brenner 
border against calls for its revision. On this point all Italian political 
parties were virtually united. 8 
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 By contrast, when the fi rst crucial discussions about South Tyrol were 
taking place at the London Council of Foreign Ministers (September 
1945) Austria did not yet even have a recognized government. The 
State Government that had been established in Vienna under Soviet 
protection in April 1945 was mistrusted by the West and boycotted for 
several months. Admittedly, under the terms of the  Moscow Declara-
tion (1943), Austria ’ s independence was to be restored, but the form 
or speed of the process was not laid down in any detail. The relative 
weakness of Austrian resistance to Nazi rule meant that Allied atti-
tudes to Austrian sovereignty were even more ambivalent than towards 
Italy. Like Germany, though less punitively, the country was to be 
occupied and subject to measures like denazifi cation and re-education. 
Though the basic aim of weakening Germany was common ground 
among the occupying powers, this did not lead to any particular sup-
port for Austria ’ s call for a border revision in Tyrol. There was no 
consensus that it was vital either for Austria ’ s independence or its 
democratic future. 
 Most importantly, even at this early stage, Western policy was 
strongly infl uenced by the fear that Communist parties in Italy and 
Austria could exploit the post-war malaise to increase their infl uence 
and ultimately take power. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union 
had an occupation zone in Eastern Austria but no military presence 
in Italy at all. Though Western policymakers felt uncertain about 
the long-term future of both countries, their conclusions differed. In 
the case of Italy, the precariousness of the government was seen as a 
reason for not infl icting on it the  ‘ loss ’ of South Tyrol with all the 
unpopularity this would bring. As a result, the West shifted its ground. 
When the future of South Tyrol had fi rst been discussed in 1944, the 
British Foreign Offi ce had not excluded the possibility of a border 
revision, which would return it to Austria, and Roosevelt had posi-
tively supported the idea. 9 But as decision-making entered a more 
concrete phase, Western support ebbed. When the newly established 
South Tyrol People ’ s Party ( S ü dtirolerVolkspartei /SVP) called for South 
Tyrol to be returned to Austria in May 1945 there was little resonance 
in London or Washington. 
 While Western calculations not only involved the imponderables 
of two countries, which were potential allies, but might also 
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become part of a threat, Soviet calculations were apparently more 
straightforward. South Tyrol played only a minor role in its strategy, 
at best serving as a possible bargaining chip to be used against either 
Austria or Italy or as a way of persuading them to accept Yugoslavia ’ s 
territorial claims. 10 
 Nevertheless, there is reason to question Steininger ’ s view of South 
Tyrol as the  ‘ fi rst victim of the Cold War ’ and his related hypothesis 
that if there had been no East – West confl ict, South Tyrol would have 
been  ‘ returned ’ to Austria. Though Western wishes to strengthen 
Italy against communist infl uence clearly played a major part in its 
decision-making, this argument pays insuffi cient weight to the 
broader anti-German climate in which the decision was made. To put 
it in general terms: in 1945 any population that could be seen as 
 ethnically German or connected Germany had a weak hand. Not only 
was there a widespread aversion to all things German, but there 
was also a deep suspicion of any claims for the collective rights of 
German (or  ‘ German-speaking ’ ) minorities including the  ‘ right of 
 self-determination ’ . The echoes of Hitler ’ s tactics of legitimizing 
German expansion into Central Europe, and in particular the misuse 
of minorities, such as the Sudeten Germans was clear. And the deci-
sion of the Potsdam Conference to agree the expulsion of some 14 
million Germans from the eastern territories showed that the Allies, 
notwithstanding their misgivings about the methods adopted, basically 
endorsed the goal of creating homogeneous nation-states in Eastern 
and Central Europe. Against this benchmark, the outcome for the 
South Tyroleans could almost be seen as fortunate. Despite the basic 
similarity of their situation to that of German minorities further east, 
they successfully evaded the logic of ethnic cleansing and expulsion. 
 A look at South Tyrol ’ s  ‘ war record ’ underlines the point. The 
decision of the overwhelming majority of the population (86 per 
cent) to resettle in Germany should not of course be equated with 
unconditional approval of the Nazi regime. Yet in the climate of 
post-war Europe, it might easily have been. In the light of Nazi atroc-
ities and the experience of occupation, Allied decision makers and 
publics were rarely able or were willing to make distinctions. The 
Italian government and media for their part were certainly all too 
ready to label those who had chosen to leave in 1939 as Nazis. Those 
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calling for them to be deprived of Italian citizenship or even removed 
them from the country could be found in the higher ranks of the 
Christian Democracy such as De Gasperi, as well as in the Italian 
Communist Party (Togliatti). 11 Unfair though this was, it had some 
basis in reality: fi rst, a broad majority of South Tyrol ’ s political elite 
had indeed openly endorsed National Socialism; second, when 
National Socialists seized power in south Tyrol they had been assisted 
by local Nazis; and third, local Nazis had participated in atrocities 
including the extermination of Jews and  ‘ euthanasia ’ killings, atroc-
ities in the Bolzano transit camp and other acts of persecution. All 
these suggest at least the probability that  – with or without the Cold 
War  – the Austro-Italian border would have remained unchanged 
and that South Tyrol ’ s  ‘ missed chance ’ should therefore not be 
ascribed to the Cold War. 
 But the argument can be taken further: in some ways South Tyrol 
positively benefi tted from early Cold War tensions. It is at least argu-
able that without the West ’ s fear of Soviet encroachment, it would not 
have exerted the pressure that resulted in the Paris Agreement. In the 
summer of 1946, Vienna ’ s South Tyrol policy appeared to be in ruins. 12 
There was no Plan B now that  ‘ Plan A ’ (border change on the basis of 
self-determination) had failed. At this point, Western policy shifted in 
favour of Austria. Perhaps the most important difference to the previ-
ous autumn was the outcome of Austria ’ s fi rst post-war parliamentary 
elections in November 1945, where the Austrian Communist Party 
(Kommunistische Partei  Ö sterreichs/KP Ö ) had performed disas-
trously. The strength of Austrian anti-communism was refl ected in the 
dominance of the new coalition government by the People ’ s Party 
( Ö sterreichische Volkspartei/ Ö VP) and Socialists (Sozialistische Partei 
 Ö sterreichs/SP Ö ) (with the Communists reduced to a minor role). In 
the deepening crisis, the continuation of this coalition seemed vital to 
the West. The British Foreign Offi ce feared that unless Austria ’ s  Foreign 
Minister Karl Gruber could demonstrate that his South Tyrol policy 
had achieved some success he would be under threat. This apparently 
weighed more than any particular concern for minority rights and led 
the Foreign Offi ce to apply great pressure on both Italy and Austria to 
come to an agreement. Above all, it made it clear to the Italian Govern-
ment that it was also in Rome ’ s interest for Austria to be favourably 
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disposed towards it. Unless it could extract something from the ruins 
of its South Tyrol policy, it might be driven to a more pro-Soviet line. 
The high expectations of the Austrian public had been shown by 
numerous demonstrations held in South and North Tyrol and the peti-
tion signed by 155,000 South Tyroleans and presented to the Austrian 
Chancellor Leopold Figl. When their demand was fi nally rejected by 
the four allies on 24 June 1946, 13 it paved the way for an agreement 
based on ‘ internal self-determination, ’ i.e., autonomy, instead of  ‘ exter-
nal self-determination. ’ Thanks to the British initiative, an understand-
ing was reached within weeks and on 5 September 1946 the Paris 
Agreement ( Pariser Vertrag ) was signed (later integrated into the Italian 
Peace Treaty). 14 This was followed in 1948 by the passing by the Italian 
Parliament of the First Autonomy Statute, which meant that unlike in 
the 1920s, South Tyrol could not be treated as a merely internal Italian 
matter. Austria was given the special legal status of a  ‘ protecting 
power. ’ 
 3  The Disappearance of Ethnic Politics ? 
 As the division of Europe deepened, both Italy and Austria became 
part of the Western  ‘ community of values, ’ in the sense that they had 
multi-party parliamentary systems and capitalist economies. Both 
benefi tted heavily from Marshall Aid and were members of the OEEC 
and its successor organizations (EPU, OECD). Austria ’ s integration 
into Western Europe ’ s economy was as crucial to its post-war recovery 
as it was to Italy but Austria, as an occupied country, operated under 
more constraints. Unlike Italy, it could not join NATO or the Western 
European Union, although in many ways  – some of them covert  – it 
was a  de facto member. 
 In this period of Western integration and Cold War tension, South 
Tyrol virtually disappeared from the international horizon in what 
some have called a  ‘ South Tyrolean lull ’ ( S ü dtirolfl aute ). It also hardly 
featured in the media or in public discussion in Italy or Austria. In 
the run-up to the 1948 election campaign Italian politics was domi-
nated by the confrontation between Christian Democrats and the 
Popular Democratic Front ( Fronte Popolare ), which included Com-
munist and Socialists. Over the following decade, the Austrian media 
Ethnicity.indb   153 1/24/2012   6:59:50 PM
Ethnicity, Nationalism and the European Cold War154
for its part focused primarily on the four power Treaty negotiations 
and the burdens of the continuing occupation. Apart from Austrian 
disappointment at the failure to  ‘ regain ’ Tyrol, there was a wide-
spread feeling that neither the Italian government (nor other 
 Western governments) should be upset at a time when their support 
was needed against Soviet pressure on the West. 15 If the South Tyrol 
confl ict was addressed at all, it was not as part of a bilateral confl ict 
between Italy and Austria, but rather in the context of the East – West 
confrontation. 16 The only major exception to Austria ’ s softly-softly 
approach came in 1953. After Italy ’ s Prime Minister Giuseppe Pella 
had demanded a plebiscite for Trieste the Austrian government 
responded with a note to Paris, London, and Washington calling, 
unsuccessfully, for the right of self-determination to be applied to 
South Tyrol. 17 
 South Tyrol may have come off the international agenda but ethnic 
politics did not disappear. On the contrary, ethnic actors adjusted to 
the new international context, seeking to turn it to their advantage. 
The continuation of ethnic politics in a new key can be seen in the 
stance of the SVP, which was the dominant regional party from its 
foundation in 1945 and consistently won an absolute majority of seats 
in provincial elections with a share of the vote ranging from 67.6 per-
cent (1948) to 48.1 percent (2008). 18 To understand this success it is 
essential to see the way that, as an ethnic  ‘ catch-all party ’ it success-
fully gained support from all social classes. 
 At the same time, it successfully operated in and exploited a polit-
ical culture which was emphatically conservative and Catholic. In 
the Cold War, the anti-socialist and anti-communist dimension to 
this culture led the SVP to give top priority to maintaining a conser-
vative hegemony at provincial and national levels. 19 In its support 
for an anti-communist front with the Christian Democrats ( Democra-
zia Cristiana /DC) its leadership was also prepared to accept the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement, even when, from an ethnic 
perspective, there was a good reason to challenge the way the DC 
was sabotaging it. 
 A major milestone in this process was the 1948 Italian election cam-
paign, in which the DC, together with other conservative parties, 
united against the  ‘ popular front ’ of the communists and socialists. 
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The elections were viewed in Western capitals as a crucial test of the 
strength of anti-communist mobilization. South Tyrol ’ s leading Cath-
olic, Bishop Johann Geisler, called it a battle between  ‘ Christ and 
anti-Christ, ’ between  ‘ Rome and Moscow, ’ and between  ‘ Freedom 
and Bondage. ’ 20 He went on to explain that 
 out of all the parties running in my Diocese, there are only two 
whose programmes conform to the demands of the Church author-
ity: namely, the S ü dtiroler Volkspartei and Democrazia Cristiana. 
From a religious point of view, believers can  – with a good con-
science  – cast their votes for either of these two parties. 21 
 In the pursuit of anti-communist unity some Catholic fi gures outside 
the SVP even attempted to convince the party not to put up any can-
didates at all, and instead give their votes  en bloc to the DC. 22 Though 
not willing or able to go this far, Erich Ammon, the SVP chairman, 
did signal to the second provincial conference of the SVP that it 
would make common cause with the DC: 
 We will fi ght the (Italian) government only in those places and at 
those times where our national interests may be harmed. We should 
not forget, however, that  this Italian government has fought for the 
consolidation of the state as well as for the Christian and European 
spirit. Electoral campaigns notwithstanding, there should be no 
doubt whatsoever that in this battle we are on their side. 23 
 The anti-communism, which underpinned this strategy, under the 
slogan of  ‘ Edelweiss Unity ’ [‘‘ Einheit im Edelweiss ” ] was, admittedly 
also later aimed at the neo-fascist right but its prime targets were any 
groups which appeared, or could be portrayed as being left-of-centre: 
socialists and social-democrats were all lumped together and labelled 
communist. Indeed, anyone who questioned the need for the ethnic 
unity of the South Tyrolean German population risked being labelled 
in the same way. This meant that all forms of political dissent or 
debate tended to be discredited. 
 As Geisler ’ s comment suggests, this anti-communism was strongly 
supported by the Catholic Church. 24 It reached new heights in Bishop 
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Josef Gargitter ’ s pastoral letter of 1955 titled  ‘ The dangers of com-
munism in our country ’ : 
 Christendom and communism are opposites like heaven and hell, 
like God and the Devil. ( . . . ) all those belonging to the Commu-
nist party and their doctrine, and all those who encourage it, are 
excommunicated  – that is, they will remain excluded from the 
community of the Church and from the graces of the Church ’ s 
sacraments. 
 For Gargitter, communism was also a threat to South Tyrol ’ s ethnic 
identity ( Volkstum ): 
 A leftist government with pro-communist tendencies in their poli-
tics, economics and cultural life is incompatible with political party 
programmes based on the bedrock of Christianity. Every connec-
tion with communism is a betrayal of the highest values of our 
 ethnic way of life. 25 
 Until the beginning of the 1970s, the Catholic Church worked 
hand-in-hand with the secular leadership of the SVP, whose main 
concern was to preserve their business interests. The two converged 
around the defense of the  ‘ old order ’ resting on the two pillars of 
the Church and the Catholic Party. The values the party upheld 
were those of a conservative  ‘ naturally ’ hierarchical social order 
(education aimed at elites, traditional woman ’ s role, etc.) and the 
rejection of industrialization, because of the danger of increasing 
working-class strength. 
 Here the ethnic cleavage (German-speaking vs. Italian) largely 
reinforced the confessional one (catholic vs. anti-clerical) since 
despite the shared confession it was the national or ethnic, which was 
declared to embody primary values. 
 The SVP invoked this ethnic primacy to argue in favour of minority 
protection and provincial autonomy while Catholic conservatism was 
directed against the communist enemy. While ideological elements 
were subjected to strong fl uctuations, and tended to be activated 
when there was a real or presumed danger of the left taking over 
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government, ethnic elements were a constant. Left-of-centre German-
speaking parties or candidates were attacked on both counts; they 
were accused of both splitting the ethnic community and supporting 
communism. This two-pronged approach can be seen in the accusa-
tions levelled in 1966 against the South Tyrol Social Democrats under 
Egmont Jenny and later against the Social Progress Party ( Soziale 
Fortschrittspartei ). The Communist Party itself, despite its electoral 
insignifi cance in South Tyrol (it never won more than six percent of 
the votes in provincial elections between 1948 and 1973) was an 
object of constant attack. This did not change as it softened its class 
struggle rhetoric in the 1970s and gave more emphasis to minority 
rights and the implementation of the  ‘ package. ’ 26 Neither did the 
evolution of the Italian Communist Party as it evolved towards reform-
ist  ‘ eurocommunism ’ signifi cantly soften the anti-communism of the 
SVP. In August 1975 the SVP Senator Peter Brugger, apparently irri-
tated by Communist electoral successes in Italy, even went so far as to 
say that the SVP would  ‘ demand the right of self-determination for 
South Tyrol, should Italy fall into the hands of Communism. ’ 27 
 4  South Tyrol Returns to the International Agenda 
 At the end of the 1950s, South Tyrol became an international issue 
once again. One likely explanation for this  ‘ reappearance ’ was the 
changes in relationship between Austria and Italy following the Aus-
trian State Treaty of 1955. The restoration of Austrian sovereignty was 
accompanied by the declaration of  ‘ permanent neutrality, ’ which 
cemented Austria ’ s position outside NATO. Neutral Austria, together 
with neutral Switzerland, now formed a wedge in NATO ’ s southern 
fl ank, leading to some disgruntled Western observers to see this as a 
rupturing of what the Western Defence Union (WEA) had joined 
together only the year before. 28 Two years later, Italy became a founder 
member of the European Economic Community (EEC) while Aus-
tria, constrained by neutrality, joined the less ambitious British-led 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Nevertheless, despite eco-
nomic contacts with its Eastern European neighbours, Austria ’ s 
dependence on West European trade and investment and its integra-
tion with the West Germany economy was the key to its growth 
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over the following decades. The implications of Austrian neutrality 
emerged more clearly after the 1956 Hungarian Uprising as the Aus-
trian government sought to make a clear distinction between  ‘ neu-
tralization, ’ which it rejected as an unacceptable departure from 
basic liberal democratic values, and a desirable neutrality. Especially 
after Bruno Kreisky took over as foreign minister, Austrian govern-
ments also began to display greater self-confi dence on the interna-
tional stage. This new assertiveness was seen in more forceful calls for 
minority rights to be implemented in South Tyrol. At the same time, 
in the region itself the political and economic situation deteriorated. 
A fi rst pointer to things to come was a bomb explosion in 1956. The 
following year, the SVP organized a mass protest demonstration in 
which 35,000 people demanded autonomy, separate from the Italian-
speaking province of Trentino. But there was no indication that Italy 
was prepared to move towards implementing the autonomy required 
by the Paris Agreement. 
 In 1960, faced with Italy ’ s fl at rejection of Austrian complaints, 
Kreisky decided to raise the South Tyrol question in the UN General 
Assembly. The decision was far from easy since it cut across the estab-
lished East – West division, which dominated the UN. Not only 
was Italy an important member of the Western bloc but the 
 Italian-American lobby was also a powerful factor in U.S. politics. 
Italy gained further U.S. support by declaring that the USA was ready 
to station NATO ’ s nuclear weapons in South Tyrol. Since it required 
the area to be politically stable, this reinforced American interest in 
maintaining Italian control there. 
 Fearing that the Soviet Union would profi t from the dispute, the 
Western powers asked Italy and Austria to resolve their differences 
bilaterally. In effect, they meant that Austria should withdraw its 
appeal to the UN. Despite being subjected to tremendous pressure, 
Kreisky resisted and instead sought to  ‘ sell ’ the idea of South Tyrol ’ s 
rights by giving them a European dimension. 29 Specifi cally, he linked 
them to the Social Democratic policy on Germany, which was to sup-
port  ‘ the peaceful reunifi cation of Germany in freedom and the 
establishment of a European security system based on the restoration 
of freedom and self-determination for all European peoples. ’ 30 Only 
by overcoming the forced division of Germany and Europe would 
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real d é tente and enduring peace was possible. Kreisky portrayed 
South Tyrol as a part of this wider project for overcoming the Euro-
pean Cold War. 
 The response of the Western powers to Kreisky ’ s initiative was luke-
warm. Admittedly, Britain was particularly active, partly because the 
Paris Agreement had been substantially the result of a British initia-
tive and partly because Britain was the leading state of the European 
Free Trade Area to which Austria also belonged. British  ‘ Tyrolophile ’ 
traditions probably also played a part. This partly offset the energetic 
calls from the Italian government for support from its NATO part-
ners. But Denmark was the only NATO member-state to come out 
openly against Italy 31 and overall Western pressure on Italy was prob-
ably less decisive than the pleas of non-aligned states, including 
 Ceylon/Sri Lanka, Cyprus, India, Indonesia and Ghana. Ireland, as a 
non-NATO state, played a decisive role in mobilizing Third World 
support for Austria. 
 Contrary to Western fears, the Soviet Union did not get involved. In 
the logic of the Cold War it might have seen the confl ict as a  ‘ windfall, ’ 
which could be used to attack Italy, for failing in its democratic duty. 
In fact, it acted with great restraint. There are several likely explana-
tions for this: fi rst, the Soviet government was presumably reluctant to 
draw attention to its own numerous ethnic or national minorities and 
their various discontents. Second, it was probably also reluctant to 
champion the rights of a German-speaking minority at a time when 
the expellee organizations in West Germany were vociferously assert-
ing their claims. This was refl ected in the DDR position that South 
Tyrolean demands for self-determination were tantamount to right-
wing extremism. 32 The Austrian and Italian Communist parties took a 
similar line. 33 Perhaps most important was the reluctance of the Soviet 
bloc to make an issue of a post-war border at a time when one of its 
main foreign policy concerns was to legitimize the frontiers estab-
lished at the end of World War II (e.g., the absorption of the Baltic 
States, the division of Germany and the Oder – Neisse line). 
 In response to two UN resolutions Italy and Austria eventually 
began bilateral negotiations but they made slow progress. 34 In South 
Tyrol this caused some disappointment and disaffection with the 
SVP leadership and led some militants to resort to armed violence in 
Ethnicity.indb   159 1/24/2012   6:59:50 PM
Ethnicity, Nationalism and the European Cold War160
the hope of  ‘ bombing South Tyrol into self-determination. ’ Interna-
tional public opinion was meant to force Italy to make concessions. 35 
On the night of 11 June 1961, later christened the  ‘ night of fi re ’ 
( Feuernacht ), the group blew up 37 electricity pylons located all over 
South Tyrol. 36 
 These attacks made national headlines in Italy as well as Austria but 
their international impact was much less than the  ‘ bombers ’ had 
hoped. The world ’ s attention was fi xed on the building of the Berlin 
Wall (11 August 1961) and the Cuban missile crisis. In comparison, 
the South Tyrol confl ict hardly seemed decisively important. Further-
more, Italian response to the bombing campaign was less repressive 
than the bombers hoped. Admittedly, Rome did send 7,000 soldiers 
and  carabinieri to South Tyrol and it also set up the so-called  ‘ Commis-
sion of 19, ’ comprising federal, provincial Tyrolean and regional 
Trentino – South Tyrolean representatives. The commission was given 
the task of coming up with a set or  ‘ package ’ of measures meant to 
implement far-reaching legislative and administrative autonomy. This 
response refl ected an important long-term shift in Rome from coali-
tions of the centre to the centre-left. Underpinning this was a broader 
process of transformation and democratization within Italian society 
and politics. At its centre was the gradual softening of the deep antag-
onism between the Communist Party and the Christian Democrats, 
which eventually paved the way to the  ‘ historic compromise. ’ 
 5  South Tyrol as a Secret Service Playground 
 While  ‘ world opinion ’ was hardly touched by the  ‘ night of fi re, ’ one 
group of Cold War actors did begin to get involved in South Tyrol 
more seriously: the secret services. From both sides of the Iron Cur-
tain they began to use the province as a testing ground. Their involve-
ment, which took many South Tyrol activists by surprise, fostered a 
wider process of radicalization and escalation. Whereas the fi rst wave 
of bombings had largely been the work of home-grown perpetrators 
or  ‘ dynamiters ’ ( dinamitardi) , a wider circle now became involved. 
And unlike the fi rst generation, which had taken care not to endan-
ger human life, the second and third generations, most of whom 
came from extreme right wing circles in Austria and Germany, were 
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less fussy. And they were ready to carry out attacks beyond South 
Tyrol ’ s borders. 
 The Austrian State Police and West Germany ’ s Federal Intelligence 
Service, who had followed the activities of the  ‘ Liberation Committee 
of South Tyrol ’ (BAS) from the start, now, stepped up their surveil-
lance. 37 Then the Italian Armed Forces Intelligence Service/ Servizio 
Informazione Forze Armate , which had initially been taken by surprise by 
the bombings, began to infi ltrate the BAS. Here they were able to test 
the methods, which they later used in their subversive  ‘ strategy 
tension ’ ( strategia della tension ) against the Italian state, including the 
use of  agents provocateurs , simulated terrorist attacks, kidnappings, dis-
information and even  – as in the case of Luis Amplatz – the assassina-
tion of terrorist opponents. 38 How far they were prepared to go was 
later shown by the (failed) coup attempt by Carabinieri-General Gio-
vanni de Lorenzo in 1964. 
 Alongside conventional Western diplomatic representatives, who 
closely followed these developments, the U.S. secret service was also 
involved. 39 The CIA had actually been present at the foundation of 
the BAS and Fritz Molden, the Austrian media tycoon and son-in-law 
of CIA Director Allen Dulles, acted as a link to the activists and orga-
nized their fi nance. Leopold Steurer has argued that the activists 
were themselves little more than pawns of the U.S. government, 
which was once again seized by the fear that the left might gain power 
in Rome. The fear was triggered by the fall of the Tambroni govern-
ment in 1961, which had been supported by the neo-Fascists of the 
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). This opened up the possibility 
that the left might join a government coalition. According to Steurer, 
the USA tolerated the bombings in the hope that the crisis would 
boost the Italian right. 40 Here at least the prospect of increased ten-
sion between the two Western neighbours, Italy and Austria, did not 
appear to be a consideration. 
 However, the involvement of West German and Austrian neo-Nazis 
also seems to have increased Soviet interest, and that of East German 
and Czech secret services. The KGB contacted some South Tyrol ter-
rorists in the mid-1960s. It even offered them logistical support but in 
line with their militant anti-Communism; the terrorists refused it. 41 
The main Soviet aim was apparently less an interest in South Tyrol 
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politics  per se than the wish to drive a wedge between Italy and West 
Germany. 42 They may have been encouraged by Italian media descrip-
tions of the fi rst wave of bombings as the  ‘ fi rst German military action 
since the end of the war. ’ In similar vein, Italian media accused 
 Germans of  ‘ anti-Italian rabble-rousing propaganda, revanchism and 
militarism. ’ La Stampa wrote that  ‘ by carrying out the bombing attacks 
in Italy, German nationalists are stirring up public opinion in favour 
of a revision of lost territory in the East  – namely: Prussia, Pomerania, 
Silesia and the Sudetenland. ’ 43 In addition, the Soviet government 
may have hoped to divert international interest from events in 
Czechoslovakia. 44 Whatever its exact motivations, the Soviet secret 
services went so far as to work out a detailed plan to blow up the oil 
pipeline that ran through the Lake Constance, and then lay the 
blame on Italian extremists. 
 By the end of the 1960s the Soviet involvement had achieved little. 
Neither the West German nor the Italian governments showed any 
interest in allowing their relations to deteriorate over South Tyrol. 45 
Increased international tensions following the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia and the U.S. turmoil over Vietnam were much stronger coun-
tervailing consideration. Most importantly, neither terrorism nor 
secret service activities were able to derail the negotiations that now 
began between the Italian government and the SVP. The 1969 pack-
age they agreed to, including 137 measures to protect the German 
and Ladin minorities, was followed in 1972 by the Second Autonomy 
Statute, which contained far-reaching stipulations such as ethnic pro-
portional representation and compulsory bilingualism in the public 
domain. There was a surge of optimism in both language groups and 
the neighbouring states and for a time nearly all violence ceased. 46 It 
seems likely that the foreign secret services now suspended opera-
tions in South Tyrol. 
 6  D é tente and the End of the Cold War 
 The  ‘ Spring ’  that followed the 1969 agreement did not last long. 
When the fi rst measures of minority protection were implemented in 
the mid-1970s they triggered a backlash within the Italian population, 
which saw their privileges as threatened. Their sense of vulnerability 
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was increased by a serious crisis that developed in regional industry 
and one of the largest employers of Italian workers in South Tyrol. 47 
On the German side there were complaints that progress towards 
autonomy was too slow. A minority group thought the measures did 
not go far enough and returned to the demand for self-determination 
and  ‘ reunion ’ with Austria. In 1984, as both North and South Tyrol 
celebrated the 175 th anniversary of the Tyrolean uprising of 1809, a 
new wave of terror began, instigated by an Austrian splinter group 
called  ‘ One Tyrol ’ ( Ein Tirol ). 48 
 The secret services also resumed their machinations, and in par-
ticular the Italian secret services its  ‘ tension strategy. ’ Here the inter-
ests of the Italian state coincided with the aim of Italian nationalists 
to discredit the separatist movements that had emerged in North 
Tyrol in particular. This convergence of interests led to tacit co-oper-
ation between rogue elements of the Italian Secret Service and the 
Italy ’ s far right.  ‘ Primula ’ was a special unit of the shadowy top-secret 
 ‘ Gladio ’ organization, which in the 1950s had been part of the co-
operation between the Italian secret services and the CIA. 49 Even 
though  ‘ Gladio ’ had supposedly long since been disbanded, there is 
clear evidence that it was involved in the new wave of attacks, which 
targeted both Italians and Germans. 50 The Stasi also returned, pursu-
ing similar goals to those of the 1960s. 51 At one point its interests even 
converged with those of the Italian secret services (supported by the 
United States) and the right-wing extremists who had infi ltrated it. 
Some double agents even worked simultaneously for both the Italian 
and East German secret services. Their shared ground was the wish to 
see the idea of self-determination tarred with the brush of right-wing 
extremism, 52 and more fundamentally, the concern to maintain the 
territorial  status quo . 
 The 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which declared Europe ’ s borders to 
be  ‘ inviolable, ’ is generally seen as the highpoint of European d é tente. 
The revival of concerns about human rights, which marked the late 
1970s, an unintended or at least unexpected consequence of it, fed 
into sharpening East – West tensions to create what some have called 
the  ‘ Second Cold War. ’ The military aspect of this deterioration was 
the crisis that followed the 1979 NATO decision to deploy a new 
 generation of intermediate nuclear missiles (Cruise and Pershing) 
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supposedly in order to catch up with the earlier Soviet buld-up of 
SS-20 missiles. Opposition to the NATO decision escalated into a 
broad social mobilization against both NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
and included both neutral Austria and the NATO member, Italy. 
Municipal governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain declared 
themselves nuclear-free zones, forming an  ‘ East – West quadrangle ’ of 
Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary. Though towns in Tyrol (North 
and South) did not join this initiative, there were cross-border initia-
tives and demonstrations calling for the closure of NATO camps and 
missile bases, including those in South Tyrol. 53 
 Nevertheless, when the Cold War did fi nally end, there was a 
moment when politics seemed to be returning to an earlier pre-war 
mode. The independence of the Baltic States, Ukraine and Belarus 
and the reunifi cation of Germany brought the issue of right of self-
determination back to the forefront of discussion and showed that 
 ‘ inviolability ’ did not preclude an agreed revision of state borders. 
For one group within the SVP this revived the vision of reunifi cation. 
There was also talk of the  ‘ Slovenian path, ’ i.e., a relatively painless 
separation from Italy. On 15 September 1991 a huge rally was held 
near the Brenner Pass under the slogan of  ‘ Break off from Rome  – 
regional unity now ’ ( Los von Rom  – Landeseinheit jetzt ). 54 Though the 
 ‘ realists ’ in the SVP quickly regained the upper hand, their concern 
to take the wind out of these  ‘ utopianist ’ sails did lead to a fi nal push 
for agreement on the last outstanding points on implementation of 
the package. 
 In 1992, both Austria and Italy formally presented a  ‘ declaration of 
confl ict resolution ’ ( Streitbeilegung ) to the United Nations, 55 formally 
ending the thirty-year-old dispute. Over the following decade, after 
Austria joined the European Union (1995), frontier barriers at the 
Brenner Pass were removed. South Tyrol now serves as a model for 
the successful resolution of ethnic minority confl icts. 56 
 7 Conclusions : South Tyrol in the Cold War 
 As the case of South Tyrol shows, the interaction between the  ‘ high 
politics ’ of the Cold War and the ethnic politics of the region 
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could be very complex. Nevertheless, fi ve broad conclusions can 
be drawn here: 
 First, the German minority of South Tyrol was in many respects a 
winner from the Cold War. As tensions between the East and West 
were starting to increase, it received the protection of international 
law in the form of the 1946 Paris Agreement. Even though its imple-
mentation took several decades, this was in marked contrast to the 
treatment of ethnic Germans in Eastern and Central Europe. 
 Second, the Cold War provided the SVP with the powerful weapon of 
anti-communism. This was used with great effect against any political 
dissent from left-of-centre. Here the Cold War appears as something 
that regional ethnic politicians could use for their own ends, as much 
as  vice versa . And, as politics of the 1960s and 1970s showed, it was a 
weapon they were reluctant to give up, even when the notion of a 
genuine communist threat appeared increasingly implausible. 
 Third, however, anti-communism was not just an instrument. Espe-
cially until the 1960s it was embedded in the world-view of Tyrol ’ s 
elites. That applied both to Church leaders or those close to the 
Church and to the secular leaders of the SVP. It meant that at the 
height of the Cold War the SVP acted loyally towards Christian Demo-
crat Italian governments and was ready to overlook the inadequacies 
of minority protection because it saw it as a bulwark against commu-
nism. Conversely, the SVP was unable or unwilling to recognize that 
it actually shared much ground with South Tyrol ’ s left-wing or secu-
larist parties. Although this might suggest that Cold War ideology (or 
religion) could and often did trump ethnicity, it should be stressed 
that most South Tyroleans saw no tension between the two. 
 Fourth, the Eastern bloc ’ s readiness to exploit the confl ict propa-
gandistically was quite limited. Even after it was internationalized, the 
Soviet government probably felt too vulnerable about its own nation-
ality policies to do so and, more importantly, was committed to main-
taining the post-war territorial  status quo . A partial exception came 
with the interventions of East European secret services (in particular, 
the East German  Stasi ), which sought to destabilize Italy as a NATO 
member and foster dissent between it and its NATO partner, West 
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Germany. But even though this sometimes produced a strange align-
ment with far-right elements in the Italian secret service, there was 
never much likelihood that the SVP would abandon its ideological 
objection to communism in order to extract concessions from the 
Italian state. 
 Fifth, ethnic politics disappeared from the international agenda in 
the 1940s and most of the 1950s and returned when Austria took it to 
the United Nations in 1961. But both the disappearance and 
 re-emergence were illusory in the sense that ethnic politics and, in 
particular, ethnic grievances had remained a central reality through-
out the period. The anti-communist alignment of the SVP with the 
DC had not stopped the SVP mobilizing ethnic resentments or 
fears. 
 Mark Mazower ’ s claim that  ‘ ethnic disputes were not allowed to 
jeopardize bloc cohesion ’ therefore seems only partly valid in the 
case of South Tyrol. The implication that coercion or pressure 
(through the invocation of the Soviet threat) was exerted from 
above by the superpowers or by national governments is undermined 
by the complexity of national and regional political interactions. 
And, as the violence in the 1960s shows, there were clear limits to the 
abilities of the superpowers to impose stabilization on a region where 
a large part of the population felt  – or was persuaded  –  that it was 
 suffering a basic ethnic injustice. 
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 Chapter 7 
 Sorbian Ethnic Interests, 
the GDR State and the Cold War 
 Peter  Barker 
 1 Introduction 
 The Sorbs of Upper and Lower Lusatia in south-eastern  Brandenburg 
and eastern Saxony are the last remaining representatives of 
the Slavonic tribes which moved westwards beyond the Oder and in 
the fi fth or sixth century established settlements in the area up to the 
Elbe and beyond. During their subsequent history, which was marked 
by close proximity to Germans, they have been subject to a range of 
infl uences, which have directly affecting both their demographic 
structure and their ethnic identity. In the tenth century, along with 
other Slav tribes, they were defeated by the Franks and henceforth 
lived in a state of submission to the dominant German political and 
economic power. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the whole of 
Lower Lusatia, as well as parts of Upper Lusatia, were ceded to Prus-
sia from Saxony. Prussian policy towards the Sorbs was for the most 
part more repressive than that of Saxony. After 1815, Prussia attempted 
to remove teaching in Sorbian in schools, and many Sorbian- speaking 
priests were replaced by German speakers. Lower Lusatia was also 
subject to much stronger economic pressures during the process of 
industrialization in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The 
development of opencast mining for lignite after World War I also 
led to the destruction of many Sorbian communities. Only two Slav 
groups managed to maintain their separate cultural and linguistic 
identity into the twentieth century: the Upper and Lower Sorbs in 
Lusatia. 
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 The Nazi takeover in 1933 led to an immediate deterioration in the 
Sorbs ’ position. Nazi policy was governed by their general view of the 
cultural and racial inferiority of all Slavs. They therefore had to treat 
the Sorbs as inferior citizens and restrict any attempts they made to 
assert their independent identity. In 1937, the  Domowina (Home-
land), the main Sorbian cultural organization since its foundation 
in 1912, was banned, and except for certain religious publications, all 
Sorbian publications were closed down. Sorbian teachers and priests 
were transferred to other parts of the Reich and by the end of 1938 
no more Sorbian was taught in schools. In 1940 plans were drawn up 
by Himmler to deport the Sorbian population to the  Generalgouverne-
ment in Poland but Hitler intervened to defer any transfers, and in 
the end no action was taken. The Nazi period certainly had a negative 
effect on the strength of Sorbian identity, language and culture. How-
ever, it is diffi cult to assess accurately the precise impact of Nazi poli-
cies on their demographic development. The offi cial census of 1933 
produced a fi gure of only 57,000 Sorbs, while a private survey carried 
out under Nazi rule by O. Nowina between 1936 and 1938 arrived at 
a fi gure of 111,000. 1 Both fi gures clearly failed to refl ect the real 
numbers but whatever the precise effect of these years of Germaniza-
tion one thing is clear about the end of the war: the majority of Sorbs 
welcomed the Soviet, Ukrainian and Polish troops who reached Lusa-
tia in April 1945 as fellow-Slav liberators. 
 Outside Lusatia, the literature on the Sorbian ethnic minority is 
sparse. The major work has been done by the Sorbian institutions 
themselves, in particular the Sorbian Institute in Bautzen, created 
in 1951. In the GDR this meant, however, that Sorbian historians 
were subject to the ideological restrictions imposed by the offi cial 
Marxist view of history. This applied in particular to the four-volume 
history of the Sorbs produced in the 1970s by the Institute. 2 Much of 
the work since 1990 has concentrated on revising the historical view 
presented during the GDR period. This has meant approaching sen-
sitive areas such as the effect of opencast mining on the demography 
of the bilingual area. 
 The end of World War II was a major turning point in Sorb-German 
relations; the social, economic and material dislocation, which accom-
panied it was particularly acute in Lusatia. From the middle of April 
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1945 it was caught up in the last battle for Berlin, and there was fi erce 
fi ghting in Bautzen and other towns. After the cease-fi re, the area was 
also directly affected by the agreements made at the Yalta and Pots-
dam conferences. The eastern part of G ö rlitz was placed under Pol-
ish administration, so that towns like Zittau, G ö rlitz and Cottbus were 
now frontier towns cut off from their hinterland. The Germans from 
these areas immediately started crossing the Nei ß e, even though 
almost all the bridges had been destroyed, and streamed into these 
towns, where they remained for several months. All the towns shared 
one major problem, the chaos in the supply system, and many were 
also victims of the indiscriminate and destructive activities of Soviet 
troops. Overall, Lusatia had to endure severe material damage as well 
as immense human suffering: widespread rapes, summary executions 
and indiscriminate maltreatment by the occupation forces. The fact 
that the Sorbs were Slavs did not stop them from being mistreated in 
a similar fashion to the German population. 
 In this immediate post-war period, the region was particularly 
affected by the re-drawing of frontiers; its sudden close proximity to 
Poland and Czechoslovakia meant that it was forced to accommodate 
huge waves of German refugees, triggered by the  ‘ wild ’ expulsions 
that preceded the Potsdam Conference. The stretch of land 200 km 
to the east of the Oder – Nei ß e line was one of the fi rst areas from 
which Germans were expelled after the cease-fi re. In this fi rst period 
of expulsions over 300,000 Germans were driven out of Silesia and 
after Potsdam in August the expulsions were swiftly reactivated even 
before the plan for  ‘ organized ’ expulsions under the supervision of 
the Control Council for Germany was signed on 17 October 1945. 3 
 ‘ Wild ’ expulsions from the Sudetenland in May and June 1945 also 
had a major impact. According to the census of October 1946, the 
Soviet zone took nearly forty per cent of all refugees and expellees, 
offi cially designated resettlers ( Umsiedler ) after the establishment of 
the Central Administration for Resettlers ( Zentrale Verwaltung f ü r 
Umsiedler ) in September 1945. By 1948 they accounted for just under 
a quarter (24.2 per cent) of the population of the Soviet zone. This 
dramatic change in the demographic structure of the Soviet zone 
had a particular impact on bilingual communities in the eastern parts 
of Lower and Upper Lusatia. From October 1945 to March 1946 
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 Saxony was designated not as a reception and resettlement area for 
expelled Germans, but only as a staging-point on the route to eastern 
Brandenburg and Mecklenburg. However, the situation could not be 
controlled by purely administrative measures and many refugees did 
succeed in settling in Saxon villages. By the end of 1946, 17 per cent 
of the population in Saxony were refugees, which was still a much 
lower fi gure than the 43.4 per cent in Mecklenburg. 4 Only villages 
and small towns were designated to take these large numbers of 
 refugees and expellees, because the need for workers was greatest in 
the countryside. More than half of those resettled in the Soviet zone 
were accommodated in villages and small towns with less than 2,000 
inhabitants. Then in March 1946 the Soviet Military Administration 
(SMAD) altered its decree and designated Saxony as a settlement 
area for deported Germans. Since the majority of the bilingual  villages 
lay in Saxony, they were affected especially badly by this measure. 
In 1946 the  Domowina put together sets of statistics for the Sorbian 
area. They make clear that the refugees who were accommodated in 
the villages of the Sorbian language area often made up more than 
20 per cent of the population; in some villages the proportion soon 
reached over fi fty per cent. 5 The head of the  Domowina , Paul Nedo, 
had already warned in 1945 of serious economic and cultural conse-
quences for the bilingual area: in his view Germanization, which was 
already far advanced in some areas, would be accelerated by these 
demographic changes. 6 
 2 The Sorbs at the Start of the Cold War 
 Since the Sorbian area was in the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SBZ), 
it was inevitable that minority policy would be infl uenced by the cool-
ing of the international climate. Particular moments of tension, 
whether within occupied Germany or more widely within the Eastern 
bloc, tended to have a negative effect on Sorbian institutions and 
leaders. The Sorbs were, after all, a Slav minority in a German envi-
ronment controlled by the Soviet Union. This meant that their lead-
ers were torn between seeking an international solution through the 
post-war Conferences of Foreign Ministers (CFM), where they hoped 
for Soviet support, and looking for alliances with whatever German 
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groups emerged from the new power structures of the Soviet zone. 
The Soviet Union saw advantages in presenting their policy towards 
the Sorbian minority as a positive model of how ethnic minorities 
should be treated. This also applied to an extent to the leaders of the 
Socialist Unity Party ( Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland /SED) 
which was founded in 1946 as a fusion of the KPD and parts of the 
SPD, although in the early post-war years this positive dimension was 
not immediately apparent. Despite the fact that both Lenin and  Stalin 
put class before minority interests, some SED leaders were highly 
sceptical about applying Leninist nationalities policy to the Sorbs, 
especially in Brandenburg. In the Soviet Union, this had given non-
Russian ethnic groups some cultural rights, although emphasizing 
that the right of self-determination could and should not serve as an 
obstacle to the dictatorship of the working class. Stalin had presented 
the outline of this policy in 1923 in the theses for the Twelfth Con-
gress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on  ‘ National Fac-
tors in Party and State Affairs. ’ 7 
 The development of policy was not helped by divisions within the 
Sorbian leadership. An acute confl ict developed between those Sor-
bian leaders in the Lusatian National Committee ( Ł u ž iskoserbski naro-
dny wub ě rk ) based in Prague, who were pressing for political separation 
from Germany, and the  Domowina , which by the summer of 1946 had 
moved to a position of qualifi ed cooperation with the SED. The 
leader of the Domowina, Paul Nedo, who had resumed the position 
he had held before 1937, is the most prominent example of a Sorb 
leader torn between the competing pressures of ethnic and national 
politics. The fact that he had joined NSDAP organizations as a school 
teacher in the 1930s and then in 1945 became a member of the KPD 
clearly exposes him to a charge of opportunism. Yet from the per-
spective of minority interests he could reasonably claim that he was 
seeking to get the best possible outcome for the Sorbs in a situation 
where they had precious few options. The National Committee in 
Prague, by contrast, favoured the international route to fi nding solu-
tions to the  ‘ Sorbian question. ’ In September 1945 the two organiza-
tions set up jointly the Lusatian National Council ( Ł u ž iskoserbska 
narodna rada ), and in this early period both were keen to gain  support 
from  ‘ Slav ’ countries. Until March 1946 the  Domowina , in reaction to 
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being denied the status of a political organization by the Soviet 
authorities, pursued a line independent of the KPD and was there-
fore prepared to support the efforts of the National Committee on 
the international stage. But by the autumn of 1946 it had joined 
forces with the SED and agreed to put up candidates on a joint list for 
local and state elections. This decision signalled the defi nitive failure 
of the  Domowina ’ s campaign to establish an independent political 
role for itself inside Germany. It was also a recognition of the reality 
that the SED was going to be the dominant political force in the 
Soviet zone. The inevitable result of this  ‘ realism ’ was to alienate 
those Sorbs linked to the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Liber-
als (LDPD), who tended to look to the National Committee in Prague 
for support. 
 By October 1946, when the Slav Committee in Bautzen was re- 
established, the split between the  Domowina and the National Com-
mittee became obvious. Though National Committee members were 
excluded, they still travelled as a delegation to Belgrade on 4 
 December for the fi rst post-war All-Slav Conference. They were fol-
lowed on 13 December by members of the  Domowina as the offi cial 
delegation. The arrival of two Sorbian delegations made it clear to 
the other delegations that the Sorbian leadership was deeply split. 
Nevertheless, the Yugoslav government agreed to represent Sorb 
interests at the forthcoming German Peace Treaty discussions at the 
London and Moscow CFM. 
 Differences between the two organizations continued during the 
preparations for these talks and although the two sides did attempt to 
work together their standpoints remained very different.  Domowina 
leaders were more constrained by the need to work with the SED, 
while the Prague leaders were relatively unaffected by these internal 
constraints and were able to concentrate on international lobbying. 
Then in February 1947, frustrated by the lack of agreement over the 
inclusion of minority protection in articles in the Saxon and Branden-
burg constitutions, the  Domowina changed its line again. The obstruc-
tive attitude towards other Sorbian cultural and political interests 
taken by all political parties, including the SED, as well as the Soviet 
administration led the  Domowina to reduce co-operation with the 
authorities and turn again to the Allies. But the attempt to involve the 
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Moscow CFM (March to April 1947) failed, despite the support of the 
Yugoslav delegation. The Soviet Union had no time for ideas of an 
independent Lusatia, mainly because this would result in a reduction 
of the territory of their zone. It therefore put pressure on its satellites 
not to support Sorbian claims and expressed its anger at Tito ’ s sup-
port for the Sorbs. The Sorbian question was only raised once by the 
Yugoslavs at the preparatory CFM meeting in London in January 1947. 
At the Moscow CFM itself the Soviet Union blocked any discussion 
and the issue was not raised again at subsequent meetings. 
 Meanwhile, the National Committee submitted a separate memo-
randum with more radical demands. The helplessness of Nedo ’ s posi-
tion is a classic example of the diffi culties faced by ethnic politicians 
seeking to infl uence international decisions, but caught between eth-
nic and national politics. The  ‘ Truman Doctrine ’ of March 1947 
promised to support any free nation seeking to defend itself, but it 
was not intended to cover ethnic minorities like the Sorbs. When 
Sorbian leaders attempted to lobby Western governments there was 
little response. Apparently, the West regarded the Sorbian case as an 
internal matter, to be left to the Soviet authorities. 
 3 Sorbs and the SED 
 After the Moscow conference, hostility between the  Domowina and 
the National Committee grew. Nedo described the Committee as 
reactionary because it refused to co-operate with any German politi-
cal forces and was demanding the expulsion of German expellees 
from the Sorbian area. The confl ict was resolved by a combination of 
natural causes and outside political events: the two main Sorbian 
leaders in Prague, Pastor Jan Cy ž and Jurij Cy ž both died in the course 
of 1947 (of natural causes) and the Communist takeover in Prague in 
February 1948 led to the dissolution of the National Committee ’ s 
offi ce there. This meant that the organization, which had most vigor-
ously represented the fears of Sorbian farmers about political devel-
opments in the Soviet zone, especially the moves towards 
collectivization and the anti-church measures, no longer existed. As a 
result, a large section of the Sorbian community became alienated 
from the political process altogether. 
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 From late 1947 to March 1948 the  Domowina ’ s policy of putting 
pressure on the SED and the Soviet administration began to bear 
fruit. In May 1947 it received permission from the Soviet authorities 
to set up a Sorbian printing fi rm and moves were also set in train to 
pass a Saxon Law on Sorbian rights. In October 1947 the  Domowina 
was recognized as the sole representative of Sorbian interests and was 
able to infl uence the drafting of the law. However, not all of its 
demands were met. For example, at the end of November 1947 in the 
course of a meeting with the SED leadership in Berlin, including the 
joint chairmen of the SED Otto Grotewohl and Wilhelm Pieck, its call 
for a separate state of Lusatia was rejected. The Sorbs were also denied 
recognition as a  ‘ nation ’ ( Volk ) by the SED and were described instead 
as a  ‘ part nation ’ ( Volksteil  ) because they did not fulfi l the require-
ment of economic independence according to the Stalinist defi ni-
tion of a nation contained in the theses of 1923. On the other hand, 
the meeting did give some support to Sorbian cultural interests. In 
March 1948 a law passed by the Saxon parliament granted the Sorbs 
a number of rights, such as the right to set up bilingual schools in 
areas designated as bilingual, and the right to use Sorbian in local 
administration. 
 In Lower Lusatia, where Germanization was much more advanced, 
the situation was very different. By 1945 Lower Sorbian was in the 
process of dying out as a living language, except in a few villages south 
of Cottbus. The SED, in particular Friedrich Ebert, their leader in 
Brandenburg, showed no interest in supporting Sorbian cultural 
interests. Here the activities of the National Committee, in particular 
their demands for the separation of Lusatia from Germany, caused 
damage. They helped make the German population very hostile to 
those Sorbs who supported the  Domowina , which was not allowed to 
operate there until January 1949. It was only after pressure from the 
Soviet authorities and the SED in Berlin that local SED functionaries 
reluctantly introduced measures to support Sorbian culture in Lower 
Lusatia. But those many Sorbs who preferred to use the older  German 
term  ‘ Wends ’ ( Wenden ) were suspicious of the links between Upper 
Lusatia and Czechoslovakia and, more widely, of the international 
activities of Sorbian institutions. Their weaker sense of ethnic identity 
had already led to greater integration with the German  population. 
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Furthermore, as Protestants the Lower Sorbs were (and still are) 
 suspicious of the strong position of the Catholic Church in Upper 
Sorbian villages. 
 There were close relations between Sorbian leaders and institu-
tions in Bautzen with Poland and Czechoslovakia but both countries 
had their own political and territorial preoccupations and this rap-
idly faded. By contrast, the Yugoslav military mission in Berlin contin-
ued to follow Sorbian activities with great interest. In August 1946, 
their representatives addressed the fi rst post-war meeting of Sorbian 
students, the  Schad ź owanka . The head of the mission, General Av š i č , 
then started a campaign to encourage Sorbian work brigades to come 
to Yugoslavia to work on projects like the building of the railway line 
between Br č ko and Bamovi ć i. The fi rst brigade, led by Jan Nali, left 
Bautzen in October 1946 and took part in the World Youth Congress 
in Belgrade and the World Student Congress in Zagreb. It was awarded 
various medals and prizes for its contribution to the work project and 
further visits were planned for 1947. These took place in the summer 
of 1947, during which the Sorbian Youth groups also participated in 
political activities. 
 Sorbian brigades were then invited to the next project in 1948, 
along with the youth wing of the SED, the Free German Youth ( Freie 
Deutsche Jugend /FDJ). The Sorbian youth organization,  ‘ Serbska 
m ł od ź ina , ’ led by the Sorbian writer Jurij Br ě zan, was still separate 
from the FDJ and was not a member of the international communist 
youth movement, the World Federation of Democratic Youth ( Welt-
bund der Demokratischen Jugend ). A group of Sorbian young people, 
organized by the  Serbska m ł od ź ina , left to work on the building of the 
Zagreb – Belgrade railway line in June 1948 and won the prize for the 
best foreign brigade. But the group was criticized by the Yugoslavs for 
concentrating too much on the Sorbian question and not displaying 
enough class consciousness. 8 The Yugoslavs also thought they were 
too preoccupied with ethnic identity and were not internationalist 
enough. 
 While the group was still in Yugoslavia the situation in Berlin 
changed dramatically. The tensions between the Soviet Union and 
the Western powers turned into a major crisis. Apart from the Soviet 
attempt to isolate West Berlin economically, the development that 
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immediately impacted on the Sorbian brigade was the currency 
reform: the creation of a separate West German Mark, followed 
almost immediately by the introduction of an East German Mark 
( Ostmark ), left it stranded without funds. As a result, the group had to 
be helped to get home by the Yugoslav authorities. 
 4 The Cominform Dispute and Surveillance 
 Soon afterwards the Cominform passed a resolution accusing Yugo-
slavia of harbouring an anti-Soviet attitude, of representing bourgeois 
nationalist positions and of betraying the international working-class 
movement. The resolution, which was the culmination of a series of 
arguments with the Soviet Union and was supported by most com-
munist parties of the eastern bloc, was followed by a wave of anti-Tito 
propaganda throughout Eastern Europe, a blockade of Yugoslavia 
from the middle of 1949 and a large number of arrests for  ‘ Titoist ’ 
activities. Another casualty of the sharpening tensions within the east-
ern bloc was the independent Sorbian youth organization, which in 
December 1948 was forced to merge with the FDJ. Up to the summer 
of 1949 Sorbian members of the FDJ still had bilingual membership 
cards and were allowed to wear a badge in the Sorbian national 
colours, blue-red-white, with the inscription  ‘ ł u ž ica ’ (Lusatia). But 
these marks of separateness were now abolished and Sorbian youth 
identity was totally swallowed up by the FDJ as part of the overall 
incorporation of Sorbian organizations into SED institutions. 
 While the fi rst Sorbian brigades were still in Yugoslavia, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia had retreated from their formal support for Sorbian 
demands for political autonomy, leaving their host government as the 
only  ‘ eastern bloc ’ country to support them. Yugoslav support had 
admittedly been fairly consistent since the end of the war, but now 
Tito ’ s main motive in presenting himself as a facilitator of Sorbian 
interests was really to use the Sorbian question in his growing disagree-
ment with Moscow. In December 1947 the  Domowina had praised 
Yugoslavia as a  ‘ land of peace and progress ’ ( Land des Friedens und 
Fortschritts ). 9 But the Cominform split transformed the context and 
led to the condemnation of Tito as a traitor, pursuing a personality 
cult and militarism. Then followed the trials of Hungarian  Minister of 
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the Interior, L á szl ó Rajk, and the Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister, 
Traicho Kostov, as well as the arrest of members of the Cominform. 
 The recent Sorbian links with Yugoslavia were now viewed with sus-
picion. Members of the returning Sorbian brigade (which had 
claimed, rather implausibly, that it had only heard of the Cominform 
resolution in Prague after it had left Yugoslavia) found themselves 
under political pressure and in January 1950 were forced to give back 
their medals  ‘ as a protest by Sorbian youth against the criminal poli-
cies of the Tito clique. ’ 10 Some of its members, like the leader Jan 
Nali, were accused of being agents of Yugoslavia and put on trial. 
In 1951 Jurij Rjen č , the Sorbian representative in Belgrade, was put 
on trial for treason and sentenced to 25 years ’ imprisonment. 11 
 From the end of 1951 to 1953 the  Domowina itself came under close 
surveillance by the SED, culminating in an investigation by the Cen-
tral Party Control Commission (ZPKK), which was responsible for 
party discipline. Erich Mielke, the deputy head of the state security 
organization ( Stasi ), had ordered regional offi ces in Dresden and 
Cottbus to monitor closely the activities of Sorbian leaders and insti-
tutions. 12 During an interrogation on 3 August 1953 by the ZPKK, 
Kurt  Krje ń c , a communist who had succeeded Nedo as head of the 
 Domowina in December 1950, was questioned about his colleagues 
and his own actions. The purpose of the investigation seems to have 
been to fi nd evidence of close links between certain members of the 
 Domowina and Czechoslovakia, in particular with the group, which 
had been put on trial in Czechoslovakia in November 1952 on the 
charge of being Zionist, nationalist traitors. Krje ń c was himself 
strongly criticized for his links with former SED members who had 
been recently purged, and for his submission of a map to the Polit-
buro, which had suggested the creation of a Lusatian district ( Bezirk ) 
after the forthcoming abolition of the eastern states ( L ä nder) in 1952. 
He was also accused of favouring the idea of a Sorbian Communist 
Party with membership books in Sorbian; all these charges Krje ń c 
vehemently denied. 13 It has to be remembered that Krje ń c was a loyal 
SED member who had been put in charge of the  Domowina in 1950 to 
keep an eye on Sorbian nationalist activities. It is therefore clear that 
at the very time when a series of measures were being put in place by 
the SED with the declared intention of putting Sorbian language and 
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culture on an equal basis with German in Lusatia, some in the inner 
circles of the party were treating all Sorbs, whether Communists or 
not, as potential enemies. They suspected  ‘ Sorbian nationalists ’ of 
maintaining close links with  ‘ reactionary ’ circles in Czechoslovakia 
and Poland following the failure of moves towards a separate Sorbian 
state. Even after the change in the leadership of the  Domowina the 
secret police complained that the proletarian group on the executive 
committee under Krje ń c was being overshadowed by bourgeois, 
nationalist Sorbs. In particular, they resented the active role of Church 
leaders, both Protestant and Catholic, in the running of the  Domowi-
na . 14 Above all, the secret police complained of its inability to main-
tain strict control of Sorbian-language publications. Since the central 
press censorship offi ce in Berlin was not in a position to exercise this 
control itself, it was forced to depend on the  Domowina , which it did 
not wholly trust. 15 
 The suspicion that Sorbian functionaries and institutions were 
engaged in anti-state activities deepened after the 1953 June upris-
ing. After the interrogation of Krje ń c in August 1953 the ZPKK fol-
lowed up its investigation of Sorbian institutions with further secret 
police raids on the offi ces of the  Domowina and the Institute for Sor-
bian Ethnic Research. They found copies of the maps and memo-
randa that had been used between 1945 and 1947 by the Lusatian 
National Council and the  Domowina to lobby the Allies in their 
autonomy campaign. The Control Commission was particularly sus-
picious of the memorandum which the Council had sent in January 
1946 to the foundation meeting of the United Nations in London, 
because it contained a map of Lusatia which extended beyond the 
Oder – Nei ß e frontier agreed at Potsdam. In a letter written to Her-
mann Matern, the Politburo member responsible for Party disci-
pline, the Commission made it clear that it was particularly suspicious 
of the Director of the Institute, Pawo ł Nowotny. They knew he had 
had contacts with the Polish secret police during the war, and they 
had always suspected the leadership of the  Domowina of putting Sor-
bian national interests before the building of socialism in the GDR. 16 
But, as the regime now made clear, the point of its  ‘ nationalities 
policy ’ was to give Sorbs more social equality, not national or ethnic 
rights. 
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 Suspicion continued through the 1950s and in 1955 – 56 even led to 
an active operation by the Ministry for State Security (MfS) to investi-
gate whether three leading Sorbs, Pawo ł Nowotny, the writer Jurij 
Br ě zan, and the former head of the  Domowina , Paul Nedo, had been 
involved in  ‘ anti-state activities. ’ Despite being very critical of their 
behaviour, the investigation came to the conclusion that it had not 
been treasonable, and active surveillance was terminated in 1956. 
 In the more liberal atmosphere that followed Khrushchev ’ s denun-
ciation of Stalin ’ s  ‘ mistakes ’ at the Twentieth Party Conference of the 
Soviet Communist Party (February 1956) the  Domowina attempted to 
enter into discussions with the Churches. They hoped to persuade 
them to soften their view of the  ‘ communist ’  Domowina and to chal-
lenge the opinion of the Catholic Church, in particular its view that 
only the Churches could lead the Sorbian people. Leaders of the 
 Domowina were also allowed to take up invitations to visit West 
 Germany and to attend congress in Austria. But the Hungarian revo-
lution of October 1956 brought this  ‘ liberal ’ period to an end. The 
latter part of the 1950s saw the fi nal split between the  Domowina and 
the Churches, the rejection by the government of any notion of a 
bilingual Lusatia and the intensifi cation of the collectivization of 
agriculture, which affected Sorbian farmers particularly badly. 
 The repression of those Sorbs who refused to accept the con-
straints of SED nationalities policy tended to be harshest at times of 
wider ideological and political tension. Thus in the period from 
1958 to 1960, when the SED was increasing the tempo of forced eco-
nomic and political change, as well as hardening its attitude towards 
the nationalities policy, there was an increase in the number of pros-
ecutions of individual Sorbs. An editor of the Sorbian newspaper 
 Nowa doba , Hinc  Š o ł ta, who had been under surveillance by the secret 
police since 1956, was regarded by the secret police as an enemy of 
socialism and suspected of using his position within the newspaper 
to produce a series of ambiguous reports. He was accused of having 
strong links with Polish and Hungarian reformers and dismissing 
the offi cial nationalities policy as no more than an instrument to 
further the interests of the SED. After arrest and interrogation, he 
was sentenced on 20 October 1958 to fourteen months ’ imprison-
ment. Although this persecution was perhaps more a result of  Š o ł ta ’ s 
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generally negative attitude towards political developments than his 
Sorbian identity, in the case of Pawo ł Nali the ethnic element was 
clearly crucial. Nali had been regarded with suspicion because of his 
support for a separate Sorbian state in the 1940s and because he had 
studied in Yugoslavia from 1948 to 1950. In the late 1950s he attracted 
the attention of the secret police because he spoke out publicly 
against the formation of agricultural co-operatives in Lusatia. He 
regarded the destruction of small Sorbian family farms as evidence of 
further repression of Sorbian culture. He also attacked the creation 
of the energy complex  ‘ Black Pump ’ ( Schwarze Pumpe) (see below) 
because he regarded it as part of an SED campaign to promote 
 Germanization. Last and not least, he was suspected of having links 
with the American secret service and RIAS, the American broadcast-
ing station. He was arrested on 14 July 1960 and in April 1961 was 
sentenced to three-and-a-half years ’ imprisonment. 
 After the political turbulence, which followed the building of the 
Berlin Wall in 1961 a more stable period began, although the SED 
became worried in the mid-1960s about the effect of the  ‘ Prague 
Spring ’ on the Sorbian intelligentsia. Between 1969 and 1972 the 
secret police carried out an active investigation of a number of lead-
ing Sorbian intellectuals, including Dr Jan Cy ž , the former chief 
administrative offi cer ( Landrat) of Bautzen, and Pawo ł Nowotny, the 
director of the Institute for Sorbian Ethnic Research. The authorities 
were aware of their critical attitude towards the Warsaw Pact invasion 
of Czechoslovakia and of their close links with Czech intellectuals. 
But they were unable to establish that a group hostile to the state had 
been formed in the Institute for Sorbian Ethnic Research, and the 
action was suspended. 
 5 Minority and International Politics 
 Both superpower relations and tensions within the eastern bloc 
were a major infl uence on the formulation and implementation of 
the GDR ’ s nationalities policy as well as on the careers of particular 
Sorbian leaders. It should be remembered that the international 
background of ethnic politics was one of unremitting tension, punc-
tuated by dramatic crises and only occasional moments of  relaxation. 
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The German – German border was the front line of the global con-
frontation, with the BRD and the GDR being incorporated into 
their respective military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Perhaps 
most importantly for the Sorbs, the course of the Cold War greatly 
affected the opportunities for Sorbian institutions to establish rela-
tions with parallel institutions outside the GDR. Whereas Sorbian 
institutions were used by the GDR to set up cultural links with Slav 
countries, especially with Poland and Czechoslovakia, the actual 
links between them and ethnic minorities in eastern bloc countries 
were restricted. One particular reason in the case of Slovakia, 
 Hungary and Rumania was the very different position of their 
respective ethnic minorities. Unlike the Sorbs, the Hungarian 
minorities in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, for example, did have a 
 ‘ kin-state, ’ which they could, at least in principle, look to for sup-
port. Similar situations existed in the relations between several 
other Eastern bloc countries and were a constant source of friction. 
The Sorbs were seen not so much as dangerous in themselves as for 
the destabilizing example they might set. As a result, open discus-
sion and the exchange of views between ethnic minorities in differ-
ent countries were restricted. 
 As for West Germany, contacts were complicated by the activities of 
German expellee groups there. The toleration of these groups by 
successive West German governments was regarded by the SED as 
evidence of West Germany ’ s desire to revise the frontier changes 
agreed at Potsdam and of its failure to come to terms with its national 
socialist past. The GDR, in contrast, wished to link its ideological 
claim that Leninist nationalities policy provided positive support for 
the minority with its  ‘ German claim ’ that it was dealing more effec-
tively with the legacy of National Socialism than its West German 
competitor. In any case, the actual links with the West were highly 
restricted. It was not until 1954 that the GDR government allowed 
two delegations from the Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein to 
visit Bautzen. An offi cial report commented that  ‘ both delegations 
studied with great amazement the democratic and cultural freedoms 
experienced by the Sorbian minority. ’ 17 In return, the  Domowina was 
allowed to accept an invitation in 1955 to take a delegation to 
 Flensburg to study the situation of the Danes. 
Ethnicity.indb   187 1/24/2012   6:59:51 PM
Ethnicity, Nationalism and the European Cold War188
 However, links with the Federal Union of European nationalities 
(FUEN), founded in 1949 and based in Flensburg, were strongly dis-
couraged and the  Domowina was not allowed to become a member. 
The secretary of the Union, Professor Skadegard, wrote to the  Domow-
ina in 1954 expressing interest in the bilingual school system in 
 Lusatia, but the  Domowina was not allowed to invite a delegation from 
the FUEN because the GDR government considered it to be under 
Western infl uence and supported fi nancially by the Americans. In 
the more liberal atmosphere of early 1956 the FUEN tried again but 
this time problems over the involvement of German expellee organi-
zations, to which the SED objected, complicated the issue. The 
department in the Central Committee responsible for foreign affairs 
sent a memo to the department responsible for the Sorbs noting that 
 ‘ the FUEV was an organisation which has close connections to the 
European movement (in particular to the Council of Europe) and 
was in general not kindly disposed towards the socialist states. It works 
closely together with West Germany and with the emigr é organisa-
tions based in West Germany. ’ 18 
 Although the  Domowina was then allowed to invite Professor Skade-
gard to Bautzen, it was told that there was no question of it joining 
the FUEN until the latter changed its attitude towards the GDR. 19 
When the FUEN then invited the  Domowina to attend the next FUEN 
congress in neutral Austria (Carinthia) in the summer of 1956 the 
Foreign Policy Department conceded that it would not be a bad idea 
for Krje ń c to attend. However, they insisted that if the German groups 
from the Sudetenland started agitating against Czechoslovakia, he 
had to leave immediately. Krje ń c then made a speech at the Congress 
criticizing the expellee groups and, according to his report, made 
little contact with most of the other groups attending. The only group 
that the  Domowina delegation met formally was the left-wing Carin-
thian Slovene group linked to the Yugoslav government (the  ‘ Demo-
cratic Front of Working People ’ ). 20 The events of October 1956 in 
Hungary put a stop to any further links with the FUEN and West Ger-
many. Professor Skadegard did manage one more visit to Bautzen in 
June 1959, but further contacts with the FUEN were blocked. 21 
 Visits to other NATO countries at the end of the 1950s were used 
primarily for undercover purposes. When a Welsh delegation consisting 
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of education offi cials visited Bautzen in April 1958, the secret police 
report revealed satisfaction at the positive reaction of the visitors to the 
bilingual school system, but they were kept under very strict control. 22 
In return, a Sorbian delegation, led by Wilhelm Koenen, the head of 
the National Front, and Krje ń c, was allowed to visit Wales in May 1959, 
but, if the secret police report is to be believed, the visit was primarily 
used to establish contact in London with left wing, pro-GDR Labour 
MPs like Ian Mikardo and Konni Zilliacus. 23 
 Nevertheless, there were some interesting visits in the 1960s. One 
came in October 1966 when for the fi rst time since 1948 a  Domowina 
delegation was fi nally allowed to visit Yugoslavia. But overall in the 
mid- to late-1960s, external relations were negatively infl uenced by 
the growing unease of the GDR government at developments in 
Czechoslovakia. In February 1967 Klaus Sorgenicht, the offi cial 
responsible for the  Domowina in the Central Committee, wrote a 
memorandum to his counterpart in the Politburo, Hermann Axen, 
titled  ‘ External relations of the Domowina, ’ which shows how suscep-
tible the activities of the  Domowina were to the regime ’ s foreign policy 
concerns. It starts by saying that the  Domowina should not be allowed 
to widen its contacts with foreign countries. Contacts with Poland 
could be continued, but only as long as they were under strict politi-
cal control. Contacts with Czechoslovakia should be curtailed and the 
Domowina should only be allowed to have contact with the Museum 
in Prague, which exhibited material about the Sorbs. There were to 
be no further contacts with Yugoslavia or with Switzerland (which 
Krje ń c had also visited in 1966). The same applied to the FUEN. 24 
These restrictions stayed in place into the 1970s, although the situa-
tion became more fl exible after the GDR signed the Helsinki Final 
Act in 1975. 
 6 Culture and Economic Development 
 The restrictions on the  Domowina ’ s external relations in both Western 
and Eastern Europe were in contrast with the growing cultural auton-
omy it was granted within the GDR. Between 1950 and 1958, in par-
ticular, the SED took the ethnic concerns of the Sorbs seriously, 
seeking to import Leninist nationalities policy and create the cultural 
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institutions and bilingual schools that were central to it. But, at the 
same time, it emphatically asserted the primacy of socialist recon-
struction: the collectivization of agriculture, the nationalization of 
the economy and the domination by the SED of all institutions 
(except the churches). The main fi gure in Sorbian affairs during this 
period was the SED Politburo member, Fred Oel ß ner, who was 
responsible for policy towards the Sorbs until he was thrown out of 
the Politburo by Ulbricht in February 1958. Oel ß ner developed the 
policy of a bilingual Lusatia, while at the same time coming down 
hard on what he saw as Sorbian chauvinism, which was seen as under-
mining the political and economic policy of the SED. Under his 
supervision, new structures were introduced along the lines of  ‘ dem-
ocratic centralism ’ and in 1952 the  Domowina recognized the leading 
role of the SED, along with other non-SED institutions. The role 
assigned to the  Domowina was a dual one: the SED saw its role primar-
ily as winning over the Sorbian population to the socialist reconstruc-
tion of the GDR, especially in the areas of industrialization and the 
collectivization of agriculture. But although Oel ß ner was responsible 
for the policy towards the Sorbs, his emphasis on Lusatia becoming 
bilingual also assigned to the  Domowina the role of principal sup-
porter of Sorbian cultural interests. 
 Parallel to this two-pronged policy was economic development, in 
the form of a massive expansion of lignite mining and the creation of 
large power stations, notably the  ‘ Black Pump ’ ( Schwarze Pumpe) near 
Hoyerswerda. Lignite was the only major energy resource in the GDR, 
and from 1955 the state sought to exploit its resources in central Lusa-
tia, a predominantly Sorbian area, which had the highest grade of the 
fuel. Many Sorbs found work in the new plant, but the majority of the 
workforce was recruited from other parts of the GDR. This meant an 
infl ux of German workers whose children then went to bilingual 
schools. These workers, including SED functionaries, objected to their 
children being forced to learn Sorbian in school and started to write 
protest letters to the SED leadership. There were attempts at the plant 
to provide outlets for the Sorbian language, but these also met opposi-
tion from the German workforce and the SED leadership in the plant. 
No brigades (the main labour unit in GDR factories and cooperative 
farms) were formed from Sorbs, which had been a major demand of 
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the  Domowina . As a result, almost inevitably, German became the lan-
guage of the workplace. Hoyerswerda, the nearest town, which up to 
the mid-1950s had a population of 7,700, (one thousand of whom 
were Sorbs), grew rapidly. By the 1980s, it had become an exclusively 
German town with a population of over 70,000. 
 The rapid expansion of opencast mining was followed in the 1960s 
by the building of several more power stations in central Lusatia. In 
these later projects, no attempt was made at all to support Sorbian 
language and culture or to avoid the destruction of Sorbian villages. 
Only in the 1970s and 1980s did some muted criticism of this policy 
become possible, expressed primarily in the literary works of writers, 
such as Jurij Koch ( Die Landvermesser , 1977) and Kito Lorenc ( Flurb-
ereinigung , 1972). By the end of the 1980s, over 70 villages had been 
destroyed completely and the populations resettled in towns such as 
Cottbus and Wei ß wasser. 25 
 The other side of assimilation was the collectivization of agricul-
ture. Ever since it was fi rst announced by the SED in 1952, the policy 
was strongly resisted by the Sorbs because the family farm was the 
only unit where Sorbian was predominantly spoken. The SED did not 
allow the formation of Sorbian cooperatives and where the Sorbs pre-
dominated in a particular agricultural cooperative ( Landwirtschaftli-
che Produktionsgenossenschaft /LPG) they either appointed German 
managers, who banned the use of Sorbian in their presence, or they 
amalgamated the LPG with one that had a higher proportion of 
 Germans. As a result, the Sorbs lost the only workplace area where 
Sorbian was still the main language. The collectivization process was 
intensifi ed in 1958 when the SED proclaimed the goal of complete 
collectivization, although it did make an exception for Church-owned 
farms, one of which was in the Sorbian area. 
 In this period the alienation between ordinary Sorbs and the 
 Domowina reached its lowest point. When the latter was forced to help 
persuade reluctant Sorbian farmers to accept collectivization, many 
turned to the Churches for support. As the  Domowina was also pre-
vented from criticizing the SED ’ s industrialization policy, it ceased to 
exist at all as a viable organization and it lost its position as the main 
representative of Sorbian cultural interests. It had to accept its social 
and political role as the transmitter of SED policy to the Sorbs and 
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was seen as having betrayed Sorbian interests. Although it did recover 
some members in the 1970s and 1980s as it attempted to resume its 
role as a defender of Sorbian cultural interests for as long as the GDR 
lasted, it was never able to escape from its image as the  ‘ red  Domowina . ’ 
Part of the  Domowina ’ s attempt to rehabilitate itself in the late 1980s 
was to resume a dialogue with the Churches, which had effectively 
ended in the mid-1950s. Many Church members had left the 
 Domowina . So had a number of priests with offi cial functions in it, 
who openly preached against socialist measures like collectivization, 
especially in the Catholic areas to the north-west of Bautzen where 
language usage was strongest. 
 7 Conclusion 
 Between 1958 and 1971, the SED successfully asserted the primacy of 
Communist goals over the concerns of ethnic politics. This became 
clear as the original nationalities policy, which had supported Sor-
bian cultural interests (within the limits of Leninist doctrine), was 
progressively undermined by state repression. After 1958, the slogan, 
 ‘ Lusatia will become bilingual ’ was declared to be false, Oel ß ner was 
removed by Ulbricht from the Politburo, and Sorbian interests within 
the political system were now represented by a functionary of the 
Ministry of the Interior. The demotion of any consideration of Sor-
bian interests could hardly have been made clearer. The  Domowina 
was told to concentrate on its political duty to build socialism and on 
its social roles. Attempts to support Sorbian linguistic and cultural 
interests were denounced as  ‘ nationalism. ’ 
 In the 1960s, several measures in educational policy undermined 
the position of Sorbian in schools. In 1962 the use of Sorbian in  ‘ A 
schools, ’ i.e., those in which Sorbian was the mother tongue of most 
pupils and where most subjects had been taught in Sorbian, was 
restricted. Henceforth, all scientifi c or technical subjects were to be 
taught in German, and Sorbian was to be restricted to the humanities. 
In 1964 it was decreed that in the  ‘ B schools ’ where Sorbian was the 
second language of most pupils (including a number of German 
pupils) Sorbian would be optional for both Sorbian and German 
pupils. In any case, the implementation of the policy had varied widely 
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between different areas: in some, such as the district of Bautzen, 
 Sorbian had been compulsory for both Sorbian and German pupils, 
while in others there had been little pressure on German pupils. The 
result of the 1962 measure was a massive drop in the number of pupils 
taking Sorbian, from 12,800 in 1962 to 3,200 in 1964. By the end of 
the 1960s the number had fallen to under 3,000, although it did rise 
again to over 6,000 by the 1980s. While the number of pupils being 
taught in Sorbian in the  ‘ A schools ’ remained fairly constant, the main 
drop was in the  ‘ B schools. ’ 26 By the time Erich Honecker became 
head of the SED in 1971, policy towards the Sorbs had degenerated 
into the hollow repetition of political slogans. 
 In conclusion, the history of the Sorbian minority during the Cold 
War clearly points up the tension between international, national and 
local ethnic politics, which in this case led to the almost complete 
subjugation of local interests to national and international interests. 
Despite the introduction of a network of cultural institutions, the end 
result was accelerated assimilation. Admittedly in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, the SED, under pressure from the Soviet administration, 
did at fi rst embark on a policy of support for Sorbian culture and 
 language through the creation of a network of Sorbian cultural insti-
tutions. Support also came from neighbouring Slav countries until 
1948, especially from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. But with the 
Sovietization of the GDR in the 1950s and the impact of the Cold War, 
any emphasis on Sorbian cultural interests came to be denounced as 
 ‘ nationalism ’ or even  ‘ Titoism. ’ Ethnic politics became subordinated 
to national and international politics, and Sorbian leaders had little 
choice but to accept this, or face the consequences. 
 In the sense that they consistently emphasized the primacy of social-
ist politics, the SED was therefore responsible for overseeing the con-
tinuing Germanization of the Sorbian population. Between 1945 and 
1990 the Sorbian-speaking population was roughly halved. This 
decline was not refl ected in the offi cial fi gure of 100,000, which the 
SED used right up to 1989. (It declined to publish Ernst Tschernik ’ s 
demographic survey of 1955 – 56 because it already showed a decline 
to about 80,000). 27 But this assimilation can also be seen as the almost 
inevitable result of the  ‘ modernization ’ of the economy and social 
structures, in particular the move from a predominantly rural to an 
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urban or semi-urban population. Though the broad phenomenon of 
assimilation was in that sense separate from the nature of the regime, 
the way it was imposed by the state and the brutality with which its 
consequences were  ‘ managed ’ , cannot be separated from the national 
and international politics of the GDR. 
 The strength of the GDR state and the ideological commitment of 
its leaders meant that in the end Sorbian leaders were powerless to 
counteract these trends. The  Domowina succumbed to the pressures 
of national policy and the policy requirements of the SED. Although 
the Sorbs benefi ted from Soviet and SED support in institutional 
terms, their ethnic aspirations were always subordinated to the politi-
cal and economic aims of the SED. The Cold War constrained the 
external activities of the  Domowina , especially those which affected, or 
could be seen as affecting the German – German confl ict. The only 
structures that were able to provide the minority with signifi cant sup-
port were the Churches, in particular the Catholic Church. At grass-
roots level, where a Sorbian identity was equated with the Catholic 
religion, Sorbian identity could still be cultivated. By the same token, 
the political structures, which marginalized religion, were rejected by 
an overwhelming majority of Sorbs. 
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 Conclusion 
 What light do these six cases shed on the role played by ethnic politics 
and ethnic nationalism in the Cold War? How should they be viewed 
in relation to the very different concerns which seemed to dominate 
those four decades: the geopolitical and military struggle between the 
two nuclear superpowers: the ideological and  philosophical argu-
ments between communism and parliamentary democracy, and the 
economic beauty contest between centralized planning and the 
 market? Given the particularities of ethnic politics and the protean 
nature of ethnicity itself, there can be no single or straightforward or 
simple answer, but these fi ve concluding points, however tentative, 
may be made: 
 First, ethnic identities were more than just tools in the hands of 
Cold warriors, ethnic or ethno-national resentments and fears not 
merely resources that could be turned on or off at will by policymak-
ers. Even in communist regimes there was something like a semi- 
public sphere, where attitudes or mentalities were expressed, which 
might be at odds with the party line but which its leadership could not 
simply ignore. As Martin Mevius shows for Hungary, the party ’ s rank-
and-fi le, far from being just a transmission belt, was deeply enough 
embedded in society to share many popular prejudices. Similarly, the 
contempt for the Sorb minority culture displayed by some SED offi -
cials differed little from the broader attitudes in the rest of East Ger-
man society, much of which was still marked by Nazi teachings of racial 
superiority. And Yugoslavia ’ s claims towards Italy (and to a lesser 
extent southern Austria) at least in part came from a fear of being 
outfl anked by the Slovene communists ’ liberal and conservative ene-
mies who nurtured similar projects of territorial expansion. 
 Second, at the East – West border (Hungary/Austria, Trieste, Bul-
garia/Turkey) the Cold War added an international and ideological 
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twist to the dynamic of what Rogers Brubaker labelled the  ‘ nationalising 
triad. ’ 1 In its  ‘ classic ’ form that developed as a minority on the  ‘ wrong ’ 
side of the state, border became the object of deep suspicion by the 
power-holders and subject to increasingly coercive assimilationist 
( ‘ nationalising ’ ) pressures. The repression often alienated and radi-
calized a section of the minority ’ s elites, leading them to turn to the 
neighbouring  ‘ kin-state ’ and often to irredentism; in a self-fulfi lling 
prophecy the radicalization of the minority was seen as confi rmation 
of its treasonable intent and thus provided a further impetus for the 
state ’ s repression. Where state border became the Cold War borders 
the stigma of national disloyalty was deepened by the perception that 
the minority was part of an overwhelmingly anti-national force, of 
international communism or capitalism. In the case of the communist 
rulers of Bulgaria, ethnic insecurity and collective memories rein-
forced an underlying sense of their own weak legitimacy. 
 Third, in contrast to these fears and the collective memory of the 
manipulation of ethnic identities by Nazi foreign policy, ethnic issues 
and grievances were used surprisingly rarely to subvert states. Yugo-
slavia may be the (partial) exception, which proves the rule, in the 
sense that its support for communist Macedonian guerillas was part 
of Tito ’ s ambitious project for a Yugoslav-led Balkan federation. But 
its claims against Austria and Italy were more limited, refl ecting as 
they did, the euphoria following victory over the Germans and their 
collaborators in the  ‘ National Liberation War ’ rather than ambitions 
to transform the neighboring country. Where instrumentalization 
was perhaps most evident was in propaganda: in a positive sense, 
Communist governments sought to demonstrate the superior virtues 
of Leninist nationality policies, including the fostering of minority 
cultures; this resulted in the concession of what were  – on paper  – 
quite far-reaching autonomy regimes (for example, by Romania ’ s 
Hungarians and Bulgaria ’ s Turks). The negative side was the attacks 
on Western mistreatment of minorities, in which the attention was 
less on the ethnic minorities of Western Europe than the segregation 
of the U.S. South, as a symptom of Western racialism and imperial-
ism. Molotov ’ s use of the issue to counter American criticism of Soviet 
repression in Eastern Europe was described by the U.S. Secretary of 
State James Byrnes as  ‘ a checkmate of the fi rst order. ’ 2 
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 Fourth, for ethnic minorities and the  ‘ ethnic entrepreneurs ’  seeking 
to mobilize them, the Cold War could be as much an opportunity as 
much as a constraint. South Tyrol experienced this early on when 
in 1946 it was treated by the West not, as might have been expected, as 
a German minority which had supported National Socialism but as an 
Austrian minority. The fear of the spread of communism (whether to 
Italy or Austria), made an agreement over its cultural identity a con-
cern for Western governments. More broadly, the language of the 
Cold War could be adapted to the needs of ethnic politics. Part of the 
Italian-language press in Trieste transported its racialized understand-
ing of Italian superiority and Italy ’ s civilizing mission as a defense 
against  ‘ Slavo-communist barbarism. ’ Some newspapers saw Slavs as 
innately lazy and passive and hence predisposed to accept commu-
nism. In a similar way, Hans Steinacher spoke in Austria of a  ‘ Slavic – -
bolshevik ’ bloc threatening Southern Austria and the whole Western 
world. Steinacher, who had served the Third Reich from the Sudeten-
land to the Arctic, now saw an affi nity between the attempts by Slo-
vene leaders in Carinthia to resist Germanization and the way the 
Bolshevik minority exercised power in the Soviet Union: in both cases 
a minority was seeking to impose itself on a majority. 3 Consciously or 
not, this reduction of democracy to the will of the majority echoed 
President Truman doctrine ’ s warning of the dangers of  ‘ armed minor-
ities ’ imposing themselves on freedom-loving societies. 
 Fifth, there were clear limits to the readiness of states on both sides 
of the Iron Curtain to exploit ethnic fi ssures. Even before the sup-
pression of the Hungarian revolution, the West made surprisingly 
little attempt to exploit the plentiful ethnic grievances in communist 
societies. However, as G ü nther Pallaver shows for South Tyrol Soviet 
foreign policy was not prepared to back ethnic nationalists where 
they were close to the extreme right. The wider Soviet concern was to 
get the post-war territorial  status quo established at the end of the war, 
signed and sealed by the West. Whether this amounted to a kind of 
tacit agreement to keep ethnic genie in its bottle is debatable, but it 
does at least suggest that the Cold War was rather less than a total 
confrontation in which, as Tony Shaw puts it,  ‘ virtually everything, 
from sport to ballet to comic books and space travel ’ was used as  ‘ a 
weapon both to shape opinion at home and to subvert societies 
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abroad. ’ 4 And it may even allow us to see at part of the Cold War more 
positively, not just as the statist straightjacket imposed on expressions 
of ethnic authenticity (as argued by Guy H é raud and to an extent 
Anthony Smith) but as a stabilizing system which helped make 
Europe ’ s post-war decades appear, in Ian Kershaw ’ s words,  ‘ unbeliev-
ably benign. ’ 5 
 Notes 
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